PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2402, 15 March 1900, Page 62

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

iuE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

Just; now the reviews and periodicals are flooded with Empire articles, and it is impossible for anyone not belonging to the leisured classes to read them all. In Melbourne the other day an enthusiast said that with such mercies as the relief of Kimberiey, the surrender oi Cronje, and the raising of the siege of L:-.dy,*mith following one another in such rapid succession, he found one mouth quite inadequate to give vent to his feelings ; and il is just as impossible for a writer in one column to give the contents of the many important and suggestive articles now appearing. I shall try, however, to give you the gist of two or three ot them. One runs something like ths: — "In this last year of the nineteenth century we are face to face with a great alternative — :he contraction of the boundaries of our Empire or the expansion of our military forces until they are sufficient to defend the vast inland frontiers our navy cannot reach. The South African War — there is no use disguising it — has strained to the breaking point our military resources. Patriotism in the hour of danger is very jjood, but soldiers cannot ba trained in a week ; so the time has come when, by ballot or conscription, or some other systematic means, the male population of the Empire can be drawn upon to be trained as effective units for defensive and, if necessity be, for offensive purposes. We must live up with the other armed and drilled nations of the world."

Why is it that with our wide world Empire we e-re so unmilitary? Our Empire building has taken the form of pure evolution, little heeded in the process, and almost wholly without guidance. Our frontiers have been extended' without any design whatever. The Russian, German, and French Empires are the result of deliberation, forethought, calculated design ; consequently, the military and naval forces have been built up a's a part of the general plan. Jtfot so with up. And the result? A blundering on, and expansion, in spite of our huge mistakes, and not because of any master policy. How often have we deliberately thrown away our chances, and had to retrieve our losses at enormous cost. In lid 9, for instance, Cjir Sydney Smith endorsed a treaty with Klebsr, the French commander-in-chiel, for the entire abandonment of Egypt by the French ; but the treatj- was promptly disavowed. And yet, what happened? Two ye?rs after, some 22,000 men, including England's crack corps, were wandering about aimlessly in transports in the .Mediterranean ; and the necessity of doing something witli the men before returning them lo England was one of the motives for landing them in Egypt, where, in 1801, directly or indirectly, untold gold and thousands of lives were spent to accomplish what could have been done two years before, without; firing a shot or speeding a sixpence. So, at any rale, says Fitchett, in his second volume of " How England Saved Europe." Even then we did not pursue our advantage, and we all know what advances and retrogressions have bsezi made in Egypt during the p^st 20 odd years. Then there is Tangier. What would we give for it to-day? Delagoa Bay, too. Both were not priced at the value of an old song. Yet what are their value today?

This, however, is a digression ; for we are wanting to have a line oi two on our army. Lord Rosebery, some years ago, pointed out that our Empire had increased in a short time fully one-third in area. What is the extent of increase now? Since he spoke we have annexed Egypt from the Mediterranean to the Equator — a trifle of, &ay, 2500 miles in length. In South Africa" our responsibilities have enormously increased, and it is pretty certain that an army of occupation of, say, 30,000 will be necessary there for some time after the war ends. Our Indian frontier has been extended. Then, in addition, we have French schemes to thwart in Morocco, Siam, and China ; and Russia in Persia, Afghanistan and China ; and both in other places. What are we to do? The terrific tension existing now, and the competition for territorial expansion as a means of increasing commerce, make it absolutely necessary to face the grave danger now threatening us., and lo devise means to have reidv at all times an army as tvell as a navy, to repel attacks on any part of the Empire. We are now fnlly realising that Greater Britain ivill have to fight for her existence, and that the responsibilities of the Empire have been allowed to out arrow its military strength. We realise, too, that our awakening has been a most opportune one. and Hint good fortune has attended us. Supposing we had — and it might easily have happened — the Khalifa as well as Ivruger and Co. to face nt the" same time, and that we had also tremble on our Indian frontier, with further diversions in Pors ; a and the Far East? — I am nuoling in effect what a writer of weight has said to have been nuite within the bounds of possibility. Oh, the navy is our first line of defence, it is said. So it is ; bur do you know what Lord Chfrles Bprrsford s.iid the olhor clnv — that a few years a£o France could have

