OTAGO VOLUNTEERS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2883, 23 June 1909, Page 65

OTAGO VOLUNTEERS.

THE EASTER MANOEUVRES.

LECTURE BY LIEUT. -COLONEL

SMYTH,

Following is a summary of an able and interesting lecture " delivered ' by Lieut. - Colonel Smyth, commanding the district, before the Dunedin Officsis' Club and other military bodies on the Easter manoeuvres. Owing to space limitations the lecture has been greatly condensed, bur an effort has been ma-dc to present the points and tenor of the remarks. In the course of a. brief preface Lieut.colonel Smyth pointed out that in this case the fault-finding and blame were not synonymous term's, >as th<?y would undoubtedly be with regular troops, and ho could safely say after two years' experience of the Volunteers that -he was aware of most of the disabilities from which they suffered. He trusted, therefore, that theso criticisms would be received in the- spirit m which they were given — that was, with the idea of helping thorn to the best of his ability. CAMP ROUTINE. The lecturer explained that it had been intended to devote P'ri-day, April 9, entirely to instruction in camp routine. Had company or battalion camps been pro\ iously held this , would have besn unnecessary. This plan was frustrated by inclement weather, and in view of the fact that the majority were in possession of only one uniform and greatcoat, many e\en being without the latter. Lisut.colonel Smyth went on to deal with the assertion that the colonial is possessed of. independence and seif-reliance to a, marked degree, and that the soldier contrasted unfavourably with him in this respect. Such characteristics were admirable und-a-r certain conditions. The 6mall patrol, or isolated scout, could forage, cook, and fend for himself, having no one else to consider. In this case the colonial would fare better than the soldier; but where hundreds or thousands were gathered together the principle of each for himself could not for a moment be tolerated. The result would be that the pushing, the unscrupulous, and the bully would fare unnecessarily well at the expense of his weaker brother, who sooner or later would be relegated io hospital. A commander could not keep his whole force efficient and every man in the ranks if the " go-as-you-please " system prevailed, The lecturer drew attention to an isolated instance which had occurred et the second comp on the arrival of a load of straw. The cart should have, proceeded to the supply depot, whence O.C.s would have obtained a supply by requisition. The actual procedure was that a, howling mob of men surrounded tho cart as it moved, tearing what they could from it whether entitled to it or not. He wished to impress on regimental officers the necessity for being constantly on the alerfc to enforce method and <ord«r, the discipline of tho regiment being in their hande, and not those of the staff. ORDERS. There had been a difficulty in getting orders carried out. Standing orders had either been insufficiently studied, not thoroughly promulgated, or forgotten. For instance, each corps should have sent an orderly to headquarters by 9 a.m., but the .only effect of this order was the appearance of a little boy bugler from one of the- infantry battalions, who did not know the position of any corps but hi 6 own. much less tho commanding officers of other corps, or where they were to be found. Police ordered in the same way were conspicuous by their absence. As to want of initiative (if tho absence- of performance of ordinary dutiea was to be dignified by this name), he would draw attention to what he would call the interior economy cf their regiments. Each day officers were seen grouped, chatting and smoking in their lines, while much work remained to be done with regard to their companies. On tlio Sunday morning more than one O.C. admitted that arms and equipment had not been inspected, and in many cases not cleaned, since leaving a. wet camp 36 hours before. These remarks applied mainly to the infantry, who held the post of honour undesirably near the 6taff camp. This branch had now no opportunity of learning camp routine, and it was evident that he ia-boured under enormous difficulties. Many regimental officer^ were being taught to run before, they could walk, which was not their fault. The lecturer weni. on to advocate, with regard to thj prevailing small musters, the combining of squadrons, companies, and even battalions, to enable commanders of all rank? to exercise proper command, and allowing each commander in turn to command. Tho present small-muster system would result in little effective training for a full-streneth command of 500. A regular battalion in India was almost rlouble this strength. Transport (entire.y inadequate, owing to economy being inD Ut»d unon), kitchen, and latrine making were purely regimental matters. The lecturer praif-cd the quiet, quick manner m which the first camp was struck and the second pitched. Tho discipline of what were young and partially-trained troops reflected great credit on themselves and their officer and was in contrast lo that obtaining, or. rather, not obtaining, in other pa-rts of the Dominion. REPORTS. Lieutenant-colonel Smyth regretted that only one or two corps had complied with instructions to draw up regimental orders, which were absolutely necessary. There was a non-promulgation of orders by many corps. Shortly before Kaste>- he had asked a young and" keen officer if he were attending the staff ride. The reply was: " What staff ride?" This officer had not seen orders since he joined. There was a tendency to be too fond of writing operation orders. It should never be forgotten that all writing, whether orders or reports'?, { was merely a means to an end. Report j writing showed an improvement. He would remind them of- a good piece of advice by someone! : " When writing reports, put yourself in the position of a very poor man sending a telegram to a fool." RECONNAISSANCE. ; The independent reconnaissance of Red's mounted troops towards Blue was ordered to impress upon both mounted regiments the mobility which the possession of horses gives. The great advantage of mobility was sometimes lost sight of 'when mounted men had to regulate their pace by that

