BRITISH TRANSPORT TORPEDOED.

Otago Witness, Issue 3216, 3 November 1915, Page 25

BRITISH TRANSPORT TORPEDOED.

NINETY-NINE LIVES LOST. LONDON, October 26. Official: The British transport Marquette was torpedoed in the Sea. It is understood that 99 of the personnel are Unaccounted for. Mr Thos. C. Harrison, of St. Clair, yesterday received a cable message from his son (Dr Harrison), 'who was on board the transport, stating that he had been rescued. Mr E. Rosevear, whose only brother is with the Australian forces, also received a cable message from his brother t “ All right.” TURKISH TRANSPORT SUNK. LONDON, October 26. Official: A British submarine sank a Turkish munition and transport vessel in the Sea of Marmora. LECTURE IN QUEEN’S HALL. LONDON, October 27. About 2500 persons were present at the Queen’s Hall at Mr Ashmead-Bartlett’s lecture on the Dardanelles. The lecture emphasised the necessity for saying nothing that would be helpful to the enemy. Whatever criticism we might indulge in regarding after events, we must admit that the scheme was a great conception. The Importance of opening a passage from Russia’s Black Sea ports was obvious to everyone. Unfortunately, Great Britain

had entered upon the expedition without a real knowledge of the Turkish strength. It was thought the Turk was on his last legs. It was believed that the Sick Man of Europe was sicker than ever. We were also led astray by reports of great Russian victories in the Caucasus. Though the Russians had smashed the Turks they were unable to follow up the victory. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett estimated that at least 800,000 Turks were under arms, and this big number Britain had to tackle in view of commitments elsewhere. Mr Ash-mead-Bartlett proceeded to detail the Australian landing, with the help of large maps. Referring to the naval operations, Mr Ashmead-Bartlett said it was quite possible to justify the use of a large surplus pre-dreadnought fleet to attempt to force the Dardanelles. Unfortunately, there was but little co-ordination between the military and naval operations, not only at the Dardanelles but throughout the war. After the outer forts had been demolished on February 25 the graver problem of forcing the Narrows arose. Here direct naval gun-fire was of little use against guns behind earthworks. Nevertheless, 14in Krupp guns and coast batteries would not have stopped the fleet in the narrowest passage, which was 1400 yards wide. The three lines of mines west of the Narrows made the task impossible, despite the heroism of trawlers and mine-sweepers. The attack which followed the council of war on March 18 waa the most remarkable sea fight since Trafalgar. After the naval battle Mr Ashmead-Bartlett dined with several of the Turkish Embassy at Rome, and the officials showed him reports from Constantinople disclosing the fact that the Turks were extremely frightened at the fearful noise of the bombardment, but firmly believed that the Divine Providence was protecting them, since practically no damage was done. Only 28 men were killed and 40 wounded, and two guns were destroyed. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett told Admiral De Robeck, and this admiral said : “ I am surprised; I thought we had destroyed only one gun.” Mr AshmeadBartlett added : “ The diplomatists let us down badly.” Mr Ashmead-Bartlett continued : After the Turks had been given a warning on February 19, we undertook a landing with far too small a force. It consisted of the 29th Division, a naval division, an Australian division, and two-thirds of the division of mixed Australians and New Zealanders. These started a desperate attack upon the whole of the Turkish Empire. The history of the world contains no more remarkable episode than the way they got ashore and held their own for the first day. We had the most gallant troops, but they lacked the preliminary and other organisation that other nations consider essential to a landing. It enabled a magnificent body of Australians and New Zealanders to write one of the greatest pages of history. I have never seen such determination in any body of men. The Australians and New Zealanders who were entrusted with such a colossal task, after their initial success pressed inland, but at the end of the day we heard that things were not going well, and the Australians were likely to be driven back to the beach. The crisis was referred to Sir lan Hamilton, and no more difficult problem was ever placed before a commander; but he boldly put his foot down and told the Australians to hold on.—(Great cheering.) The Australians resisted every attack, and at night were finally able to thoroughly establish themselves. LONDON, October 28. Mr Bartlett said that a popular query was, why had the Allies not persevered with the attack on the Asiatic side. The fact was that there were hardly enough troops. To hold Cape Helles it was essential to bring back the French and extend them to our lines. Another possibility was a landing at Bulair, but though a naval demonstration revealed that there were no Turks, we landed no troops. Cape Helles was selected because the landing was easily covered by fire from the battleships. Mr Bartlett considers that the landing at Anzac was unwise, as pur hands were full at Cape Helles in withstanding Turkish counter-attacks. If the Australians had been put ashore at Cape Helles there would have been enough men to capture Achi Baba. This would not have been decisive, but useful with a view to future operations. The task of the Australians was to push on to Maidos and capture the Narrows, but the scheme failed. A new situation arose after the failure of the May attacks. New plans should have been introduced at this juncture. It was quite evident that the Turks were not feeble and were not going to surrender the Dardanelles. English divisions continued to arrive, and were used in various local attacks to little purpose. A false optimism prevailed. At this time everywhere people seemed to think it was an accident that the Turks held out so long. In reality, they were becoming more skilful and more tenacious daily. The positions at Achi Baba and Anzac were stronger than Plevna. FAILURES AT ANAFARTA AND SUYLA BAY. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett said that the operations on Gallipoli were severely handicapped by the difficulty of getting a

