THE SOMME BATTLES.

Otago Witness, Issue 3277, 3 January 1917, Page 16

THE SOMME BATTLES.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S REVIEW. ASCENDING OF ALLIES. (By Cable.) LONDON, December 29. Sir D. Haig's despatch occupies 16 pases of the Gazette. It covers from May 19 to November 12. All the Allies agreed to the principal offensive campaign in the Bummer of 1916. " Finally, in view of the Austro-German offensive at Verdun jmd in Italy and Russia, General Joffre and I agreed that the combined FrancoBritish offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June. The enemy's Sositio i consisted of several lines of deep trencke , and the wire entanglements were sometimes 40 yards broad, and built of iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire as thick as a man's finger. There were numerous woods and villages with deep cellars, while quarries provided cover for machine guns and trench mortars. " Preparations for the attack commenced on June 24. Gas was discharged in 40 places over a frontage of 16 miles, and the infantry carrier! out 70 raids. The attack on July 1, from Maricourt to Serre, was entrusted to General Rawlinson. The Fourth Army, with five army corps of General Allenby's army, carried out a subsidiary attack at Gommccourt. As the result of the day's operations I decided to press on a front extending from the junction with the French to a point half-way between La Boiselle and ContalHiaison. "In order that General Rawlinson might be free to concentrate his attention on the front where the attack was being pushed home, I placed the operations from La Boiselle to Serre under General Hubert Gough, who was given two cf the northern corps from General Rawlinson's army." I instructed General Gough to press steadily on and act as a pivot on which our line could swing as the attacks upon his right progressed northward. He emphasises three main phases of the battle : Firstly, the considerable confusion and disorganisation in the enemy's ranks caused by our attacks at the beginning of July.

Secondly, the operations of July 7-14, ■which gave us command of the southern crest of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Razentin-le-Petit, with the subsequent prolonged struggle for mastery, in which, though progress was slow and difficult, the confidence of the men in their

ability to win was never shaken (by September 1 they had established a fighting superiority which has left its mark on the enemy). Thirdly, the phase in which we pushed down the slopes of the ridge and extended our flanks from Morval to Thiepval. We commenced our attack on the second system of defences on July 14. There is strong evidence that the enemy forces had been severely shaken by the repeated Anglo-French successes, but the great strength and depth of the German defences secured them sufficient time to bring fresh troops. The vigour and- determination with which our troops fought up to July 14 awakened in the enemy a fuller realisation of their danger. They hurried up numerous fresh divisions and more guns; but POINT AFTER POINT WAS TAKEN, and in the great majoritv of cases their frequent counter-attacks failed completely, with heavy loss. Describing the operations round Pozieres, Sir Douglas Haig says : The Fourth Army on July 23 advanced on a wide front from Guillemont to Pozieres, and found the enemy in great strength all along the line, with machine guns and some troops thrown forward in shell holes well ahead of the main defences. It was evident that the enemy had recovered from their previous confusion. •' Our assault was delivered simultaneously on July 23 by General Gough's army operating against Po/.icrcs. By the morning of July 25 the whole village was carried, including the cemetery. IMPORTANT PROGRESS WAS MADE along the enemy trenches to the north-east, but by August 7 it beoame evident that Guillemont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy losses.

Accordingly arrangements were made by the French army for a series of combined attacks by progressive stages, including Maurepas, Fallemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuz'e Wood, and Ginchy. Apart from these major operations there was

FIERCE AND OBSTINATE FIGHTING on other fronts, and the British lines were pushed forward wherever possible by means of local attacks, bombing, and sapping. Our line was thus brought to the crest of the ridge above Martinpuich, Pozieres Windmill, and the high ground north of that village. At a later date we reached the defences of Mouquet Farm. The fierceness of the fighting is shown by the fact that one regiment of German Guards acting in reserve opposing Mouquet Farm lost 1400 men in 15 days. When the weak salient in the allied lino

finally disappeared on September 9 it was evident that our new armies were not only able to rush the enemy's strongest defences, but to wear down and break the German power of resistance by

