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INTERNATIONAL STORM CLOUDS.

THE WORLD'S PEACE-DISTURBER.

RUSSIA'S ÜBIQUITOUS PLOTTING

SOME IMPORTANT VIEWS OF EURO-

PEAN STATESMEN

(From Oun Own Correspondent )

LONDON, May 23.

Although to the superficial observer it may seem that the world ha= entered upon a period of almost millenial peace, to those who are accustomed to look below the surface and to otudy the inwardness of tilings the present international situation teems with suggestions of disquiet. | Ono writer puts in in this way : "So ! highly charged with electricity is the poli- [ tical atmosphere just no,v that amid a | universal distrust of appearances men start 1 at e\ery new thing to inquire what it may i portend to the peace of the world.- The i seemingly hopeless complications in the I Near Bist accentuated by the concentration 1 of European interests in Western Asia, sugI g&st all sorts of anxious queues. Is the , 1 Sultan in earnest or playing a dark game? \ Is Russia sincere in her profe6spd desire for •a peciceful solution of the Balkan problem? What part is Germany playing at the Sultan's ear in Constantinople? And how are the interests of Great Britain likely to be I aft'eelcd by any distuibancc of the status j I quo? Lately tho State v.'mt of the King to ] tho Mediterranean and Paris has pet on | foot a fresh tram of speculations as to its re-al connect. on with the international policy j of Great BnUm. Only those whew diplo- ' malic position or opportunities enable them I to penetrate tho Keusinian mysteries of the political world can answer such questions with any degree of assurance. The opinions, therefore, of one puch personality whose position in tho diplomatic arena lends x value to their expression will undoubtedly be welcomed by the average man who, while deeply enough concerned in the outcome of so many conflicting interests, is denied either the time or t'io facilities necessary for gauging them aright. ' In these few sentences rre indicated, it will be observed, a collection of problems so complex and far-reaching that their solution must ner>ds tax the highest capacities of the world's statesmen. The points actually involved are much too delicate and too deoply fi aught with grave potentialities to be suitable for ;,tiblic d^cu"=«ion by those ' who are engaged in the endeavour to solve them. Thus it is only occasionally that one can glean any authentic information as to the tiend of events from souicrs entitled to confidence. During the past day or two, however, an eminent statesman, whose identity, and even his nationality, must not be hinted at, has allowed himself to be interviewed, and has spoken out with more directness than is usual in the case of diplomatists. It may, of course, be said that possibly he* had a motive in this candour which may have been more apparent , than real ; but, at anyrate, his view of the j situation po=sepsc\s all the elements of oredi^J bility, and is, to Fiy the least, highly interesting. I may add that lie has long been connr-cted with those pharos of international politics which are generally known as the Eastern questions — the plural lias now to be ' u«ed because we have not only the Near East and the Far Eabt, but also tho Mid Ea«t.

He starts from tho old classic basis of cvi bono ; that is to say. in tracing out motives and intentions you have to look in the first plaeo to ccc who is going to benefit from wh^t. Pas=i*ig over what he regards ns '" accepted facts " — such as, to choose his own instance, tho British occupation of Egypt_. — ho maintains that one of the main factors in tho international problem consists in " those perfectly recognisable ambitions of nations winch are fond of <lr.=cribing them ns their national destiny." He proc-eccta to indicate two of t.hci-e tondonoios: " Thua, in tho fii-t-t nlace " '<o 'ay "it has lone br-pn recognised a 1 - an nxiom indicative of futuro political disquiet that the ambitions of both Germany and Ru=sa look southward, and to the east: that tlu aspirations of tho former are directed toward Trieste and Fiume, as well as to the extension of her influence throutrh the European and Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. That this eastward trend of Germany is no novel cone-op-tion of her Kaiser's brain, but that, on the contrary, his policy is but tho expression of a time-honoured smbitioii, is evidenced by the wntinus of (Jerman propagandists who were pointing In this direction as long a? 30 years ago. Secondly, with regard to Russia, it has been recoprnised that what the latter chooses to consodor her national df lies in the por«iMent southward pmh of her immense border-line from the Cas-