concentrated artillery fire upon the trenches. Commanders in France were now country commanders in Gallipoli. The British Cabinet in July decided to send out reinforcements to secure decisive results. It would have been far better to have used the troops to force Bulgaria to join our side. The Bulgars could have got astride Bulair, and with our attacks on the coast and the submarines in the Sea of Marmora we could easily have cut off the Turks in Gallipoli. The Bulgarians were sympathetic with the Russians, and they to the last did not desire to fight against the Allies. The diplomatic situation wanted proper stage-management. Diplomatists needed plenty of money to spend, and as this was lacking Serbia was sacrificed. In view of Bulgaria’s indecision our best course would have been to land north of Bulair. The difficulty was the length of the communications, which were 30 miles. If Enos had been chosen as a base, and if we had landed at Bulair alone, the sea communication would have been equally lengthy, though the navy undertook to land troops anywhere. Even if the attacks at Anzac succeeded, Mr AshmeadBartlett was convinced that that did not mean getting to Constantinople, as the Turks had a fortified channel beyond the Narrows entrance to the Sea of Marmora. Even if a large part of the navy reached Constantinople, it was doubtful if the Turks would have surrendered. “ I never wavered in my opinion that the attacks attempted had not the smallest chance of success.” ‘‘No regulars were landed at Suvla—men trained to fight in any climate. The attackers deserve all honour and consideration, but they were untrained in the oldfashioned skirmishing warfare. We require at Gallipoli men trained in modern trench warfare. When they are unable to see their officers they are required to work individually. They failed in their objective of capturing the Anafarta heights. The English nation is one of the thirstiest in the world, and it is impossible to supply the Suvla troops with water, particularly as Turkish corpses were found in the wells. , The whole operation at Suvla Bay was far too difficult to face modern rifle fire. The Australians and New Zealanders at Anzac put up a re-, markable fight, and it was a great tragedy that they did not succeed. It was hoped, if they took the position, to get Constantinople, but it was useless to hide the fact that they had suffered a very bad reverse. ‘‘ When the Bulgarian attaches found that we had failed, they reported that they thought the other side would win. Now that the Bulgarians and Turks have joined up with the Austro-Germans and are coming south, it is too much to hope that we can reach Constantinople. I do not think we can advance any further in the Dardanelles.” OUR PLEDGE TO SERBIA. Mr Bartlett concluded : “ The pledge to help Serbia was made with all honourable intentions. It was deplorable that we were unable to redeem it. Serbia must not go under or make terms. It was useless for the Allies to pour troops into Salonika. The difficulties were enormous, with the mountainous country, the railway cut, and no roads. It was equally impossible to attack Bulgaria. Only three or four weeks remain in which a campaign is possible. Our mistake was in not going to Macedonia long ago to occupy the Yardar line, which was one of the best defensive positions in the world. “ I am not pessimistic. We are bound to win the war, but we are going the wrong way. Our enemies are now able to send men to any part nearest to them in three or four days; we will take three or four weeks, and the troops arrive in the worst condition. When we direct our forces into the right channel the real end will begin.” Mr Bartlett declared that what our submarines had achieved in the Sea of Marmora was so marvellous that when thcomplete tale was told it would almost atone for the other mistakes on the peninsula. PROFESSOR DAVID ENLISTS. SYDNEY, October 28. Professor David’s services have been accepted for the front, tie will go as geological expert to the mining engineers, with a major’s rank. DEATH FROM WOUNDS. LONDON, October 28. Lieutenant G. S. Boyle, of the Royal Engineers, a New Zealander, has died of wounds at the Dardanelles. MAJOR-GENERAL BIRD WOOD PROMOTED. LONDON, October 28. Major-General Birdwood has been appointed a temporary lieutenant-general for distinguished services. LORD BRASSEY’S CRITICISM. ‘‘A HUGE MISTAKE.” LONDON, October 28. Lord Brassey, interviewed by the Australian Press Association on his return from the Mediterranean and the Dardanelles region, said: ‘‘l never met any officer, naval or military, who is not of opinion that the operations contemplated at the Dardanelles, from every point of view, were a huge mistake. We were forced to undertake the Dardanelles expedition on account of pressure by Russia, who said: ‘We are fighting very hard.