STEADY, RELENTLESS PRESSUREThe enemy knew our attack was coming, but considered the troops already on the spot, aided by their apparently impregnable defences, would suffice. General Gor.gh's army before Thiepval was now advancing by methodical progression, in which great skill, patience, and endurance were displayed. It acted most successfully as a pivot to the remainder of the attack. There was now no need to incur heavier casualties in an attempt to rush the Thiepval defences, though undoubtedly they could be rushed when the time came. As a result of the fighting of September 15 and the following days, our gain was considerably greater than any that had attended our arms in the course of a single operation since the commencement of our offensive. During A SINGLE DAY'S FIGHTING we broke through two enemy main defensive systems and advanced to a depth of a mile on a front of six miles, capturing three large villages. This was all accomplished at the cost of small casualties in comparison with the number of troops employed. Preparations for further attacks were hindered by bad weather, but Morval, Les Boeufs, and Gueudecourt were assaulted on September 25, and a belt of country about 1000 yards deep, curving round from the north of Flers to a point midway between Flers and Martinpuich. The whole of our objectives were taken by nightfall, except Gueudecourt and Combles, which were taken on September 26 in inexpensive fashion. Gueudecourt was taken the same day, after its protecting trenches to the westward had been captured in interesting fashion. They were taken early in the morning. We started down portion of the trench, firing machine guns, followed by bombers. The enemy were unable to escape, as we held the southern end of the trench. At the same time our aeroplanes flew the length of the trench, firing their machine guns. The enemy waved handkerchiefs, and when THETR SURRENDER WAS REPORTED our infantry accepted the surrender of the Gueudecourt garrison, comprising 370 prisoners, apart from a great number killed. Our casualties were- only five. This success of the Fourth Army enabled me later to assault Thiepval. Unfortunately, the unfavourable weather interfered with our advance in the direction of Le Translov and Bapaume. There was constant rain in October and November, which turned our hastily-dug trenches into

CHANNELS OF DEEP MUD. The country roads were broken by countless shell craters, and were almost impassable, making the supply of stores and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that I found it impossible to exploit the situation with the rapidity necessary for us to reap the full benefits of the advantages we had gained. The delay gave the enemy time to reorganise and rally their troops.

THE GERMAN RESISTANCE again became stubborn, and they seized every available opportunity to counter-at-tack, and the trenches changed hands with great rapidity. The condition of the ground made it difficult to renew our supply of bombs and ammunition and consolidate the ground won. The weather improved on November 9, becoming dry and cold, with frosty nights and misty mornings. Final preparations were made to attack the Ancre line at Beaucourt and Beaumont-Hamel. Realising their clanger, the enemy multiplied their guns and introduced additional divisions between Grandcourt and Hebuterne. Our attack was delivered in dense fog on November 13, and

ACHIEVED REMARKABLE SUCCESS in view of its Vapidity of execution and the lightness of the cost. Fourteen hundred prisoners were captured. St. Pierro and Divion were taken by a single division at the cost of 600 casualties From May to November the rolo of the other British armies to beyond Ypres was necessarily secondary. Their task was to keep the'enemy CONSTANTLY ON THE ALERT. This entailed heavy work on the part of the troops and constant vigilance on the

