PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3443, 9 March 1920, Page 62

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

LORD FISHER AND THE DARDANELLES. In a previous Chat I have, told you what Lord Fisher's scheme was, and now I'll add a Chat upon how he came to giving a seeming consent to being diverted from his objective. On page 81 we get the following : "10th Meeting of War Council, Janruary 28, 1915, at 6.30 p.m. : The plan of a naval attack on Zeebrugge was abandoned, and the Dardanelles operations decided upon. [You will remember Zeebrugge was a . part of the greater scheme Fisher had in his mind, but accompanied by a supporting land force.] "11th Meeting of War Council, February 9, 1915: Mr Churchill reported that the naval attack on the Dardanelles would take place on February 15. £This was afterwards postponed until February 19.] "12th Meeting of War Council, February 16, 1915: Agreed that the 29th. Division should be sent to the Dardanelles, and other arrangements made to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles.

"The Admiralty .were pressed to build or obtain special craft for landing 50,000 men wherever a landing might be required. "13th Meeting of War Council, February 19, 1915: Transports ordered to be got ready:—{l) To convey troops from Egypt to the Dardanelles: '(2) To convey the 29th Division from England to the Dardanelles, but no final decision to be taken as to 29th Division.

"14th Meeting of War Council, February 24, 1915: General Birdwood selected to join Admiral Carden before the Dardanelles. The decision as to sending 29th Division postponed. .

"15th Meeting of War Council, February 26th, 1915: Mr Churchill said he could not offer any assurance of success in the Dardanelles attack.

"16th Meeting of War Council, March 3, 1915 : The future of Constantinople was discussed, and what should be the next step after the Dardanelles. Lord Lansdowne and Mr Bonar Law, besides. Mr Balfour, were present. "17th Meeting of War Council, March 10, 1915: The War Office was directed to prepare a memorandum on the strategical advantage of Alexandretta. "18 th Meeting of War Council, March 19, 1915 : The sinking of the -battleships Irresistible, Ocean, Bouvet, the running ashore of the Gautois, and the disablement of Inflexible were discussed. . . . Lord Fisher said it was impossible to explain away the sinking of four battleships. He had always said that a loss of 12 battleships must be expected before the Dardanelles could be forced by the navy alone. He still adhered to that view.

"19th Meeting of War Council, May 14, 1919: Mr Churchill reported that one, or perhaps two, German submarines had arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that the attack on the Dardanelles had now become primarily a military rather than a naval operation." Elsewhere the War Council of January 28 is more fully referred to under the heading "The Dardanelles," and I'll quote most of this to show that Lord Fisher was opposed to the scheme all along. Before this meeting Mr Asquith had discussed with Mr Churchill and Lord Fisher the proposed Dardanelles operations, and at the meeting the following took place :

"Mr Churchill asked if the War Council attached importance to the proposed Dardanelles operations, which undoubtedly involved risks. "Lord Fisher said he understood that this question was not to be raised at this meeting. The Prime Minister knew his (Lord Fisher's) views on the subject. "The Prime Minister said that, in view of what had already been done, the question could not be left in abeyance.

[Note.—Thereupon Lord Fisher left the Council Table. He was followed by Lord Kitchener, who asked him what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied to Lord Kitchener that he would not return to the Council table, and would resign his office as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener then pointed out to Lord Fisher that he (Lord Fisher) was the only dissentient, and that the Dardanelles opperations had been decided upon by the Prime Minister; and he urged on Lord Fisher that his duty to his country was to go on carrying out the duties of First Sea Lord. After further talk Lord Fisher reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener and went back to the Council table. Lord Fisher elsewhere .emphasises that it would be unseemly and improper for him to have an alteration with the Government head. Silence or resignation was the right course."

■nJ £ a 4 been decided to recall the Queen Lhzabeth. Mr CbuxchiU stated that if it had been known three months ago that an army of 80,000 to 100,000 men would now be available for the attack on the Dardanelles the naval attack would never have been undertaken. Lord Fisher reminded the War Council that he had been no party to the Dardanelles operations. When the matter was first under consideration he had stated his opinion to the Prime Minister at a private interview. Conclusion.—Lord Kitchener to send a" telegram to Sir lan Hamilton asking what military force he would require to ensure success at the Dardanelles.

Note.—-On the evening of this day, Mr Churchill drafted orders for further naval reinforcements for the Dardanelles, a course to which Lord Fisher could not assent. (This led to Lord Fisher leaving the Admiralty.) The parting of Lord Fisher "with Mr Churchill was pathetic, but it was the only way out." Differences between Lord Fisher and the War Council had. taken place before, but the doughty Naval Lord sank his differences because he thought it was "of vital importance to the nation to carry out the large building programme initiated by him, which was to enable the navy to deal a decisive blow in the decisive theatre (in Northern waters) as would shorten the war. ..."

Lord Fisher January 28, 1915. As it was, there was "great delay in the completion of the five fast battle cruisers, and in the laying down of further destroyers and submarines, and, in fact, four large monitors .... and the further building of fast battle cruisers waa given up." He had also prepared a design for a very fast battle cruiser carrying six 20in guns, and the model was completed.

That he was right has been proved by subsequent events. Major-General Sir Charles W. Caldwell, in' the Nineteenth Century for last March, speaking of the Dardanelles adventure, says; "The whole thing was a mistake, quite apart from the disastrous influence which the premature and unsuccessful operations exerted over the subsequent land campaign." Again, General Sir Charles Munro, Commander-in-Chief in India, recommended the immediate evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, an opinion Lord Kitchener himself backed up eventually. Again, Marshal Liman von Sanders said i "The attack on the Straits by the navy alone I don't think could ever have succeeded. I proposed to flood the Straits with mines, and it was my view that these were the main defences of the Dardanelles, and that the function of the guns was simply to protect the minefields from interference." That it would have been difficult to silence the fixed and the moving batteries and at the same time to sweep up the mines, is shown by the fact that, after the Armistice, it took the British admiral, assisted by the Turks, many weeks to clear a way through the mines for/his take him to Constantinople. - v '

Why was Lord Fisher allowed to leave the _ Admiralty? Was he too strongwilled? Had he too much initiative? His scheme was a sound one as far as can be judged. Was it a case of a military man, Lord Kitchener, clashing with an equally strongly-willed naval man, and the -politicians were browbeaten by Kitchener ?