PATER’S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3524, 27 September 1921, Page 55

PATER’S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

THE PASSCHENDAELE INFERNO. , I propose to give a composite picture of | the Passchendaele battle, for it is so tedious and difficult to a cleai a*r | running narrative in a few lines oi so intricate and confusing a story ot men up to their middle and horses up to then bellies in a pea soup consistency. .Men and horses were tired and tagged with their exertions. Hut in spite of t lei losses the horses were flogged by tneir masters as long as there was an inch ot go left in them; and the flogging was as , hard on the men as on the horses, tor j what can be more pitiful than to have j horses with eyes as pitiful as those oi the , men flogging them? To make matters j worse, there was the enemy barrage and | our own at times in confusion. hat a hell it must have been. We read that I in this battle, and it will do to precede j and succeed the Passchendaele inferno; “Tile state of the ground, as a result of the heavy weather and persistent shelling, was daily becoming worse, and was to prove a terrible handicap in regard both to our preparations and the attack itself. At many points the losses were severe.’ But worse : “The obscurity which temporarily prevailed, as a result of the unsatisfactory issue of the attack on October 9. and the absence of any definite information on the situation until 3 p.m. on the day following, afforded New Zealand Headquarters Division but limited time which to decide on the tape-line for the attack on the 12th; for the drafting and issuing of orders; for the commanders concerned to make the necessary vital preparations; and for artillery barrage tables to be formulated. There were other

stupendous difficulties which the brevity of the warning seriously accentuated.” Passing over the three objectives to be captured and consolidated by (aj Second Battalion of Otago: (b) First Battalion of Otago; (c) First Battalion of Canterbury; with one company of the Second Battalion attached. Passing over these three objectives, and looking at the picture of the ruins of Yyres—as a view of what the guns were doing—and it stands for a good deal of the Passchendaele hell, we lead of the sending forward of 12 machine gnus —have you ever imagined them in action pumping streams of lead to assist in consolidating the final objective? Prepared -and issued almost on the eve of the attack—these were the disposition of the Second Brigade for an action which, as a review of the situation will disclose, was already fore-doomed to failure. Have you realised what that means? Try to till it hurts ’. The next page tells of “that redoubtable fellow, Sergeant Travers. No Man’s Land was a mass of shell holes three parts filled with water, and scattered among them were broken wire entanglements. Overlooking this waste, and commanding approximately 1000 yards of the valley and the country as far back as Korek. were many concrte ‘pill-boxes,’ or block houses, hemmed in bv wire. At las! six of these were discovered along the front of the Battalion sector, four in fronl of Bth Company and two in front of 14tl Company.” 'Picture these spraying the N ew Zealanders ! “The New Zealand Field Artillerx arrived in the Yyres zone. . . . whet the whole of the area taken over at St Julien was first to be water-logged, and ii a general condition of wreckage. ' “The divisional artilleiy took part h the attack on October 4th. and when th infantry were relieved continued in Hue Orders were then issued for a readjust merit of artillery groups, but in attempt ing to move forward many of the gun were stranded. . . . Artillery sup pi, could be maintained only by pack-mules and stranded guns were hauled off th road and got into action where they were. “But the divisional artillery action wn equally unsuccessful. The roads wei submerged in mud and strewn with th wreckage of transport and the multilate bodies of men and horses, the result of th shelling of the previous night.” These were some of the desperate cot ditions against which the artillery ha to contend. “The result was that onl a proportion of the guns were in positio for the attack fixed for the 12th, and tho; that were got up in face of stnpendoi dillh ulties sank down to their axles in media Lely they began to fire, or before i Adequate support from (he artillery, f vital to the assaulting infantry, was i consequence not forthcoming.” Further on we read that “tlrn Battalions were thus assembled across r area which was approximately only 1( yards in depth, creating serious thou.: unavoidable congestion.” These da; and nights were faced But how? Further on we read, and how mm easier it is to read hv a comfortable fi than to experience the following

“Throughout the night of the llth-12t.i the enemy frequently shelled the division on our light, using many gas-shells. The task of getting into position of assembly, in face of darkness and over ground thae was sodden and yielding and literally torn with shell-holes, and then lying overnight in what was for the most part a morass, combined with a certain knowledge of the great difficulties of the task ahead, presaged a bad start for an attack at daybreak. “The inadequacy of our artillery barrage, by* reason of the conditions explained, was at once apparent, and its inaccuracy was responsible for wiping out many of our men while still in their assembly positions. On the left, for j example, a number of men of 10th Company of the Ist Battalion were killed by our own shell-fire when 100 yards behind the starting tape. This, combined with the inevitable confusion created, prejudiced the success of the operation from the outset.” Our men to be Tilled bv our own men ! I wonder whv they did not become demented. ‘Concrete block houses and deep rows of uncut wire, from the security of which German machine gunners delivered a .terrific volume of fire, confronted our infantry as they moved | forward to the assault. The enemy was | only too well prepared for an attack in ! which the elements and the deadly inj efficiencies of the supporting artillery con- ; spired to help him. At the moment the attack was launched the enemy dropped an artillery barrage along a line about 50 yards on the western side of tlie Ravebeck and in the vicinity of Waterloo Farm. Simultaneously, from the block houses and fortified shell-holes on the crest of Bellevue, there burst forth the most intense machine gun and rifle fire. This piece deals with artillery barrage, “pill boxes,” and men hemmed in by barbed-wire entanglements, and one -wonders what they were, whether they were men or demi-gods. How they came throw.-]] I cannot imagine. This is a chapter of horrors. And to think that we have men in our midst who went through it! This was a fearful battle, and while we are horrified at the battle and wonder when war will cease, we cannot but remember tiled this war has ended, and that we have won. But how much has it cost us ? And now I have not touched upon what I ret out to write. To think that men should have to face this in the twentieth centurv of civilisation! How much longer will God permit it? I have forgotten that I am reviewing a book on the war. If you have any relative who was in the war see lhat von get a copv of “The Otago Regiment, N.Z.F..F. Egypt, Gallipoli, Trance, j Tlanders, 1914-1918.” j By the by, what does the Maori I “kia mate toa,” and “kia ake kaha” (twe phrases) mean? The first page is a study.