'of infantry. The Blue mounted men had i demonstrated . what distances could be acJ complished, even when untrained, without i undue fatigue. They were aware that an I attempt to raise an M.I. corps recently j had failed. Any corps of this description would be useful in dealing with a raiding force probably without horses, or time to i land them, *or without opportunity, h-a trusted, tq " commandeer " them. The South African war showed the advantage of the mobility possesssd by mounted men, in rapidly reinforcing, changing front,- etc., and later, in the " here to-day arid gone to-morrow" tactics of De Wet. His criticism in the district had aJways been the same ; too many were used for reconnoitring and watching, and too few for fighting. Another principle constantly -lost>s:ght of was that a patrol never fought unless cornered; therefore why be strong? The strength was required when and w.here the fight is decided upon. Then superiority was the one essential; surprise being also a most important factor. After dealing, with tLe importance of all employed on reconnaissance being despatched with a specific task, which should constantly be borne in mind, the lecturer passed to advance and flank guards as touching the Saturday morning'.s operations. -in the i Hokonui Gorge. Tlie first mistake, and ' one that on active service might have been attended with disastrous results, was thi entering and riding through the defile b\ the mounted troops of the. advance gUaro. without reconnoitring, and, if necessary, clearing the heights on either side. This was th© invariable duty of the leading troops. He had witnessed the whole ol the main guard, which included half tha Battery, enter tha defile within easy rifla ' range of good positions for the enemy, and , thero appeared little chance of its escapa had even a small party of the enmy evaded the notice of the scouts, and a large force oould easily have done this; ' This dangerous procedure was acted on by one o( the contingents in the Boer war, although the heights were known to be occupied. This showed a want of that training, considered by the man in the street to ba unnecessary. He .reminded them of the disaster to the Russians who, when driven back, retreated, not along the heights, but along the valley. The Japanese commander, acting at once, on this mistake, seized the heights, and- the slaughter thatensued could be better imagined than" described. The scouts on the Saturday in point should have ridden or climbed, leaving their horses at the bottom, and having found all clear for some distance, have signalled '"no enemy in sight," pushed on along the heights, or, returning to the roads, have made for. another point of vantage, then to have been followed by increasingly large parties. Advance guard work as a rule was too slow and timid, yet •there was often, as in this case, unjustrfiabls rashness endangering the troops following. Small parties attempting- to harrass or delay an .advance guard must bo vigorously brushed aside j artillery, if necessary t opening, at effective, or even decisive .range. Mounted troops might bo moved rapidly to a flank, when small parties (infantry "holding them meanwhile in front) would doubtless deem it advisablo to retire. When an advance guard was I confronted with a superior force it should tuke up the bsst defensive position available, and evary endeavour made to give the main body time to convert the order of march into the order of battle. Some Continental critio had been credited with saying that in th.? late war the Japanese fought with the drill book in their hands. He quoted this because b.e had here given them copybook nxixims concerning advance guards applicable Jo every situation. As to flank guards where • the heights- were accessible but impracticable for movement, as was the case in the gorge at' 'Easter the Indian Frontier method, " picqueting," should be adopted. The advance guard, abnormally strong at the outset, as • it proceeded, sent out small piequets to hold commanding heights till the main body ' passed. The main body, when tha transport consisted of elephants, pack animals, camels, mules, etc., extended for mile 3, winding its way along a narrow path, bordered, perhaps, on one side by precipitous heights, and on the other by a sheer precipice; or again moving through' ice-cold water in the bed of a stream, with heights on either side. The picqueta eventually dropped down, usually hotiv' pursued, and joined the rear guard, which , momentarily became stronger proportion-, ately as tho advance guard became weaker. For surprise there was^ no excuse ;■> for defeat there might be. j OUTPOSTS. 1 The lino taken up by ths outpost comxnanr'or at the second, camp was a good one, but, as far us he could make out, tha , high ground to the north of the Otamita • was neithar picquefed or patrolled, and this neglect would have constituted a danger ■to the camp. On the morning of Blue'<* ; attack he was pleased to see that O.C. qicquets had since last year recognised lhot r.ocossity for keeping or getting together a body capable of producing a volume of fire for resistance. Had last year* mis- , tai-e of having driblets everywhere and , strength nowhere been repeated, Blue i could easily have hurled them ba-ck on an unprepared camp. Tho object of Blue'a so-called patrol of 30 men was not understood. It was too weak to drive in a piequet. and tco conspicuous for useful: reconnaisan.?3. He was informed that ifi had remained quietly under fire at a range of SOOyck — an example of the unreal situation occurring on manoeuvres, — and was eventually captured. THE ATTACK. Lieutenant-colonel Smyth then passed to that most important operation, the- attack of an enemy in position. We were not going to resist any invading or raiding force by taking up a defensive position and waiting for him; hut we must act up to the old maxim: "Hit first, hit hard, and; . go on hitting." He considered that th6attack was an operation which should be carefully thought out, studied theoretically, and, above all things, constantly practised, without ammunition, with blank, with ball, t>y sections, companies, regiments, in Brigade, and, finally, with a mixed force of all arms. And how often, was this done? The ground originally selected would .have been suitable for this operation, but could not be reached. ArtUleryt would have had more scope for manoeuvres, mounted troops would have had the country, for practising pursuit, infantry after a march of three or four miles could havo practised changing from column of route to line of company columns when coming under distant artillery fire, and from that formation could have straightway 'developed thq attack. As things turned out, the artillery movement was limited hy ihm