pian to the China Seas. It is at this point

that we can abandon generalisation, for we do not need even the strangely frank avowals of Russian political writers to assure us that the ambitions of Russia aje concentrated in overwhelming force upon that part of her southern frontier which overhangs the plains of Mesopotamia and the land of Palestine. Thlis nacepted political axiom has long been a dominant factor in Great Britain's political calculations affecting the Nc-ar East. And tho policy of successive British statesmen has been directed to guard against an eventuality which is so full of monao? for the interests and even the safety of the Britwh Empire." Starting from this basis he goes on to point out that the early efforts of British statesmen wore directed to remove any excuse for a Russian crusade to the south by the reformed pdmitmtrafcion on autonomous lines of Syria and Armenia. Then, as Jerusalem was undoubtedly the ultimate aim of any move from the Caucasus, tho mo^t obvious oounter-policy consisted in the establishment in Palestine of a measure of Jewish independence and autonomy under tho Sultan. But every attempt on these linos was checkmated by R.U'vsian hostility to any plan for the rehabilitation of Turkey, or the publishment of Jewish power and influence in the Holy Land. Accordingly another barrier to Russian aggression had to l>e deviled, and Lord Beaconsfield's policy in this quarter materialised in the acquisition of Cyprus as a naval and military "point d'appui within a striking distance, of Russia's line of descent to the south."

"But," he say^ — and this will probably be quite a new revelation to many people — " the lato-t and most effective move on the political chessboard of the Near East was that devised by Lord Salisbury a few years back when he accorded to Germany a. free hand in Asia Minor, and thus threw her across the line of Russia's advanoe from the north. Russia, who looked for no other rival than Great Britain in Western Asia, was completely surpised, not to say desperately alarmed, at thn new turn of events. The periodical mutterings of her press bear witness to this."

This is quite true. Only recently the Novoe Vromya deprecated strongly any too soiious entanglement of Ru.=wia'a military resources in China on Hi© ground that " our most vital interests are centred inalienably in the Near Eastern arena." And yet another writer declares: "This incursion of Germ/my into Asia Minor is full of most serious menace to the national aspirations of Russia." ; and again: "The Baghdad railway nm;t not be!" But the interviewed diplomatist proceeds: "At this poini fortune has changed sides, and enco more favours Russian interests. Great Britain and Germany, who->o cordial co-operation in tho Near East would nvo=t proba.bly have succeeded in opposing an impassable barrier to Russian aggression, are unable to act in harmony. The German disposition is to monopolise every prospective advantage in the new position of affair?, which &o accurately reflects her previous diplomacy in dealing with ourselves and her cnvn allies in Europe, has alienated the confidence and support of Great Britain. The natural consequence is that Russia, relieved from the fear cf on Anglo-German coalition in Western Asia, is much better placed to defeat the great German project, which for her has become a veritable nightmare. Undoubtedly her most obvious course was to jeopardise the security of the railway as a commercial investment by the creation cf ju=fc such a state of anarohv at its bn.se in tho European provinoes of Turkey as that which is now developing. There is not only oxcpc-dingly little doubt in the diplomatic world that had it coincided with the interests of Rus=ia tho insurrectionary movement which Turkey is now called upon to face would never have reached any serious proportions, but the unmistakable action of Russian agents in fche disturbed area points with still greater certainty to the inspiration of the present crisis, to say nothing of the source of warlike raptorial which is daily finding its way through fche Balkans in convenient and unobtrusive disguises. The creation of a state of warlike anarchy in Turkey servre Russia's purpose in two ways. Not only does it still furbber tend toward the economical exhaustion of the Ottoman Empire, but, as long as political disturbance continues, it is no good Germaay talking of kilometric guarantees, or hoping to attract financial support for her commercially discredited railway. For the moment tho chano&s of the project have been shattered by Germany's own selfish bad faith and Russian intrigue."

So much for tho international situation, as in tho opinion of this eminent critio it stands at present with relation to the Eastern question. It now becomes needful to consider what sequel is indicated as probable. He states his opinion with almost startling frankness: "The next move in the drama," ho says, "is likely to be of absorbing interest. As things stand at present the Kai&er, with the secret support and sympathy of Austria, has pretty effectually barred a Russian landward invasion of Turkey by tho reorganisation of the Turkish army and a good understanding with tho Power of Roumania as his furthest Eastern outpost; while Italy's interests are also deeply involved in the existing balance of power in tho Mediterranean. But a Russian attack upon Constantinople to-day will descend hy sea upon the Golden Horn, and, in addition to this, an equally, if not more eff r etivo, mean* of reaching the Mediterranean, and of shutting the gate of the East to Germany for o\er, i» open by an advance through Diabokir to Alexandretta, situated at the angle formed by the junction of tho southern coast of Asia Minor with that which forms the eastern boundary of the Mr-ditcrranoan. But "Russia is not the ai biter of dostiny, and it the present moment the extension of her immense empire to the China Seas has proportionately weakened hor roscrpos both financally and military. On tho went she is faced by the inflexible noopp-sity of stopping Germany before that Power can extend her influence in a material shape across the DiabekirAlexandretta line. Tin's she may be expected to attempt if the need becomes pressing, even at the risk of war. At the present moment, however, she is gaining time by the despatch of political inrondiariea and raw material through the Balkans, and by cho mutual divergi-nro of Gi-m* Britain and Germany. This has enabled her for the moment to adoot a more aggTesiive policy upon her Far 'Rastprn flank and to consummate, if possible, the practical annexation of Manheuria."

