ECHOES OF THE WAR

Otago Witness, Issue 3526, 11 October 1921, Page 17

ECHOES OF THE WAR

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. LONDON, 0 ctober 4. The letters of Mr T. £. Page, exUnited States Ambassador to Italy-, which are being published in his “World's Work.” reveal an attempt by the United States in May-, 1914, to prevent the war. Mi Page in August, 1913, wrote to Colonel House, who had the close confidence of ex-President Wilson, suggesting that the la lid-stealing business should be ended for ever, and that Europe should be invited to co-operate in cleaning up the backward lands of Africa and elsewhere. After Mr Churchill’s “naval holiday” speech, Colonel House wrote to Mr Page saving that he (Colonel House) was going to see the Kaiser in the spring and try to win him over to the thought which was uppermost with the English Government, and that of the LTnited States. When Colonel House arrived all the German leaders ex eept Admiral von Tirpitz gave the proposals a respectful but cynical hearing. Admiral von Tirpitz was openly hostile, denouncing England. When Colonel House spoke to the Kaiser lie found the Kaiser obsessed by the “ Yellow Peril.” The Kaiser said there could be no question of disarmament while this danger to civilisation existed. Mr Burton Hendrick, who compiled iris life letters, says that the Kaiser walked with Colonel House on the terrace at Potsdam for half an hour, while the German generals stood at a respectful distance. Apart from the “ Yellow Peril,” the Kaiser was alarmed about Russia. He spoke contemptuously of France and Britain as enemies, but the size of Russia exposed the eastern frontier of Germany, and appalled him. He discussed with derision Air Bryan's Arbitration Treaty-. It is curious to recall that if the Kaiser had accepted it the United States

would not have been able to enter the war until April, 1918, and Great Britain might have been starved into surrender, while Germany might have wished Europe with her armies.

THE MOBILISATION ORDER. PARIS, October o. The Matin publishes an interview with Herr Steiner, the Austrian sociologist, an intimate friend of the late Field-marshal Von Aloltke, who was Chief of the German General Staff. Deferring to Field marshal Yon Moltke’s memoirs on the origin of the war, Herr Steiner said that Yon Moltke. on returning to Berlin after the ultimatum was presented to Serbia, found that the plans of the German General Staff were practically unchanged since they- had been drawn up by- Yon Schieffen and Von Moltke on July 50. He asked the ex-Kaiser to sign tile mobilisation order, but Wilhelm satisfied himself with pronouncing a threat. Von Moltke returned to the palace on the following afternoon. The ex-Kaiser was denouncing his Chief of Staff’s plan, and said that he had received better news from England. He added that England would not only remain neutral, but would prevent France from participating in a war. "In these circumstances,” said W ilhelm, “ the logical plan was to throw all Germany's forces against Russia. ’ Von Moltke had no faith in the news from England, and as lie held a mobilisation order which had in the meantime been signed by- the ex-Kaiser, he withdrew at the first opportunity, but was overtaken and asked to return to the palace. He handed the order, however, to an aide-de-camp, and told him to order the advance of the troops. V ilhelm showed Von Moltke a telegram from England, from which it appeared certain that England and E ranee would be neutral. The ex-Kaiser remarked: 'We must countermand your order to advance.” Von Moltke refused. Then the ex-Kaiser sent an order to headquarters for the army to stop one hour’s march from the Franco Belgian frontier. The ex-Kaiser summoned Von Moltke at 10 o’clock the same evening. Wilhelm said that he had received fresh news, and added: “ Now, do as you wish.” W ar started the following morning. MARSHAL VON LUDENDORIF’S VIEWS. PARIS, October 6. Marsha i von Ludendorff, interviewed, said that it was quite possible to establish a- lasting agreement between Germany and France, on condition that the two nations came to an arrangement. This would be as much in the interests of Germany- as of 1 ranee. French policy- since the war had strengthened the German conviction that Fiance was determined to crush Germany completely. This explained the ever-growing animosity of a large number of Germans towards France. This animosity- would disappear the moment that the French Government resolved to modify the policy which it had directed against Germany-. “FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS.” LONDON, October 4. The Daily Express states that Mr Churchill's speech, in which lie suggested that Great Britain should be forgiven her debts if she forgave her debtors, precipitated a demand by- the United States for the repayment of the war debt amounting to £972,000,000, of which three years’ interest is due, and the whole of the principal is due on demand. The DailyExpress states that Air Churchill's remark produced a considerable storm in American newspapers which asserted that it was the beginning of a movement by which Great Britain may- avoid payment altogether. “The City of London,” remarks the Daily- Express, “regards with dismay any suggestion that the country should shirk its financial liabilities. We have £128,000,000 in gold which could be shipped to the United States. It is of no value here and it would be better, therefore, if the gold were shipped. FUNDING OF ALLIED WAR DEBT. LONDON, October 5. Inquiries in the best financial circles prove the report that America is demanding the immediate repayment of £1,000,000,000 war debt is without foundation. Direct evidence to the contrary is found in a Washington despatch, which states that Mr Harding intends to request tile early- consideration and the prompt passage of a measure providing for the funding of the Allied debts. The Washington correspondent, however, qualifies his statement by commenting that the present- temper of Congress, particularly the Senate, makes its passage very dubious indeed, no matter how strongly the President mav urge it.