NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2401, 8 March 1900, Page 24

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Major Kennedy.

February 27.

The cable from, Lord Roberts to his Excellency the Governor of Queensland states that he could find employment for any additional colonial troops that the colony •would send. This message, although addressed to Queensland, lias special meaning which all the colonies and the Motherland ought to take note of, for, if it means anything at all, it is an expression tof opinion by the greatest living British soldier that our forces in South Africa 'are inadequate. The message has a particular meaning just at present, in view jofthe intelligence that has been received f* s to the preparations made by the. miliary party in Russia for an attack on Herat Great Britain is busy in South l^frica, . That the Czar ,is -friendly to England and "opposed to war on principle, and jpatticularly §o with a friendly State, might fie taken as a guarantee of peace if he were an reality the autocrat that popular opinion Relieves the Emperor of all the Russians 'to be. "But the fact of the case warrants the belief that is ■ held by everyone who lias studied Russia and the .Russians — to •wit, that the war party of Russia, and ,4hot the Czar, is the power that controls jfcheVjlestiny of that great empire, and, however much the Emperor bay desire '

peace, it is the military chiefs that Great j Britain Aviil have 'to watch. After the close of the war of 1878-79 in Afghanistan it Avas supposed that the policy of pushing a line of railway through that country to Herat would be continued until we had ' a railway line by .which troop?, stores, and munitions could be delivered quickly on the south bank of the Oxus River for the defence of Afghanistan whenever Russia challenged our supremacy in that quarter. This policy, however, was changed by an alteration in the Imperial ; Go\ eminent programme owing to a change ' in the party in power, and instead of there 1 being a British railway from India to the Oxus Are have not a single mile of the road constructed, Avhile r Russia has not only built a line of railway from' St. Petersburg 1 over mountains and plains to the Oxus and / beyond, but she has also tested its caI pacitA- in transporting troops to within 60 I miles of Herat, the recognised base for a I military invasion of India. It is under these circumstances absolutely necessary that the South African Avar be brought to an end quickly, and that British military ascendency shall be beyond dispute, and our forces be prepared to accept the gauntlet of Avar in the East if the military party in Russia, led on by General Kouropatkine, should prove_ Coo strong in their demands for the* Czar- to successfully resist them. There, is a limit to the power of the Czar, - and -when that limit is reached Great Britain' will have to fight. The weakness that has been shown to exist in our military sy-i,em has encouraged the military chiefs 'of Russia, and they iioav hope to profit at Britain's expense before she has time to remedy.' the defects in her army and stop the chances of a Russian occupation of Herat, Cabul, and Kandahar, and, later, their advance to the Persian Gulf. The plans of Russia, and the message of Lord Roberts- ought to sjmr up the British military^ spirit in every part of the Empire, "and the old 'adage, " In time of peace prepare for Avar," ought to receive the attention that it deserves. If Aye need an example of the effects of a nation taking . that adage to heart and folloAving its teachings we can point to Germany as she was prior to 1860 and as she is to-day. Turning again to the more immediate questions of the Avar and its bearing, it is noted that the losses experienced in the fighting north of the Tugela are somewhat heavy. The way the enemy, are contesting General Buller's ~adA r ance would, lead one to suppose that General Joubert intended to contest the relief of Ladysmith regardless of Cronje's predicament. But the Boer leader would probably be only too glad to hasten his forces in the passage through the Drakensbergs if General Buller would give him an opportunity of retiring unmolested. It is evident that General Buller is carrying out a part of a combined plan, and\ that he Avill harass General Joubert's retreat in such force thajfc ,the enemy : will- be z top. late to help 'Orqnje out of the- hole he is in/ or to join forces Avith • the' balance of Cronje's army, which, has evidently escaped beyond the limits" where pursuit by General French's cavalry would be advisable until Cronje is a prisoner. , The' use of the soft-nosed bullets by the enemy is reported, but Avorse still/ is the 'statement- that 'these bullets haA r e been treated 'to a chemical process which causes serious injuries. To be plain, the bullets have been poisoned in a scientific manner to cause the greatest possible number of deaths to our soldiers. If this should un-haT>mly-prove to be true it Avill brand the Boer Government and their, officers as murderers of the foulest kind, and Avill re«iOA r e the last claim that the most rabid h^ter of Great Britain can make in behalf of lvrugerism. It is to be hoped that upon investigation the crime of poisoning bullets cannot be added to the long list of crimes that is directly chargeable to the Dutch Afrikander. The position of Cronje on the Modder is one of great strength, provided he had plenty of guns and ammunition. The steep banks of the river afford splendid protection against- the destructiA-e fire of the British guns, and give the enemy a grand opportunity of constructing shelter for their men when not in action and for their stores and ammunition. From the description furnished in the cables of the position the enemy occupy, it is" evident that it will be difficult to dislodge him as -long as food and ammunition' hold out. : The reconnoitring of the position by balloon Avill enable the British to destroy any part of the enemy that are exposed, but if the" position is to 'be made- untenable quickly it must be accomplished by means of -sapping. The cables state" that sapping has commenced, and Aye may therefore expect some days to go by before the trenches have reached close enough to the enemy's lines to allow the infantry to carry the enemy's laager at the point of the bayonet. [Since the above was written the Agent -general's message, announcing the unconditional capitulation of Cronje and his forces, has come to hand.] The system of reaching an enemy's position across an open country by means of sapping is a very old one — in fact, it may be said to have come into use as soon as firearms became of general use in Avarfare. Sapping is ci system of throwing up entrenchments forming parallels and approaches one after the other in regular or irregular lines, each one bringing the besiegers closer to the position they Avish to attack. In the present instance, it Avill enable the British infantry to get Avithin striking distance <if the enemy without having to expose themselves to the fire of the enemy directed at them Avhen crossing the open , plain. The destruction . of four waggons laden Avith ammunition in Oronje's laager with* in an hour after they had been located by observation from a balloon speaks Avell for the efficiency of the British artillerists, and, although so much has been truthfully said and written abotit the inferior range of the British guns, it is particularly satisfactory to be able to state that the personnel of the artillery branch of the army is superior to any similar body of men in existence. In fact, it can be truthfully said that in efficiency the men of the artillery are superior to the same class in any foreign service to-dajr, and that they are not only equal but superior to airY