Naturally at this stage the reflection forces itself: What is likely to be the view taken of this position and prospect by the Great

Powers most chiefly interested? Her© once more the "interviewee" speaks out with, refreshing candour. He says: "The issues involved aro serious enough to call for tha most energetic action on the part of Greafi Britain, Japan, and the United States; while if a Machiavellian policy on the parfe of Germany assists in the final px - edominanco of Russia in North-eaatern China, so much the worse for her in that inevitable day when Teuton and Slav meet face to face ia Eastern Europe. Japan, perfectly aware tha* the continued advanoe of Russia is a mattei* of life and death to her, is determined to make a fight for her existence when the necessary moment arrives, and England*, whoso initiative in the Far East is now inspired by the capable brain of Sir Ernesfi Satow, is preparing to adopt a strong policy in support of her ally. I may say that if! is the possibility of this eventuality whicf* has really brought about the sudden, andl temporary postponement of the Somali oarrx^ paign. On the other band, whether sho i» so or not, Russia is very anxious to appeajj to mean business jiwt now. She haa rather more than 250.0C0 men in the Far East, backed by a stronsr fleet in the China Seas, while several additional warships o£ hera have for some little while been ostentatiously waiting at British coaling stations en route to the po-sibl« scene of action". The next few weeks will decide whether Russia is enabled to establish herself witlurn a short sprinc; of Peking, or is to recoive t*. set back which will give the world time to breathe while she devises and intrigues her n&xt aggression."

Here, then, you see, matters are broughfc to a point which becomes a sr>ear directed! at the heart of the world's peace. If this \ery well informed snd singularly clearsighted authority can be relied upon, almost any day may see England, America, and Japan compelled to fight for their vital interests with reference to Manchuria; or ife may see England called upon at *?he briefest! notice to stand By Japan with t'h-a full force of the Empije in repelling Russian aggression in Korea ; or it may see this country once more virtually foroed info association with Germany, and this time with Italy and Austria, to resist Russia's long-desirod and long-df>layed pounoe upon Constantinople — the alternative being the abandonment to Russia of predominance in the Mediterranean and a dingerous base from which tha Anglo-Indian trade could be assailed or harassed ; but even th-a seemingly comprehensive survey practically omits from its scope ono of the mos<t serious and menacing problems of all— that of the Mid East, otherwise Persia and the Persian Gulf.

On all hands just now, in America and Germany as well as in .England and Japan, and .sometimes even in Franoo, one constantly finds the old term of opprobrium, Punica fides, a.nplied to receat Russian methods, and there seems a growing deposition to recognise that, at all events as regard her " punic faith," Russia is ■ fcho Carthage of modem times. No Power whosea interests are at all irreconeilablo with those/of Russia feels perfectly safe that some fine day may not attempt by a sudden coup to secure a formidable advantage. So "trongly does this sentiment pervade present feeling that the fact of 11 Russian warships being at Colombo Just now in the guise of friendly visitors has created some serious apprehension, and attention has ever! been called in Parliament to tho fact. It is recognised that tho sudden seizure of Cey.'on, would confer upon Russia enormous advantages in facilitating tho development of her Far Eastern policy, and some of our least alarmist statesmen do not feel at all comfortable about the matter. I need hardly recall to New Zealand readers how often during the past decade I have reminded them that such a step with reference to New Zealand lias long been absoluitoly known to be one of the earliest moves contemplated in any Russian hostilities against this country.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/OW19030701.2.47

Bibliographic details

Otago Witness, Issue 2572, 1 July 1903, Page 18

Word Count
2,572

INTERNATIONAL STORM CLOUDS. Otago Witness, Issue 2572, 1 July 1903, Page 18

INTERNATIONAL STORM CLOUDS. Otago Witness, Issue 2572, 1 July 1903, Page 18