made us put our best foot foremost even" wiih our navy, and that it was oiuy persistent agitation that enabled us to make up leewd3 T ? It was not on account of a consistent i^Hcy pursued year in, year out. Exclusive of British' troops, in India — I am giving the figures of an article — we have 595,000 men, and of these 550,000 were in the United Kingdom at the commencement of the outbreak. These, however, are to be divided into six divisions, serving under different conditions, and in each case the paper strength exceeds the effective strength, so much so that we had to make immediate demands upon India and colonial garrisons, and were glad to accept' colonial contingents. What would the result be if we were at war with a first-class power necessitating, saj', an extra 100,000? We have been standing on the brink of a precipice. We have plenty of men ; but a recruiting ground isn't a ready-made army. We must in future fully man all our military stations, and have 400,000 men ready and equipped for active service within a fortnight. Another writer's words, epitomised, read somewhat as follows : The sterling qualities of the British soldier have never shown brighter than on the heavily stricken fields of South Africa. Regular and colonial . troops have been called upon to face a terrific fire of which European armies knownothing, and have unflinchingly withstood the ordeal. A "United Empire has arisen to meet a national emergency, and its manhood of eveiy degree shows no signs of decadence. If we emerge from 'this difficult contest — and we shall — stronger, bound to- - getter by closer ties, with a new understanding of our Imeprial responsibilities, and with purer aims, the gallant lives cheerfully surrendered and the lifelong sorrows that have fallen upon British liomea in many lands will have their recompense. A great American once said lh.it 'our flag, wherever it has been advanced, has benefited the coum'rv ovei which il floats ; and lias canned with it civilisation, the Christian i elision, order, justice, and prosperity. And we ourselves honestly think our Empire stands as the symbol of liberty and ■ progress. Tlwn it is an Empire worth defending : but fighting men are needed.

Another -writer, empiiasmg the nted of a large army and «it Imperial system of organising embracing ail colonial forces, points out the stupidly nan ow- view we look of the seriousness of the South African crisis. Like the Ministers of Napoleon 111 in 1870, we entered the war with an outburst of jubilant jingoism, and a general impre'-csiou that we were in for a comparatively eysy kind of picnic; which -would cover us with, glory, and iill the world, with envy. .Two arinv corps and about 310,000.000 were thought to suffice. And what do v.-c iind? Eight army corps", and more to follow, and £100.000^000 will not be an overeyrimatioo. ■Instead of a picnic, thore is a sombre Christina:-, and vn ackuowledj,'in'iro \h»'c comuieiical estimates of our requirements wexv more accurate than ours. Ai.d wo might jj.ive known better. The Spaniards Xouacl a fleet of gunboats and 150.000 men 100 few to crush Cuba ; Italy had an army of 60..000 almost annihilated in Abyssinia ; the Americans found 65,000 useless to quell the Philippines ; ~ and the Auslrians needed 200,000 for two years, to crush the Bosnian mountaineers. Why did we expect to fare better, especially in the face of a hostile Europe?

I have outrun my space, but I haven't given a tithe of the outpourings of responsible writers on the present situation. You will sec, however, by what I have written that the situation is a perilous one, and it will be anything but patriotic to shut our eyes to facts and trust to luck. True patriotism glories in the deeds of the past and the present ; but it does more ; it realises that we hive a heritage to hand on to future generations : that we must look "at the dark side as well as the bright, so that we may see what may eventuate ; and so get ready for all possibilities. Am I not right?

And after all I haven't outlined any scheme for providing troops. One -writer advocates the Swiss system ; perhaps I'll give it next week.

— The omnibus* company of Paris, on ths occasion cf the Exposition this year, will have S2 lines and 1500 vehicles, performing 25,000 journeys a clay, and capable of transporting 1,028,000 passengers.