You must try and open the Dardanelles.’ Our Foreign Office felt the justice of the Russian representations, and no doubt urged the Admiralty to act. Mr Churchill was a dashing administrator, but did not know how difficult the operation would he. Orders were accordingly given to the fleet to undertake the task. “ Having failed at the first attempt by naval means alone, it was decided late in the day that it should be a combined naval and military operation. It took considerable time to prepare both forces The Germans who officered the Turks had full time to prepare, and when our second attempt was ready Gallipoli was a fortress of first-class magnitude. It was absolutely impregnable. We tried to land men at the three least prepared places, but with fearful sacrifices. Sir lan Hamilton, who held a high reputation, was exceedingly anxious to carry out the utterly impossible task placed before him by the Government. He appealed for reinforcements, and Egypt was depleted of troops. The Australians and New Zealanders tried to penetrate the Peninsula of Gallipoli, which presented insurmountable obstacles to moving our artillery.” ” I say it is perfectly impossible to get guns into positions for bombardment. Attack after attack was made, hoping against hope. One doctor told me that he saw men climb a difficult slope, at the top of which invisible gunners were waiting till they came in view, and then mowed them down. All this happened again and again I consider the Government should much earlier have realised the futility of it all, and stopped this useless slaughter. “ When I was at Lemnos a ship was sent there bv the Red Cross full of supplies, but there was no person in authority to distribute them. In that extremity the captain asked me to help with clothes for the Australians, many of whom needed them sorely. We got together pyjamas and such other things as we could provide, and temporarily relieved the situation.” MR ASHMEAD BARTLETT INTERVIEWED. LONDON, October 28. Mr Ashmead Bartlett, in a special interview with the Sun’s London correspondent, said it was impossible for the fleet alone to pierce the Dardanelles; the attempt was silly. The original expeditionary force was also far too small, and the troops were insufficient for anything further than the landing at Cape Helles. It would have been wiser never to have landed at Anzac. After the failure of the final attack upon Achi Baba on May 8 the whole expedition should have been seriously reconsidered, having learnt the fighting strength of the Turks. • But the staff seemed to desire to avoid facing the facts. The subsequent attacks upon Achi Baba, involving tremendous loss of life, should never have been made. We advanced on June 4 and 28, and on July 12 and 23, and then, having lost between 30,000 and 40,000 men, the attacks were suddenly abandoned. Even if we had taken Achi Baba, we would have been faced by an even stronger position at the Kilid Bahr salient. Of all the troops engaged, he specially praised the Australasians. The entry of Bulgaria into the fighting had, said Mr Bartlett, entirely changed the situation. It was futile to try and save Serbia by a few scratch divisions at Salonika. The great danger of these Balkan adventures was the huge distance from the bases, whereas the enemies had the advantage of interior lines. DEATH FROM WOUNDS. SYDNEY, October 29. Private R. K. Wright has died from wounds. He was employed in the Herald office. His parents reside at Invercargill. SIR lAN HAMILTON’S FAREWELL. LONDON, October 29. Sir lan Hamilton, in a farewell order, thanked all ranks at the Dardanelles for the wonderful way in which they had seconded his efforts to lead them forward to decisive victory, which he had implicit confidence they would achieve under General Monro. DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDERS. WON BY NEW ZEALANDERS. LONDON, October 29. Distinguished Service Orders have been conferred upon the following New Zealanders :—Major STANDISH, Captain FINN, Lieutenant ROBERT M‘PHERSON. Major Standish, of the 3rd Battery, displayed conspicuous gallantry in controlling a fire in an exposed section of guns on August 27 under heavy fire. When one of the guns was put out of action, a fire broke out round the ammunition pit. Major Standish immediately ran and assisted in extinguishing it. Captain Finn, of the Medical Service Corps, showed conspicuous devotion to duty. From the 6th to the 9th August he worked day and night unceasingly, without rest, rescuing the wounded under continuous fire. The dressing station was heavily shelled for an hour, and many of his assistants were wounded. Lieut. M'Pherson, of the Field Artillery, showed conspicuous gallantry. On August 27 he descended a pit containing 50 high explosive shells at great personal risk, and extinguished a fire caused by blazing brushwood, as the result of a Turkish bombardment during the assault on Hill 60.

AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER’S DICTUM. MUST REFRAIN FROM CRITICISM. MELBOURNE, October 30. In the House of -Representatives the Prime Minister was asked whether, in view of the facts revealed by Mr AshmeadBartlett, it was not time that the Government came to some arrangement about th* Gallipoli campaign, as we were apparently sending men to useless slaughter. Mr Hughes replied that he knew we owed the Imperial Government a duty in refraining from criticism. The duty of the Government was to mind its own business and send, effectively equipped, the quota of men asked of us. MR ASHMEAD-BARTLBTT. THE CENSOR DEFENDED. LONDON, October 29. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett, commenting on the paucity of references to particular units in his Dardanelles messages, says that in 99 cases out of 100 the censor was responsible, and for excellent reasons. Sir lan Hamilton earlier relaxed the rule whenever possible, remarking that the composition of his whole force was known in Cairo, which was swarming with spies. Later on greater secrecy was necessary, owing to the arrival of drafts from Home for the great effort, which began on August 6. and may be said to have definitely coma to a standstill on August 21. The forces engaged in the Suvla landing consisted of the 10th and 11th Divisions of the New Army and the 53rd and 54th Territorial Divisions. The 13th Division of the new army landed secretly at Anzac and participated in the desperato fighting at Sari Bair. These young and untried soldiers did extremely well alongside the more experienced colonial companies, who helped to complete their training under fire. An excellent feeling of friendship had sprung up between the Australians and the volunteers from England. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division also fought at Anzac. But the time had come to do belated justice to the famous 29th Division in this Homeric struggle. The 29th Division landed under General Hunter-Weston, and had since fought under General De Lisi e - England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales were represented in it. Ail mention of this division’s final efforts to achieve success had hitherto been suppressed, otherwise the secret strategic move would have been disclosed. The facts are that when the attempt at Anafarta had definitely failed it was decided to employ the 29th in a final effort to cut the enemy’s communications. Three brigades were secretly brought up by night in trawlers, and were landed at Suvla Bay. Their arrival stimulated the whole army. It also showed how seriously our leaders regarded the task. Everyone felt that if the 29th Division failed .no one could succeed. Like the Old Guard at Waterloo, they were brought up for a last effort to break through the enemy’s ever-strengthening works. Tho 29th Division will ever be surrounded by the halo of romance, and glory attaching to Caesar’s Tenth Legion and Napoleon's Old Guard. - A few veterans who had been in the landing at Sedd-ul-Bahr were left, soma of them having been wounded many times since then, for this division has had tho most prominent role in almost every engagement. At least thrice their original strength had passed through their ranks before the middle of September. Here we see the value of tradition. It does not matter how young and inexperienced are the drafts; no sooner do they find themselves with that mysterious halo “ No, 29’’ than they distinguish themselves. They fight or die like that marvellous band of old soldiers who are the Last of our original regular army. And they made history in the landing of April 25.

