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IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

THE HIGHER COMMANDS. EXPLANATION BY MR LLOYD GEORGE. THE CRISIS OVER. (By Cable). There was much excitement in the House of Commons on the 19th in expectation of a clearing-up of the Sir William Robertson mystery. Mr Lloyd George's cold, however, made it impossible for him to attend. Sir J. H. Dalziel asked whether Sir William Robertson had been offered and accepted an important military post. Mr Bonar Law replied: " Yes ; he has accepted the Eastern command, which was offered to him to-day." Mr Hogge intervened: " Why not command of the Boy Scouts?" Mr Bonar Law added that the Prime Minister would make a full statement next day, and the House would have am opportunity for discussion. The House of Commons was crowded when Mr Lloyd George made his promised statement regarding General Roberteon. The Prime Minister followed his notes closely. The House seemed to generally accept his vindication of the Versailles changes. Mr Asquith's opening phrases showed that he had no intention of moving a vote of 90 confidence. Mr Chamberlain heartily approved of Mr Lloyd George's statement, though the rest of the debate was sharply critical, particularly in connection with the Northcliffe and other newspaper attacks. upon Lord Jellicoe and General Robertson. There was a similar debate in the House of Lords, where Lord Curzon said Sir Douglas Haig was still in full control of his own troops. The only difference was that the Supreme Council would have certain* troops &% its disposal, which it could add to Sir D. Haig's forces or send elsewhere according to the needs of the moment. THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH. Mr Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons on the recent army changes, said that the retention of Sir William Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff had latterly been incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that the Allies had suffered in the past through lack of concerted, co-ordinated efforts. If the policy decided upon at the Allied Council at Versailles was right, no personalities, however valuable, important, or distinguished, should stand in the way of its execution. —(Cheers.) If that policy was wrong, .no personalities and no'Governments ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated. The Prime Minister emphasised that there was absolutely no difference between our policy and the policy of France, Italy, and the United States in this respect. That policy was based on the assumption that the Allies, had hitherto suffered through LACK OF CO-ORDINATED EFFORT, and our. purpose and policy had been to get concentration and unity of effort. It was only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly the same set of circumstances, inevitably diminishing our power of concentration which would otherwise have been possible. In order to counteract the efforts of the Germans and of the Russian collapse it was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority to exercise discretion over the allied war policy; and that authority must be interallied, and must have executive power. The only difference of opinion was over how that authority should be constituted, but agreement on this point had also been reached.

The Prime Minister then proceeded to mention several proposals which were considered and rejected at Versailles. One was that the central authority should be composed of the chiefs of' staff, but this idea was unworkable. It was felt that the new body must not only know the conditions of its own armies and its own fronts, but all the conditions on all the fronts and in all the armies. Versailles was now the .repository of such information, which was co-ordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information. The Prime Minister proceeded to adduce cogent reasons why the chiefs of staffs in the various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. The Supreme Council, for these reasons, had unanimously rejected this proposal. The delegations then separated and considered the matter independently, with the most remarkable result that next morning each delegation submitted EXACTLY THE SAME PROPOSAL —namely, the proposal which now held the field. He would have liked to read to the House the document wherein the American delegation cogently put the case for the proposal which was finally carried : but he could not, because it was mixed up with the plan of operations. The Americans presented their case with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours of discussion, in which there was not a single dissentient, so far as the plan was concerned. " Sir Douglas Haig," continued the Prime Minister, " called attention to a weak point or two, and. we undertook to remedy them ; but these were not points affecting the root proposal." Upon returning hero he reported to Cabinet that he thought Ike plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Armv Council made certain criticisms from the constitutional viewpoint. The Prime Minister said h» considered these carefully with Lor-J Derby, who throughout had put Six Wili'am Robertson's case before Cabinet. The Prime Minister emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should receive the wholehearted support of all British and French military authorities,

