PATER’S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3487, 11 January 1921, Page 55

PATER’S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

‘ THE CRISIS OF THE NAVAL WAR.'’ This is the title of our Governor - General's latest book. It is dedicated ‘to the Officers and Men of our Convoy Escort, Control, and Minesweeping Vessels and their Comrades of the Mercan tile Marine, by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and unflinching endurance the submarine danger was defeated.” Rather a long dedication, but the men deserve every word of it, and more. We have men in our midst who threw up employment, but because they were working under men whose patriotism was only lip-service, when they returned, because of the overlooking of a simple oversight or two, their services were ignored. We have a curious way of wriggling through our wars. Archibald Hurd, in “The British Fleet in the Great War,” published in 1919, says in one of his chapters we were “saved by our navy, built under the influence of panics,” of which he mentions six, and it was mainly by the genius of Lord Fisher and M‘Kenna that we were prepared for the Great War. But I promised a chat upon the “Admiral of the Fleet,” Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa’s book, and not on Hurd’s. At the outset, I must express my regret that the layman—look up the dictionary for that word—should have to wade through so much uninteresting routine to get the really interesting kernel of the book. Perhaps our Governor-General will hand his book over to a practised journalist and get its essential parts made into a book for Juvenile Navy Leaguers, for Navy Leaguers are to become the intelligent voters of the future. He tells us in his Introduction that it had been his intention to have published it, as a companion, with his former volume, but that this proposal was pre vented by his departure on a naval mission early in 1919, which postponed his finishing touches until his return. And if the fleet was the result of a series of panics, didn’t we leave too much to chance ? The Germans left nothing to chance. How then did we win? Mainly because they measured us by their own yard measure, and thought we should come to heel as their own docile subjects. We had not been militarised enough, thanks be, for their purpose; but for goodness sake don’t let that excuse stand in the future. We must trust in Providence, and keep our powder dry. We made rash promises of what we would do for the widows and children; promised that we would do this, that, and the other thing. But have we kept our promises? Hardly We must remember that democracy is coming into its own. But before its time? That remains to be seen; but we do know that a democracy puts off until to-morrow what it should take in hand to-day. And this difference between British democracy and the discipline of the German nation accounts for the great commercial success of the Germans. We do not occupy the great lead commercially and educationally we did, for the last 30 years have seen Germany go ahead by leaps and bounds. Take her imports and her exports in 1890, and Britain’s, and in 1900 and 1910 and make a comparison. But I must allow Lord Jellicoe to speak. “This second volume,” he says, “dealing with the defeat of the enemy’s submarine campaign, the greatest peril which ever threatened the population of this country, as well as of the whole Empire, may not he unwelcome as a statement of facts.” The statement of facts may not be welcome, but Khope that it will teach us a lesson. Otago, through its Navy League, so well organised by its late secretary, Mr Charles Darling, now living in retirement as a result of his too strenuous life, if the organisation is efficiently kept up, will do its duty, but what of the rest of the Empire. Will the Empire, as a whole, learn the lesson Lord Jellicoe would teach us, and as Mt Hurd asks us to see “behind the gallant troops the shadowy forms of the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines of the supreme British Fleet? . . . shall we translate our impressions into co-ordinate actions? A VIVID PICTURE. There is one long paragraph in Lord Jellicoe’s book, a portion of which I shall reproduce. It reads like a dream of impossibilities translated into cold facts: “Who, for instance, would have ever had the temerity to predict that the navy, confronted by the second greatest naval power in the world, would be called upon to maintain free communications across the Channel for many months, until the months became years, in face of the naval forces of the enemy established on the Belgian coast, passing millions of men across in safetv. as well as quantities of stores and munitions? Who would have prophesied that the navy would have to safeguard the passage ’of hundreds of thousands from the Dominion to Europe, as well as the movements of tens of thousands of labourers from China and elsewhere? Or who, moreover, would have been believed had he stated that tin; navy would be required to keep open the sea communications of huge armies in Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and East Africa, against attack by surface vessels, submarines, and mines, whilst at the same time protecting the merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and neutral powers against similar perils, and assisting to ensure the safety of the troops of the United States when they, in due cour hroi g! ! across the Atlantic? Compare the. e varied tasks with the comparatively modmi duties which in prewar times were generally assigned to the navy.” Most of this extract T gave last week, but it will bear repeating. This is in connection with adverse criticisms often well enough meaning, hut passed with insufficient knowledge of the problems often enough never foreseen. Wc ttust learn to put our trust in leaders

who have made a special study of the problems. “Wisdom distilled from events which were unforeseeable should find expression not in criticisms of those who did their duty to the best of their ability, but in the taking of wise precautions for the future?” I take exception to this. We know that men have, been placed by influence into positions of great trust and have been kept there; and we know, too, that men have been broken —that is, ruined, because politicians have muddled things, and men have been broken, though they were good -men, because it was easier to blame them unjustly than the politicians over them. We have had that in the war. We may say -with Lord Jellicoe that “every operation by sea, as well as by land, was carried out under the mere protecting shield of the Fleet, which the enemy could not face.” MEN FRANKLY PRAISED. Every here and there we are faced with the fact that we were in a tight place, and that it was only the initiative of our men afloat, backed up by our men ashore and well versed in naval matters, that we could find a way through the submarine piracy with which the Germans were degraded. It was a case of win by fair means if possible, but if not possible by civilised means then foul means were to be used without compunction. We have a saying that “everything is fair in love and war.” The Germans have taught us that in war the drowning of people not connected with war is allowable; but we should say it is fiendish. But I must cry Halt ! All’s well that ends well ! The war has ended now over a year ago, and is being forgotten except in families, unfortunately too many, who have suffered. But it is being forgotten in an impersonal way. Our GovernorGeneral says that his book contains “the only record likely to be available in the near future of the work of fighting the submarines in 1917.” But he also writes: “The writing of this book appeared to be the only way in which I could show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and devotion to duty of the Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious, and audacious schemes developed and carried through for the destruction of submarines and the safeguarding of ocean-borne trade, and of the skilful organisation which brought into being and managed with such success that great network of convoys by which the sen communications of the Allies were kept open. The volume shows how the officers who accompanied me . . . with the necessary and valuable assistance of our comrades of the Mercantile Marine, gradually produced the measures by which the Sea Service conquered the gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire.” Can we recognise the full significance of the words: “The gravest danger which has _ ever faced the Empire?” Try to realise what the words mean and act accordingly.