Mr Ashmead-Bartlett continues ; Tha troops rested quietly in the trenches throughout the morning. They fully realised the responsibilities of the task assigned them, which they regarded as more difficult than any they had yet been called on to make except the iirst landing. They realised that the eyes of the whole army, were watching for the signal if the dangerous honour were con ferred on them. When asked to make a fresh effort the 87th Brigade attacked Hill 70 and the 86th Brigade Hill 112, while the 88th, were held in reserve. The Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Border Regiment first attacked Hill 70, and almost reached the crest, but were driven orf by the concentrated fire of shrapnel from machine guns. The 86thi repeatedly made an effort to advance, but failed with heavy losses. Th* South Wales Borderers, in reserve, were then called up to make one more effort. They succeeded in digging in under tho crest, and, participating in the final charge, gained possession of the crest. Thus it was that the brunt of the fighting on Aug< ust 21 fell on the 29th Division. They failed, but a brave and determined had the incalculable advantages of position, and the division added to their fame by their failure. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett points out that the chief credit was given to the yeomanry in previous accounts because it was tha only corps the censor allowed to be mentioned. It was really the reserve, and

they were not called upon until late in the afternoon. They deserve every credit for their magnificent behaviour. It was their first time in action. They advanced for two rallea amid a perfect hail of shrapnel across bare and coverless ground.

D. 5.0., who saw the Dardanelles defences from the Turkish side,, has published a bock on the Dardanelles. He denounces the appalling plan of smashing a channel through to the Black Sea. which he says was due to ignorance, wrong information, or absolute contempt of all military and naval precedents. 'There was no chance of a battleship running the gauntlet of the forts in the Narrows. The British