and especially that Sir D. Haig should be satisfied. Therefore, before the agreements were made, he had the matter over with Sir D. Haig, who said he would work under the new arrangement. This arrangement was that the British permament military adviser on the Council of Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should constantly communicate with the Chief of Staff, and should be ABSOLUTELY FREE IN THE ADVICE he gave. The Chief of Staff would have the same powers as his predecessors and as Sir William Robertson, and would remain the supreme military adviser to the British Government. He' would accompany Ministers to the meetings of _ the Supreme War Council as their adviser, and would have the right to visit France and consult with the military representatives there. Our representative at Versailles must have the most perfect freedom to discuss and recommend plans. If the Commander-in-Chief did not approve of them, or if there was a difference of opinion among the various representatives, then the Government would decide. There was no derogation of authority by the Government. The Chief of Staff would be chief adviser to the Government in the event of any such difference of opinion. It was only after the Government had decided to offer Sir William Robertson the position of British representative at Versailles that the Prime Minister realised that SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON OBJECTED on military grounds to the system which the Versailles Council had decided unanimously to adopt. Sir William Robertson suggested that our representative at Versailles should be made a deputy of the Chief of Staff; but the Government rejected this suggestion because the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make the British representative inferior to the other members of the Versailles Council. A Voice: "What about General Foch?" The Prime Minister pointed out that General Foch waj within 25 minutes of Versailles, and could be consulted in the event of an emergency. The Prime Minister reiterated that the Government most deeply 'regretted that it had been obliged to proceed without Sir William Robertson. It was a choice between carrying out THE UNANIMOUS POLICY formulated by the military advisers of the Allies and of retaining the services of a most distinguished and very valued public servant. He (Sir William Robertson) was paid the fullest consideration, but, in view of the magnitude of the policy, the Government was bound to stand by the arrangement with our Allies. Mr Lloyd George dwelt on the natural difficulties in securing military unity of the Allies. Some thought the new arrangement would secure political unity, but the prime need was unity of the, armies. The Government proposed to invite suggestions from the highest military authorities as regards the best means of removing the anxiety felt lest the new scheme should impair the. efficiency of. our army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the new scheme. National feeling, historical tradition, and suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also difficulties due to professional conservatism. He pleaded for MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, which were the very soul of victory. Mr Lloyd George further said: "We discussed and rediscussed this plan, in order that our whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break the most terrible foe that civilisation was ever confronted with. Wo are faced with terrible realities. The enemy have rejected our most moderate terms, which the whole of civilisation accepted as reasonable. Why have the enemy rejected them? Because they are clearly convinced .✓that the Russian collapse will give them power to achieve a military victory and impose Prus3ianism forcibly on Europe." The Prime Minister begged the House to turn down all controversy and close their ranks.—(Loud cheers.) If the House disapproved of the Versailles policy, let members put in a Government who would refuse to accept that policy—but it must be another Government.—(Cheers.) The Government was entitled to know, and to know that very night, whether the House -and the nation wished to proceed with a policy deliberately settled with a view to organising our forces. We must advance on the foe. In conclusion, he said: " I have endeavoured to discharge the terrible functions of my position to the utmost capacity of my strength.— (Cheers.) If the House to-night repudiates that policy, for which I am responsible, and on which I believe the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but one regret—that I nave not had greater strength and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest hour of her history."—(Loud and prolonged cheers.) MR ASQUITH'S SPEECH. Mr Asquith paid a tribute to General Robertson's great example. He said he could not help wishing that Mr Lloyd George's speech had been made a week ago, when the Prime Minister refused to define the functions of the Versailles Council. He added: "For asking this information I was assailed as a pacifist and even a 8010 in disguise. Such was the fashion of some important and widely circulated newspapers now conducted under the auspices of those who since last week had- become custodians of the propaganda. It was understood last week that the changes at Versailles had the full assent and approval of all the Government's military advisers. 'We now know this was -untrue as regards General Robertson."