that Great Britain has ever placed in the field.

The action of Mr Sailer in stopping the pay of the men who have volunteered to go to the front if they belonged to the Cape railway service may be set down as the work of the whole Cape Ministry, . as ylv Saver is only one member of that antiBritish body. February 28. At length we have the glorious news that Cronje and all his forces are prisoners of war, having, surrendered unconditionally to Lord Roberts on the morning of the 27th. The result of Cronje's surrender will have a most depressing effect on the enemy's forces, and will certainly result in shortening the duration of the war. We may now expect a hasty retreat of such of the Transvaal Boers as have, escaped, and the Free Staters will probably try to desert and return to their farms.

The moral effect of the victory of Lord Roberts over Cronje Arill be all the greater since the Boers from one end of the tAvo Republics to the other look on Cronje as then' greatest soldier. His fall sounds the death knell of the Boers. Cronje a prisoner with over 4000 of his one-time A"ictorious army, must of itself dampen the spirits of the Africanders, cA r en if they could repair the losses of so many men, and so much stores as haA r e fallen into the hands of Lord Roberts. As there is no possible means of repairing the loss they have sustained, the effect of the capitulation is so far greater concern to Kruger, Steyn, and Co., and the cause they represent. The future of the campaign and Avhat effect Cronje's surrender Avill have on its continuance az % e the chief objects the Avriter must keep in A 7 ie\v.

