THE NORTH SEA OUTRAGE

Otago Witness, Issue 2665, 12 April 1905, Page 80

THE NORTH SEA OUTRAGE

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION.

CONDEMNATION 'OF THE RUSSIAN

ADMIRAL.

{From Our Own Correspondent.)

LONDON, March 4.

It was not until last Saturday night that the outcome of the International Commission, which has so long been engaged on investigating the circumstances of the North Sea outrage, became authentically known. Two days previously an utterly false and misleading forecast, purporting to bo an accurate summary of the report, was telegraphed from Paris, and published far and wide, ostensibly as virtually authoritative. The gist was represented as being- dead against England on all the main points, with merely a few minor qualifications, evidently intended to be in the nature of the jam which conceals the nauseousness of a medical powder.

It need hardly be said that the publication of this alleged forecast, implying, as it did, a grossly unjust and anti-English attitude on the part of the commissioners, excited a storm of indignation in this country. Indeed, public feeling was excited to such a pitch that the situation was little less dangerous than it had been even during the first few days after the Dogger Bank outrage was perpetrated. An almost unanimous shout went up that such a preposterous verdict was a death-blow to all future reference to arbitration. At the same time, it was felt and freely admitted that England was absolutely bound by the report of a commission to which she had agreed. But the danger was this : not only was it certain that, if the alleged forecast were verified, English people would never again tolerate any reference to arbitration, a reference which in such a case would have had a still more unfair and disastrous result than that on the Alabama claims ; but also there was foreshadowed a grave peril that, under the influence of righteous indignation, the press and the public of England would assume an attitude of bitter hostility to Russia that could hardly fail to precipitate the two countries into ■war on the smallest future provocation.

It has since transpired that this false report was another of the rascally dodges which Russian diplomatists deem consistent with their presumable character as statesmen and gentlemen. The general manager of Reuter's Agenoy has published in every leading English paper a full and ample apology for "that agency, usually so careful and correct, having inadvertently been made the channel through which the scandalous tissue of iies was transmitted. His explanation was that the information had reached him from a presumably creditable and authentic source, and I understand that the matter is being very thoroughly ■orobed privately. The secretary of Reuter's Agency writes : — ' ' Considerable comment has been aroused by the forecast, which we published in a telegram from Paris on February 22, of the report of the North Sea Commission. From the form in which the statement was conveyed and the authority of the source, there was no reason to suppose at the time that it was otherwise than an authentic summary of the report. We greatly regret that the publication of the full text shows that, by the communication in question, wp have been made the victims of a manoeuvre designed to mislead the public both here and abroad."

What has come out is that the Russian authorities responsible for the fraud desired this inaccurate report to be sent to Ru=sia, and published there, in order to amuse and gratify the public, it being at the same time decided that when the trtifi report should arrive its publication should be rigidly suppressed in every part of Russia. Th-e whole proceeding is eminently characteristic of Muscovite methods and Russian rascality. Fortunately the consequences which might so easily have been disastrous have been averted.

The genuine report -was, as I have said, completed on Slat-irday night. It appeared fust in this country in the Sunday papers, and, of course, in the daily issues of the following day. Its gist has "been cabled to you, but I may as well append for the sake of clearness, a succinct summary of the findings. These were as follow: (1) The warnings he had received justified the Russian Admiral in taking every precaution against hostile craft. (2) No "torpedo-boat was in the vicinity of the trawlers. (3) That being so, the opening of firing by Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not justifiable. (4-) The trawlers committed no hostile act. (5) The fact that the Aurora was hit several times suggests to the commissioners that it was this Russian cruiser that drew the first fire of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's flagship. The Aurora seen from behind, would be carrying no visible light, and optical illusion, natural at night time, may have induced to mis, taking her for a torpedo-boat. (6) The duration of the firing was longer than was necessary. (7) Admiral Rozhdestvensky did everything in his rower to prevent trawlers, recognised as such, being fired upon. (8) The commissioners regret that the Admiral did not, as soon as he had passed the Straits of Dover, inform the authorities of a neighbouring Power that the trawlers were in need of sviccour. (9) The findings cast no reflections upon the military capacity or the feelings of humanity of Admiral Rozhdestvensky or of the personnel of his fleet. The Russian commissioner did not believe himself warranted in sharing the opinion of his colleagties that, there was no hostile craft in the vicinity, and expressed the conviction that suspicious vessels approached the squadron with hestile intent, and thus provoked the firing. There were, it appears, many somewhat Leated discussions and even one or two scenes during the private deliberations of the commissioners before this was ultimately arrived at. The Echo de Paris mentions certain points on which the discussion of the North Sea incidents took a particularly serious turn. The first was the declaration formulated by Sir Lewis Beaumont, supported by Rear-admiral Davis, and accepted by Admiral yon Spaun, that tho Russian squadron was not in the presence of torpedo boats. Admiral Dubassoff desired it to be admitted at least that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had been in the presence of ships having suspicious or hostile intentions. Admiral Fournier merely observed that there was no certainty about the matter. Another question gave rise to a heated discussion. Sir Lewie Beaumont insisted on the adoption in the text of the words " Admiral Rozhdestvensky had no right to fire*" The American adniiraj §up-