Mr Lloyd George interposed: "I thought the Government nad then met all purely constitutional difficulties, and that there

was nothing else left. It was only afterwards that I found General Robertson regarded the matter differently." Mr Asquith : Is it not a fact that General Robertson intimated on Monday, the list inst., that he could not possibly assent to the proposal? Mr Lloyd George : No. Mr Asquith: And is it not a fact that General Wilson had been already sent for to succeed him ? Mr 'Lloyd George: The proposal was made only on Saturday, when Sir Douglas Haig came over. It surprised me when resistance developed on the ground of policy. Mr Asquith pointed out that the United States was refraining from political participation, though military representatives were partaking in the council. Mr Asquith said that while the scheme aimed at securing unity of control among the Allies we were near sacrificing unity of control in the British area. This was a question of efficiency, upon which soldiers were better judges than politicians. The Government had now taken the responsibility of disregarding the greatest strategic and technical authorities. There was some disquiet in the public mind owing to the forced retirement of Admiral Jellicoe by a virulent and unscrupulous press campaign. It was scarcely an adequate compensation that Lord Derby remains at Whitehall and Lord Beaverbrook is entrusted with propaganda work. Mr Lloyd George admitted that the Versailles War Council possessed executive powers. LORD DERBY. In the House of Lords Lord Derby, Secretary for War, strongly supported the Versailles Conference, which, he said, had already achieved excellent results. He had done his utmost to induce Sir William Robertson to accept the Versailles scheme. Lord Derby added that he (Lord Derby) had tendered his own resignation, but Mr Lloyd George had asked him to remain at Whitehall. In the House of Commons, Major David Davies demanded that Lord Derby be removed from his office as Secretary for War, he having played the fool in the crisis of the past three months in failing to stop the press campaign against generals at a time when they ought to be collaborating to their utmost capacity upon schemes of defence. The debate was adjourned. Lord Derby denies that he has resigned. The Manchester Guardian says that it is now probable that Lord Derby will persist in his resignation of the Secretaryship of War, and it is likely that Mr Llo<George will assume the duties of War Minister temporarily. NEW APPOINTMENTS. General Sir Henry Rawlinson (who has for long been in command of one of the British armies in France) has been appointed the British representative on the Versailles War Council. Sir William Robertson has accepted the Eastern home commands PRESS OPINIONS. The French press cordially approves of General Wilson's appointment, which it considers will help to increase the authority and co-operation of the Allied Council. The Daily Telegraph's parliamentary correspondent says that symptoms of a crisis have vanished. The Unionist War Committee met privately, ■ and endorsed the Government's policy.' The committee heartily concurred with Mr Chamberlain's declaration that the Government must sever all connection with press influence, and must itself govern. Strong representations to this effect have been made to Mr ■ Lloyd George privatelv by his most ardent Unionist supporters. Mr Chamberlain said that half of Mr Lloyd George's troubles arose from the fact that the Government was associated with certain newspaper proprietors, thereby surrounding itself with suspicion and distrust. Punch publishes a cartoon which represente Mr Punch saying to John Bull: " Don't worry about Russia. What we've got to worry about is this cursed backstairs intrigue in press and "Parliament." The New York Times states that Mr Lloyd George's explanation entitles him to the Parliament's and the country's confidence. The overthrow of the Ministry would be regarded with apprehension in America. "He has won our confidence because of his intellectual force, power of organisation, and definite war policy." THE MORNING POST PROSECUTION. Mr Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post, and Colonel Repington have each been fined £IOO and cosfcs for evading censorship of an article contributed by the latter on the Versailles decisions. In the Morning Post prosecution defending counsel protested against the Crown basing its case on the publication of Colonel Repington's article without permission, whereas the Crown should have tried to prove that the article assisted the enemy. Counsel argued that there was no proof of the article damaging the national interests. He added that no patriotic editor would ignore the censor's warning if convinced that national interests were likely to be injured, but Mr Gwynne, the editor, considered it a patriotic duty to inform the public what was happening at the Versailles Council. Counsel submitted extracts from German newspapers to show that the enemy were aware of the Versailles decision respecting reserves. Notice of appeal was given. The Morning Post does not believe the public yet realises the army's position. This is not surprising, because any newspaper to explain it. is rigorously treated. "jßut may not the public," asks the Post, "look to'the House of Commons for the truth?" It had swapped horses in the biggest crisis of the war when the stream was at its deepest and the night at its darkest.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/OW19180227.2.45

Bibliographic details

Otago Witness, Issue 3337, 27 February 1918, Page 21

Word Count
2,626

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. Otago Witness, Issue 3337, 27 February 1918, Page 21

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. Otago Witness, Issue 3337, 27 February 1918, Page 21