The information that 5000 of the enemy's troops had AvithdraAvn from Natal up to Friday last comes someAvhat of a surprise, as iwe had previously been informed that | 20,000 men from Joubsrt's army had gone to reinforce Cronje. There is an indisputable conflict here which renders it impos- ; sible to arrive at the true position of affairs.. However, the latest cable is invari*ably the more reliable, and on that these remarks are based. Possibly one of the results of Cronje's surrender Avill be an exchange of prisoners bebAveen the two Governments. But it hardly likely that Lord Roberts Avill agree to include any of the rebel Dutch colonists, or any other British subjects in the number to be exchanged. The release of about 2500 of British soldiers from Pretoria will be hailed with joy by their comrades, and in a lesser degree by the public throughout the Empire. It must not be taken for granted, hoAvever, that Cronje's capture Avill end the Avar, but its bearing on the Dutch prospects are of greater consequence than such a loss Avould be under ordinary circumstances. If the object Cronje had in vieAv AA'as to delay the advance of the troops under Lord Roberts until Joubert could retire from Natal anU concentrate for the" protection •of Bloemfontein and, later, Pretoria, it is clear that he has failed, as the latest information from the vicinity of Ladysmith shows that the constant harassing tactics of General Buller, ably assisted j by General White, has prevented any hasty retreat of "the enemy in the direction they desire to take, and as a result Cronje^could, obtain no assistance from Joubert. ' " The question noAv is, Where is De la Rey? What has become of his division of the Boei army, and where are the commandos forming the bulk of Cronje's army that were not captured • Avith him? It is A^ery likely that these are the forces that were said to be concentrating 30 miles from Bloemfontein, and- it is almost certain that the 5000 sent from Natal are on the way to join forces Avith them. It is quite within the range of reason that the re&erves sent from Pretoria Avill also be joined to this Boer army. The strength of this combined force it is impossible for us to estimate with any degree of accuracy, for there is bound to be a great falling oft* in the ranks of the Free State commandos by" reason of desertions from their ranks, and there is little hope that fresh recruits Avill hi obtainable from the colonial Dutch, for, however much the rebel colonials may sympathise Avith their Republican kinsmen, there is little chance of any more of them risking their necks and property on account of sympathy when tho tide of cA r ehts is so markedly in favour of the British. ,The Boer forces must, therefore,- be prepared to continue the struggle unaided, or folloAv Cronje's example. To do the former they must be able to fall back Avithout delay and concentrate on -the north bank of the Vaal River. The question that this naturally leads up for answer is, Can Lord Roberts's army stop the enemy and compel them to come to terms before they reach Vereeniging, for here th.ey must concentrate to contest the passage across Viljeon's Drift? The condition of General French's caA^alry and artillery horses Avill haA T e to be taken into consideration when answering that question, for to the horse artillery, cavalry, and mounted infantry AA-e must look for the necessary forces to compel the enemy to entrench, so as to give the infantry a chance to overtake the more mctoile troops of the enemy in retreat. The information avc receiA r ed on the 26tn docs not giA'e too much to hope for, as at that time hundreds of General French's horses AA-ere worn out and otherwise rendered unfit for service, and it is more .than likely that the experience of the past feAV days has not left the balance is. an imi3roA r ed condition, as hard riding has been necessary to,prevent the forces of the enemy from coming to Cronje's aid and to keep Cronje's troops from breaking aAvay piecemeal. Consequently if the Boers take advantage of the Bloemfontein and Pretoria railways for transport and retire promptly "they Arill in all probability reach tlie north bank of the Vaal before General French can prevent them, and if they reach that point it is just possible that Joubert may be able to gradually retire to the north from in front of Ladysmith. But unless the Boer armies noAv in the Free State escape as outlined, then Joubort Avill fall into the hands of either Generals Buller or White, as he cannot retreat quick enough to keep Lord Roberts from gaining his rear and cutting the lines of communication between Pretoria- and Ladv-

smith if the Boer army does not delay Lord Roberts in his- passage to the Vaal. The" withdrawal of the Free State Government from Bloemfontein to Winburg is only one stage of the inevitable journey to Pretoria, where the final act of the war will be the seizure by Lord Roberts, in the name of the Queen, of the books, papers, and property belonging to the Republic, as part of the indemnity for the cost of the Avar.

The Boers are evidently also getting the worst of it in Cape Colony, as General Clements with the Inuiskilling Dragoon's has been driving them back once more from the vicinity of Arundel. In this engagement the Australians seem to have played an important part. From Barkly East comes cheerful news, and even at Lady Grey, in the Barkly district, the enemy seem to have lost heart. That Lord Roberts does not consider the war by any means over is conclusively proved by the cable we have just received stating that 10,500 men of the Bth Division of the army would leave England for the Cape next week. It is matter of importance that troops be furnished in sufficient numbers, and that promptly to crush out any further chance of Boer successes, for by doing so we will run far less risk of being involved in a war with Russia.

