COASTAL WAGES IN FOREIGN SHIPS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2928, 27 April 1910, Page 14

COASTAL WAGES IN FOREIGN SHIPS.

HUDDART-PARKER CO UNSUCCESSFUL.

APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL., WELLINGTON, April 21. In the case Huddart-iParker Co. v. Nixon, the Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout), after stating the facts and setting out the provisions of section 75 of " The Shipping and Seamen Act, 1908," stated that by virtue of section 2 that section applied to the plaintiff company's ships unless it was ultra vires of the powers of the General Assembly. The question that was raised in the Wellington cooks and stewards' case did notarise, because the Shipping and Seamen Act purported to apply to all British ships trading to New Zealand, whereas the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act applied only to New Zealand. His Honor wished to say that he adhered to the view he had expressed in a former case as to the potency of our Constitution Act, in spite of the criticism to which it had been subjected by some English writers on constitutional matters. If there was anything in section 75 conflicting with the English Merchant Shipping Act, section 75 would be ultra vires in so far as it conflicted. It was suggested that the section conflicted with section 166 of the Merchant Shipping Act, which provided that where a seaman was engaged and the voyage terminated in the United Kingdom, he should not be entitled to sue in any court abroad for wages. So far as British ships were concerned, the provision in section 75 entitling seamen to sue in New Zealand was ultra vires, but there was nothing to prevent section 75 applying to plaintiffs'ships while engaged in the coasting trade in New Zealand, as while at sea between New Zealand ports. In fact, the New Zealand Legislature was expressly empowered by section 736 to make laws dealing with British ships engaged in the New Zealand coastal trade. These ships did not come within section 166 of the Imperial Act, but that section had been re-enacted in New Zealand, and they ought to have the same protection as British ships. As to the question whether the contentions of the Marine Department were well founded, after setting out those contentions, he stated that if the Legislature had power to enact that the wages paid in the coastal trade must be the current wages, then it followed 1 that it could enact laws to exact compliance with that provision. That was all that subsection 3 purported to do. It was within the power of the Legislature to enact that a clearance should be refused to any vessel whose master had not complied with the law as to payment of wages. There was nothing in such provision conflicting with the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act. As to the third question, it did not seem to him of any moment whether the power of endorsement had been properly vested in the Superintendent of Mercantile Marine or not. It was merely ancillary to the provision that extra wages should be paid. It was within the competence of the Legislature to enact such a provision as to the fourth question, seamen could sue only for extra wages, not for the wages in the articles and extra wages. The wages fixed in the articles were not payable in New Zealand. It was not within the competence of the Eegislature to over-rule in this respect the provisions of the articles, nor was it necessary to do so to efficiently oontrol the coasting trade. He was therefore of opinion that judgment should be for defendant. Mr Justice Williams in a separate judgment concurred. Mr Justice Edwards delivered a separate dissenting judgment. His Honor was of opinion that section 75, with 'regard to both wages and extra wages, was in conflict with the provisions of section 166 of the Merchant Shipping Act, and" was therefore ultra vires. The intention of the Imperial Parliament as expressed in the section was plainly that all claims by seamen for remuneration in respect of their service should be determined by the courts of the United Kingdom only. If that provision was ultra vh-es, the provision which entitled the superintendent to refuse clearance was ultra vires also. For it was merely a method of enforcing a right which the Legislature had no power to confer. The plaintiff company's ships were in the same position as British" ships in this respect. He was therefore of opinion that the questions put in the special case should be answered in the plaintiff company's favour. Mr Justice Chapman delivered a separate judgment, in which he agreed in the conclusion arrived at by the majority of the court, though his reasons were different. Judgment was therefore given for the defendant, with costs (£36 6s), and disbursements. On the application of Mr Chapman, K.C., leave was given to appeal to th« Privy Council upon the usual term*.