existence of fences and crops. The movement was unreal. It could not have been done in war- The infantry in the main attack was compelled to march across the enemy's position in full view. The camp had been within long-range fire of the enemy's guns all night. The lecturer then outlined the manner in which troops cooperate for the attack nowadays,, 1 the necessity for infantry securing superiority of fire effect at decisive ranges, and for the importance of artillery with shrapnel in keeping the heads of the defenders down. No stubborn enemy would ever be 'driven from a. position by fire alone. Continental nations, especially Germany, insisted on th« forward movement being always energetically carried out, the objective being _ the enemy's trenches. Every attack, therefore, should conclude with a. charge right through the enemy's supposed ranks, followed by a rapid re-forming to secure against recapture. The position captured, the mounted troops covered end supported by artillery fire must take up the pursuit with the utmost vigour, allowing "the enemy no breathing space. This last operation, he hoped, would be practised at- regimental camps this year. Lieut.colonel Smyth ...remarked on the . absence of fire discipline, control, and observation apparent at Easter, and hoped commanders would" take every opportunity (few enough he knew) of practising extend- ' ing for and . developing-^an . attack under various conditions ; so . that when the . day. of. trial came, if it came, officers, noncommissioned officers, and men would know their work. If the attack could not be carried out without confusion on a summer's afternoon with no more formidable enemy than a line of brown paper, he dared not contemplate the result when under heavy shrapnel and rifle fire of a daring and highly-trained enemy. REAR GUARDS. Referring to the retreat on Mandeville, the lecturer described the disposition el the rear guard as faulty. The mobility of the mounted troops was not taken advantage of, and the rear guard remained <oo long. The game of " bluff," which should be acted by a rear guard to enable the main body to get away- unmolested, was not played. , On this day, as throughout the manceuvi-es, the operations, a« must be tha case on peace manoeuvres, were sadly interfered with, not only by the weather, but by the necessity for all troops entraining at a particular hour for home. MEDICAL. It "was remarkable that the best officered, beet disciplined, best trained corps were far and away the healthiest. The figures showing the percentage of sick, as shown on the return of the P.M.O-, might with a few exceptions have been read inversely as marks 'awarded for musters, general efficiency,- discipline, and training. Corps recruited from the country aho obtained hardier men used to a healthy outdoorlife. - The Blue force of 120 odd men riding day and night- in, th© wet without . straw required tho services of a doctor for - only one -man, and he had" been kicked by a horse: -In conclusion, Lieutcolonel Smyth acknowledged -iho loyal support of all officers under his command, j and as ho bolisved it was proposed to pit \ them against Canterbury next Easter, he , trusted that they would prepare themselves , and their commands, so that Otago mig/it give a "good account of itself, and a.s a. result acquire confidence to meet the real thing should it ever 'be their fortune to do so. .