NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN

Otago Witness, Issue 2402, 15 March 1900, Page 11

NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN

OUR RETURNED SPECIAL INTERVIEWED.

(Feom Our Own Correspondent.)

WELLINGTON, March 6.

Mr J. E. Moultray, who up to the time he was laid aside with fever did such good work for your journal at the front in South Africa, was in Wellington to-day, and the following interesting interview with him appeared in to-night's Post: —

Mr Moultray said it was to be regretted that the public were so severe in their condemnation of some of our generals. It was apparently forgotten that Lord Roberts required over 40,000 men to accomplish what General Methuen had been endeavouring to do witli 13,000. If the latter had made a serious blunder at Magersfontein in deliver ing a frontal attack upon a position that was afterwards found to be impregnable, yet it §Uou.ld be borne in mind that to have attacked

the position on either flank would have com' pelled him to expose his own base and lay open the whole country to the Boers as fai? as De Aar. Of two evils he chose the lesser. Whether the undertaking was directed with' the requisite wisdom and skill it was not for him (Mr Moultray) to judge. The feeling in Cape Colony against General Buller was very strong- after .the second defeat, but to anyone who had seen the country it was marvellous that he had ultimately forced a passage through to Ladysmith. The general who has gained the greatest reputation out of the war so far was (next to Sir George White) Lieut.general French, to whose cavalry division Mr -Ujullray was attached. Some people wera inclined to blame him for Ihe Suffolk disaster bul that vkas a case of the Suffolk commander endeavourj ng to do more than he was authorised by his instructions. There were two kopjes near the camp, the further of which was held by the Boerd. The Suffolks' orders were to seize the nearer hill. During the uight the artillery, who proceeded by a different route, were to open fire at daybreak from another position, and wl en the defender? had been sufficiently shpiied the Suffolks were to storm the kepje with the bayonet. That was the plan. This was how it was carried out: The Suffolks reached the first position all right. Through the darkness they could see the outline of the next kopje looming tip dark and silent; indeed, the silence was so intense that the Suffolks were deceived, and, thinking- that the position had been abandoned, they were marched across, and_slrode into a perfect volcano of fire and tfmolce. Men were falling on all nides. and in the darkness and confusion the Boeri bawled out orders in English, which were obeyed, witbthe result tlmt, a number surrendered, while others made a dash through, the darkness for liberty, and arrived in camp with an account of the disaster. It was also reported that_ the artillery, according to its orders, came into action, and in carrying out its programme comioe'iced to shell the position, sending its deadly projectiles amongst both friends and foes, thus unwittingly completing the panic. The public may rest assured of one tiling, saj's Mr Moultray, and that is that the conduct of this campaign will ftp well threshed out in the British Parliament, but not until the war is concluded.

As for our field guns, when in one of his letters he wrote about them being outranged, Mr Moultray simply described what he actually saw. The weapons were horje artillery 12-pounclers, and the Boers certainly made excellent practice against them ; but whether the weapon they used was what is called a gun of position or a field piece, it was impossible to say. A field gun i& intended to keep up with infantry, covering three miles an hour over rough country. For this purpose it must be light, and to secure this lightness its length of barrel must be curtailed with the result that with a weapon about 6ft long it is impossible to get accurate shooting much beyond 4000 yards. Our weapons ar3 sighted for a much longer range. Our naval 4.7 in gun more closely resembles the Boer guns in accuracy, but it is a long unweildy weapon, requiring; a large team to drag it, arid quite incapable of the rapidity of movement for which our field guns are so well adapted. If we had always had our guns at the long range we would not have lost so many men ; but at Arundel Mr Moultray saw the guns being worked within rifle range of the enemy, and in approaching them a gunner was seen to fall, shot through the hip with a Mauser bullet, fired about 900 yards away ; while our correspondent? himself had to pass into the fire zone, where bullets were ploughing lip the ground before he could speak to the gunners. It will be remembered that General Buller lost 10 guns because Colonel Long took them within the ranp.e of the Boer rifles. The conclusion Mr Moultray comes to is that if our guns were worked at long range they might equal the enemy's in distance, but he doubts if our gunners will break off the habit that they have of always pushing their guns further xip. Mr Moultray cannot praise our^medical service too highly. It is simply perfect. He always found the Red Cross waggons well up towards the fighting line ; and, with reference to the Boers firing upon them, he considers that we have ourselves to blame, for the flag flown is only about the size of a pocket handkerchief. A large cross painted on the white tilt would be a decided improvement. The Boer medical service is rather antique, where it exists at all. A refugee told him that the last thing he saw as he fled out of Colesberg was the Boers marching in with one of his father's grocery waggons, with a red cross painted roughly on its side. The Boer uses the waggon more for strategic purposes than for its legitimate purpose. Mr Moultray quoted an instance where the JBocra aftain and accain tried to cross to a kopje that they wanted to occupy, but found our rifle fire too serious. At length a string of waggons and carts passed out upon the veldt, and moved towards the kopje. They all exhibited prominent red crosses, while at the further side of them marched the crowd of. chuckling Boers, who were thus enabled to reach the coveted loosition in safety.

As regards the feeling among the resident Dutch in Cape Colony, they are like a barre] of powder awaiting the match. Their fondest wish was that the Boers would capture Cape Colony, and that some Power would fall foul of us. Both hopes were from the first doomed to disappointment. The Dutch did not realise that at first, but they know it now, and their very impotency makes their rage more furious. Among the loyalists great disappointment was expressed that the Government should give traitors found with arms in their hands the benefit of trial by jury, especially in such a den as Capetown. If, as is not improbable, they are acquitted — for our correspondent was informed the verdict must be unanimouf — thousands of the disaffected will join the enemy, to assist at the crowning struggle around Pretoria.

Mr Moultray has formed a very poor opinion of South Africa. If it were not for the principle involved, the place would not, he says, be worth fighting for. He admits that he saw it at its worst, there having been an exceptional drought ; but there is an old saying about Cape Colony — " Rivers without water, flowers without perfume, women without beauty." He admits the truth of the first two sentences, but cannot endorse the last. If New Zealand adopted the Boer system of tactics in its defence scheme ifr could, Mr Mcmltray believes, hold its own against any Power in Europe, particularly since ha has watched the behaviour of our men under fil'P.

The colonial troopers are, as regards valour equal to the Imperial troops, and at scouting and patrol work they are the acme of perfection. Our men are cheery ond full of fun when lying in camp or roasting on the burning kopjes, and prompt to obey orders in an emergency; while they still retain the many traits characteristic of their New Zealand origin, their quaint originality often attracting the notice of the general and his staff, and eliciting praise. New Zealand may, he observes* well feel proud of her sons.