ported this proposal. Admiral Dubassoff rose and declared that if this text were adopted he would abstain from signing the report. Thanks to the conciliatory intervention of Admiral Fournier, the British and American admirals gave way. The American admiral was more English than his British colleague, and in this connection some amusing incidents occurred. '•No," said Admiral Davis, once giving his opinion on a question which he considered favourable to Rufsia. " Pardon me, Admiral," said Sir Lewis Beaumont gently, " I have already said yes." And Admiral Davis, who as a rule refused absolutely to give way, modified his vote. The commission unanimously admitted that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had done all he could do to avoid hitting the trawlers. Sir Lewis Beaumont, who at first would not admit that the Russian admiral had not aimed at the trawlers, thought, on the contrary, that he had deliberately fired on them, believing them to be accomplices of the suspected boats. The discussion developed in a dramatic manner. Sir Lewis Beaumont having remarked, "In fact, then I am here to save Admiral Rozhdestvensk3'." Admiral Dubassoff, who was usually very calm, hereupon rose, pale, and replied: "Admiral Beaumont, I do not wish to take offence at what you have said, but really your remark seems to me neither just nor kind nor gallant. Admiral Rozhdestvensky has no need to be saved, believe me ; and I might answer you that I am here to save England and remove the suspicions of complicity with the suspected boats. I have proofs of their existence which I do not wish to produce though, perhaps,^ I am going too far in holding them back." This declaration (says the Echo de Paris) had the effect of a cold douche. But the British commissioner insisted that at least Admiral Rozhdestvensky should be censured. Admiral Dubassoff protested, asking why the honour of Admiral Rozhdestvensky should be thus insulted, and why the commission shoald wound the national amourpropre of the Russians, thus i-unning the risk, instead of bringing about tranqiiility, of stirring up fresh passions. These words triumphed over the last resistance of Admiral Beaumont, who was thoroughly convinced of the justice of his cause and evidently acted in good faith, but " whose irreconcilable attitude," in the opinion of the Echo de Paris, "had its origin in the national animosity of the British against the Russians."

A Paris correspondent writes : " A special note of urbanity marked the last sitting of the Hull Commission. This, indeed, was its sole distinction, except for the unusually large attendance of the public. From every point of view the result of this last sitting belied the prophets. The decision was much more favourable to England than had' been announced. It was noticed that no speech was made orj the Russian side, but this was because Sir Edward Fry. as the doyen of the assessors, spoke in their collective name. Sir Edward Fry's venerable appearance secured for him the most respectful attention, and when he rose to epeak the silence was profound. His voice tiembl-ed with emotion when he referred to the great progress which civilisation was making in the cause of peace, and of which the commission was an instance. At this passage many people craned over each other's shoulders to look at Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, the apostle of arbitration, who was seated on a front bench. Admiral Spaun's reply, requesting Admiral Fournier to transmit to M. Delcasse and the President of the Republic the thanks of the commission for the graceful hospitality received in France, was the Austrian admiral's maiden effort in oratory so far as the public sitting-s were concerned. His extraordinarily gruff and thick voice raised a discreet smile. Admiral Fournier bowed and smiled over this exchange of compliments, with typical French grace. And when he had announced that the sitting was over, the crowd that thronged down the steps from the imposing- entrance of tho Ministry and across the big gravelled courtyard, in the full blaze of a brilliant afternoon sun, i-esembled a fashionable congregation leaving church after an aristocratic marriage."

That th-e commissioners' verdict in regard to the British case was received with strong satisfaction in this country is undeniable. Yet, it must be admitted that the satisfaction was dashed with a good deal of unconcealed contempt for the manner in which the commissioners had endeavoured "to make things pleasant" for Russia and to let Admiral Rozhdestvensky down gently. Everybody naturally is saying : " How is it possible consistently to find Admiral Rozhdestvensky guilty of unjustifiably firing upon peaceful vessels, and of continuing that fire for an unwarrantably long time, and of steaming away without reporting anywhere the condition in which he had left the outraged vessels, and yet declare that these findings east no reflection either upon his capacity or his humanity." Tho absurdity is sufficiently obvious. Still, it is recognised that there was a just desire to avert so frightful a catastrophe as an Anglo-Russian war, and thus a good deal of allowance is made. The Hull fishermen are _ quite satisfied, their greatest anxiety being that they should bo acquitted of the treachery which would have been implied in their sheltering hostile torpedo boats. But the whole affair, the more it is ventilated, shows io still greater disadvantage the Russian character. It is openly declared by one or two papers, European and American as well as English, that the delicate euphemism " optical illusion" was considerately employed by the commissioners as evidently only a polite way of expressing that deplorable affection commonly expressed in English by the two letters, D.T. It is practically notorious that the personnel of the Russian fleet on that eventful night was in plain terms blind drunk, and hence it was that they drifted 30 miles off their course and were frightened into murderous fits by the apparition of a fleet of harmless fishing vessels. "When one reads the amazing accounts of the order for champagne and liqueurs given by the Russian officers during the stay of the guilty fleet near Madagascar, which orders have sent up the price of those drinks <by 75 per cent, to 100 per cent., it is not difficult to understand how the whole'affair happened. Meanwhile, what England has to be thankful for, and New Zealand equally so. is that the threatened world-war has apparently been averted. Press and personal comments upon tho findings have naturally been numerous and vigorous. Admiral Sir E. Fremantle, in an interview, remarked : "If Rozhdcstvensky was not justified in opening fire, and if he ought to have made a report of the occui'renc©, as the commissioners say, then ob\iously the only corollary to this is that h&

ought to have sent some ship to stand by and to find out what damage had been done, and offer assistance. It is satisfactory, at anyrate, that the commission has com© to the conclusion that there- were no torpedcbcats, and that the Admiral was not justified in giving the order to open fire. Incidentally, of course, the report means that the commissioners could not have believed the Russian witnesses, and their evidence is discredited. Klado positively affirmed lhat he saw torpedo-boats among; the trawlers. The Aurora," added the Admiral, " might have been mistaken for aj torpedo-boat, but how the trawlers, which! had plenty of lights, could possibly have been so mistaken on the daitkcst night Iti is difficult to imagine."