people were sadly befooled when a British commander proposed to get astride Gallipoli Peninsula. They forgot that the Germans were in touch with Turkey. “ Early in June,” says the author, “ Sir lan Hamilton’s army had a gambler’s chance of success, in view of the possible exhaustion of the Turkish ammunition, but Germany sent trained munition workers to take over the Turkish ammunition factories, and after their arrival these factories soon began to turn out a sufficient supply for all needs. ‘‘ The Balkan crisis comes opportunely, as it would excuse our evacuation of the Dardanelles as a military necessity. Pie who pushed the plan cannot escape indictment for his folly. This gigantic failure has cost us 100,000 casualties. It is certain that the German General Staff know that our Mediterranean force must either be withdrawn, or be exterminated. If the war ends in anything more favourable to us than a draw, Germany must be beaten in France and Flanders.” [Colonel Fortescue served in the Burmese and Karag (Gold Coast) Expeditions, and with the Natal Field Force in the Boer war, on each occasion being mentioned in despatches.] BRITISH MINE-SWEEPER SUNK. LONDON, October 30. An Admiralty report states that the auxiliary mine-sweeper Hythe (Commander Bird) sank on Thursday night after colliding with another British ship off Gallipoli. One hundred are reported as missing out of 250 aboard, besides the crew. October 31. Ten naval men and 145 military are missing from the mine-sweeper Hythe. 'TURKISH AMMUNITION STORE EXPLODED. LONDON, October 30. A British communique states : Near Anafarta our artillery exploded an enemy ammunition store There has been artillery and hand-gre-nade fighting near Ari Burnu and Sedd-ul-Bahr. PERSIAN NEUTRALITY. PARIS, October 30. The Persian Legation denies the rumour that Persia has concluded an entente with Germany and Turkey, and adds : ‘‘Persia will firmly maintain her neutrality.” AUSTRALIAN'DETERMINATION. MELBOURNE, November 1. Senator Peai’ce, in the course of a speech at Brighton, said there was no need for pessimism because of the enemy’s temporary success here and there. It was no time to talk of abandoning Gallipoli or of, losing hope, but to send more men, munitions, and money, with every confidence in the brains of those directing our military strategy. HOSPITAL AT SICILY. ROME, October 31. Eight thousand British wounded from the Dardanelles will shortly be arriving at Palermo, where there are the fullest hospital preparations for their reception RETIREMENT FROM BUSHIRE. LONDON, October 31. The Indian Government announces the termination of the British occupation of Bushire, the Persian Government guaranteeing the security of British interests. THE SUVLA BLUNDERS. WHO WERE. RESPONSIBLE? LONDON, October 31. An article in the Weekly Dispatch says; ‘‘After the Suvla landing, hours were .wasted when minutes were precious. A passion for drill was indulged to the utmost. Trenches were dug in useless positions, and night marches , were muddled. The British reinforcements failed to hold Sari Bari, which one-tenth of the number of 4 Anzvcs ’ had held previously, because the new troops had never been trained for such fighting as Gallipoli. No single scapegoat can be made. Australia and New Zealand, in addition to Great Britain, are consumed with a desire to know who is jointly responsible with the general in command at Suvla.” Lord Milner, at Canterbury, defended the criticism of the Government. “No task was more obvious, but if mistakes like that of Suvla Bay are glossed over, and blunder piled on blunder at the Dardanelles, we cannot expect any improve•ment.” TURKISH REPORT. AMSTERDAM, November 1. A Turkish communique states: There has been increased activity at lusty by artillery, supported by warships. Our Anafarta artillery hit a transport, which withdrew enveloped in dense smoke. THE GERMAN SUBMARINES. SINKING OF THE TRIUMPH. LONDON, November 1. Mr Ashmead Bartlett, describing the German submarines in the Dardanelles, says: “ One of the first fruits was that the Albion ran ashore. Tire enemy directed a heavy gun fire at it, and shrapnel was bursting all round. The Canopus went to the rescue, and finally towed off the Albion, which was hit 200 times by shrapnel and common shell. The men on the Swiftsure arranged a sweepstakes for sighting periscopes. Fourteen-pounder guns were ready day and night to fire at a

moment’s notice. One day a submarine appeared 300 yards off the port bow of the Swiftsure. The gunners fired, and she disappeared. It is thought the submarine was trying to force an entrance into the Dardanelles. She came up blindly among the ships, and when the alarm was given the destroyers were Immediately alert. As if by magic every battleship and transport weighed anchor and steamed at full speed away. “ When the Swiftsure signalmen announced that the Triumph was listing, we rushed to the quarterdeck. While our guns were bombarding the Turks theirs were leisurely responding. We watched the dying struggles in silence. Suddenly she seemed weary of the hopeless fight against invisible forces, and eight minutes after she was struck she turned turtle, floated for half an hour, and then plunged and disappeared.”