PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3352, 12 June 1918, Page 57

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

THE GERMAN ADVANDK

Last week I made a slight reference to the recent German drive. Let me recapitulate and add a few words.

Get a map out, though most maps published were not in anticipation of a burst through in lower latitudes, so do not take in the Marne. The best for general use just now, and if one does not wish to spend much —I have been extravagant enough to purchase a. score or more, —is "The Times War fc Atlas and Gazeteer" (about 3s 6d), and Nelson's " Map. Book of the World-wide War," containing 55 maps, published a year or two ago at 7d net—probably Is now. The former has a name index, and the latter a diary up to the Italian declaration of Avar; again, the former has a colour scheme which shows aproximate heights.

For my present purpose, take Nelson's, because on pages 22 and 23 we have from Lerobery in the east to Havre in the west, and from Berne in the south to north of Copenhagen. This general survey brings in Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Brest Litovsk, etc., in the east, and acting reallv as ganglia, for the surrounding areas, and Lille, Paris, etc., as corresponding nerve centres in the west. On contemplating these two continuous maps one is struck with the immunity from attack by aerial or sea power that Berlin and Vienna possess, and how in the present war these are centres from which interior lines of communication radiate with safety from attack, though M. Cheradame thinks that, if wo had kept the Pan-Gei*man objective in view, Budapest would have proved the weak joint in the armour of the Continental Powers.

Now, having taken a bird's-eye view, look at a smaller area. And this can be well done by taking pages 4 and 5 in The Times Atlas, for here we get from Verdun in the eaet, with Metz and Nancy just over the border of the map,

to Amiens nnd Paris in the west, and south to the Seine, with a full view of the basins of the Marne, Oise, and the Aisne, with their tributaries. As the Germans have crossed the Ourcq and the Marne (the former a tributary), we see that two trunk lines of railways running east from Paris have been severed, the former passing through Rheims, the latter passing by Chateau Thierry through Epernay and Chalons-s-Marne, and both, though the latter by a more circuitous route, connecting up with Verdun. So Rheims is now isolated, and can await Gorman's convenience, and the latter can be reached by rail only by a long roundabout way: further, troops in the intervening area are, it seems to me, in danger. Most of the important names in the Witness last week and this will be found on these two pages. THE OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFENSIVE. Let me repeat and emphasise and add a little to point* I mentioned last week. 1. Neither side could take the offensive and make any appreciable advance before the ground had dried up, and fairly good means of communication had been made. Remember that it is impossible for an army in modern times to advance very far before consolidating and bringing up fresh supplies. In a modern battle, involving (a) such large numbers, (b) such immense quantities of munitions in these days of rapid firing, (c) such distances, and (d) such large commissariat stores and ambulance and other transport, it is impossible to advance very far without a ..slackening down., so do not put me down as unpatriotic or pessimistic when I say that the present slowing down or stoppage is due as much to the German foresight not to overrun themselves and lay themselves open to attack by becoming disorganised or getting out of touch of supplies as to any pressure the Allies have put upon them. There has been a danger of a flank attack on the right aa they have advanced, but this appears to have been # guarded against by moving also in a south-west direction, and then by lining up facing west, as they penetrated .south, thus protecting themselves and indirectly reaching out to one of their objectives. % 2. The Germane have been close student* of military history, and as it has been eaid that Prussia's only industry is making war, the War Staff is bettor educated in what they have to do and better organised than we are. And here let mo tell of an incident. A friend of mine was travelling in Germany a year or two before the Avar, and got into conversation with a well-educated lady who could make herself understood in English. My friend eaid to her that it 'was a pity that we could not both disarm. " But," was her reply, " what would our fathers and brothers and relations do if here were no soldiering?" There the true Prussian spirit unconsciously came out. 3. Germany has the inner lines 'of communication, and since 1870-71 have had definite aims in view, and have built strategical railways to further those aims. Theie inner lines are ungetatable. 4. In the Austrian war and the FrancoGerman war the War Staff always aimed at having a preponderating force at the point of attack. Anyone with common sense can see the reason for this. Further, the Germans find the weakest point and attack before any reserve force can come up; and when tiievhave gone as it has been humanly possible to go without useless loss they dig in j consequently, I think Ave have been overestimating the losses they have uffered. In the present case, for instance .ve admit our lines were'thinly held, which case we could not inflict so i loss on the enemy in proportion to tne numbers engaged as we must have suffered ourselves —again in proportion to numbers engaged. 5. We seem to be trusting too much to reserves, which cannot get up with supplies—and they are comparatively nothing without supplies—in time to check a forward move or to stop it until it has lost momentum. It seems to me that reserves simply stop a second advance in the same place, in which case another avalanche is prepared to fall upon another point to repeat the process. Probably the Allied reserves are in insufficient numbers. 6. The Germans generally act on the offensive, and having big projects in hand, do not bother with raids to the extent we do, and do not mind our having minor .successes as long as these do not upset their yplans for major successes, tactical or strategical. The offensive may mean great initial loss of life, but may be economic of life in the long run.

7. The present war—from a German point of view, of course —justifies an autocracy, because an autocracy thinks ahead —in Prussia's case two or three generations. —and its plans are not liable to modification by the whim of a people or of politicians depending upon the will of an unthinking mass. An autocracy has an undivided absolute command to carry out its deeply-laid plans. Consequently, whenever possible, a - military autocracy is always ready for the offensive, and that being so, chooses. what it thinks is the time most favourable to itself to pick a quarrel with its neighbours, especially if the neighbours are democracies whom they can catch unprepared.

8. This should have come after 6. It anoears to me that we really have insufficient reserves. We are doing our best to tide over the crisis, which will last until the Americans come in in sufficient numbers to turn the scale. If we had had larce reserves I think we, should have taken the offensive on the same principle as the Germans have adopted—attacking in the weakest part, and using reserves to drive the attack home until enemy accumulating forces check a further advance : and then repeat the process elsewhere.