I part of their commanders, but it was ; carried out unfailingly in a spirit of unselfish, broad-minded devotion to the general good. During the four and a-half months from July 1 no fewer than 360 raids were carried out, in which the enemy suffered many casualties and hundreds of prisoners were taken. During the battle of the Somme A STEADY DETERIORATION in the morale of the large numbers of the enemy's troops was apparent. Many of them fought with the greatest determination, but the resistance of larger numbers became later decidedly feebler than early in the battle. The great depth of their defences and the frequent reliefs which | their resources in men enabled the enemy to effect, together with their discipline and j training, held " the machine" together sufficiently to enable the enemy to rally and reorganise their troops after each defeat. When the weather unfortunately broke, there is no doubt that the enemy's power of resistance was very seriously [ diminished. I Our results were achieved by troops the vast majority of whom gained their first experience of war in the Somme battle. We were conqjelled to use hastily-trained and inexperienced officers and men, or we would have failed our allies. All difficulties and hardships were cheerfully overcome. The endurance, determination, and invincible courage displayed can hardly be imagined by those who ha/ve not had personal experience of the Somme battle. It is impossible to particularise units, brigades, or divisions without giving information to the enemy. It must suffice to say that the troops from every part of the British Isles and every dominion and quarter of the Empire—Regulars, Territorials, men of the new armies —bore a share. All have DONE THEIR DUTY NOBLY. The enemy's employment of gas and liquid flame necessitated our devising similar instruments. The great fertility of invention shown by our chemists, physiologists, and physicists of highest raiik, who have devoted their energy to the task, enabled us to SURPASS THE ENEMY in their use of these means of warfare, which took the civilised world by surprise. j The enemy suffered heavy casualties from? ' our gas attacks. j The gallantry and devotion of the medical service were shown by the large number of Royal Army Medical Corps men and men of the Medical Corps of the dominions who have fallen in the field. The health of the troops has been most ! satisfactory. There was an almost complete absence of wastage duo to diseases o. ? a preventible nature. The responsibility of the Somme battle I was entrusted to Generals Rawlinson and Gough. For five months they controlled | operations in one of the greatest struggles | that has ever taken place. Their thorough knowledge of their profession, their 'cool, sound judgment in attack, and their ' determination proved equal to every call upon them. | Sir Douglas Haig explains why our offensive was so long delayed—namely, because of the necessity for great numbers of men and munitions, also because of the fact that a large proportion of our officers and men were far from being fully trained. j For these reasons, continues the despatch, I the longer the delay the better, but the reports of the German attack on Verdun and the Austrian offensive in the Trentino ' gave evidence that i THE STRAIN ON OUR ALLIES might become too great to be borne unless timely relief action were taken. The despatch gives details of the stupendous preparations on the Somme, including the accumulation of vast stores of all kinds near the front; the construction of new railways of different gauges; the gun equipment, the trench tramways, dugouts for ammunition, food, water, and engineering material and stores ; the miles of deep communication trenches; also, numerous well borings were sunk, and 120 miles of water mains were laid. Sir Douglas Haip: defines the threefold object of the offensive • First, to relieve Verdun.

Second, to assist the Allies in other theatres by stopping a further transference of enemy troops from the west front. Third, to wear down the strength of the enemy. He claims that all three objectives of the battle were achieved, and that while any one of these results would in itself have justified the battle of the Somme, the ATTAINMENT OF ALL THREE amply compensates for ihe sacrifices to

ourselvcs«and our allies, bringing us a long way towards final victory, lie says that the fact of the strength of the enemy in November on the western front being greater than in -July, despite their aban-. donment of their Verdun offensive, justifies the first two claims. Regarding the third, he admits that any statement by him must depend to some degree on estimates. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that it is undoubted that the enemy's losses in men and material were considerably higher than the Allies' losses, while morally our advantage was greater. AN UNIQUE FEAT. Four-fifths of the enemy divisions on the west front were thrown successively into the battle of the Somme —some of them twice and some thrice. Undoubtedly to-, wards the end of the operations the enemy's power of resistance was very seriously diminished. These results, achieved by troops the vast majority of whom were raised and trained during the war, constitute a feat to which the history of our nation contains no equal. The despatch concludes : The enemy's power is nofr yet broken, hot is it possible to estimate the period before the objects for which the Allies are fighting will be attained. But the battle of the Somme has PLACED BEYOND DOUBT the ability of the Allies to gain these or> jects. The German army is the mainstay of the Central Powers. A full half of that army, despite all the advantages of acting on the defensive, and though supported by the strongest fortifications, suffered defeat on the Somme. Neither victors nor vanquished will forget this, and though the bad weather has given the enemy respite, there will undoubtedly be many thousands in their ranks who will begin the new campaign with little confidence in their ability to resist. Our new army entered the battle with the determination to win and confidence in their power to do so. They have proved to themselves, the enemy, and the world that THIS CONFIDENCE IS JUSTIFIED. They have learnt in a fierce struggle many valuable lessone which will help them in future. *