It now remains to be considered what are the positions that the enemy will try to defend, provided they are able to withdraw from the positions they now occupy, and are able to reach the Transvaal. A careful study of the situation leads to the conclusion that the enemy will try to make use of the Vaal River as their next line of defence, as to defend Bloemfontein even under ordinary conditions would be madness, and under existing circumstances even a madman would hardly think of doing so, as there are neither food* nor ammunition in sufficient quantity to last an army of occupation 10 days. Besides, all supplies would have to come from Pretoria, and the investing force would easily cut off such. It very naturally follows that Bloemfontein will not be the centre of any of the stirring events of the struggle fo~ supremacy of the Boer and Briton. WinbuKg, -where the cables state the Free State Government have removed, is equally untenable for tho enemy. Neither is there any other place in the Free State- .that can be, made defensible, and be? provisioned in time to stop the British advance. But if the Boer forces from the Free State join forces with the Boer army now in_ Natal,- -and take up a position on the Vaal, they can create that river into a second Tugela, as the deep-cut river bed offers -f ew chances . to a force of infantry to gain a crossing, the banks of the stream being mostly high bluffs, offering splendid positions to troops defending the passages over the drifts. The distance from one bluff to the bluffs on the opposite shores render, bridging both difficult and dangerous if the troops engaged in construction are opposed by an enemy. For these reasons it is " evident" the Vaal River 'will be -the scene of the next attempt of the enemy to stop the progress of the British on their march to Pretoria.

" The' report that is cabled that General Buller ordered the attack on Spion Kop tor relieve the pressure that the 'enemy * were putting on General Warren's division can hardly, be .taken, seriously, as it* was a-part of General Warren's division that occupied and held the Kop. We are left in wonder at the yarns that are_ cabled out here. How is it possible to relieve pressure on a. division by sending it into a hotter corner than it already occupied?

March I.'

The cables give a more detailed account of the surrender of Cronje at Koodoosrand. It is stated that Lord Roberts attributes the capitulation to the demoralisation of Cronje's troops caused by the" easy victory achieved oA'er the Boer reinforcements, a*s the enemy alloAved him to push forward his trenches until the British cordon in one -night Avas drawn so tight that the enemy surrendered at dawn. Having seen the defeat of the forces sent to relieA'e them, Cronje's men lost heart and gave up the struggle. The capitulation of Cronje so soon after being hemmed in is in marked contrast to the gallant stand made, by General White at Ladysmith and by Colonel Kekewich and Colonel BadenPoAvell at Kimberley and Maf eking. -Had the troops under these officers been as easily- discouraged as Cronje's men all three toAvns- ■ Avculd 'have fallen into the possession .of the. Boers before a single battalion of General Buller's army corps left Southampton. Luckily for the honour and prestige of the British Empire our men are hot easily "discouraged. 1 •" ' The losses sustained by our troops at Paardeburg total 740 for one day's fighting. This loss falls on General Knox's division in their fight Avith De la Rey's of the Free State on the 18th.

Distinguished services have been ren-^ dered by the Canadian Regiment, and their losses plainly show that they Avere eager to gain a place amongst the fighting regiments. Those who knoAV them have always held a high opinion of the Canadian forces.

The colonial forces, under General Brabant, although only recently sent to the front, are doing splendid service also. Brabant's force Avas enlisted in Cape Colony, and, though many of the men in its ranks are not Cape colonials, they are

a -hardy lot, used to the rough life at the Cape and inured to the climate that is so trying to the "average new chum. . The capture of several towns in the Barkly East district by Brabant's Brigade within the past tATo Aveeks has been mentioned, and now Are are told that they haA r e secured a lot of the enemy's horses. The loss of his horse is a serious matter for the average' Boer, and it is particularly hard just at this time Avhen horses are so very valuable.

The rumour that the enemy buried their big guns at Magersfontein before leaving 1 , and that they threAV others into the Modder RiA^er, may be set doAvn as unworthy of belief. If the enemy had time to bury, these guns they had time to carry them off with them, and if they had throAvn them jnto the Modder RiA r er our troops AA-ould have discovered them, and Aye Avould have more than supposition to go on. It is very likely that the missing guns will be found when the main body of Cronje's army are captured. It is plain enough to see that the stand made by Cronje at Koodoosrand on the north and by the Boer forces at Paardeburg on the. south of their line of retreat Avas for the purpose of covering the retreat of the main body, with its guns and stores. Looking at ,the position taken up by th& enemy, the military man avJio any practical knowledge of his profession could form no other conclusion as to Cronje^ intentions. It is more than probable that if he had. continued his retreat a feAv miles further the Avhole of his army Avould have been . surrounded, and an -African Sedan Avould have resiflied. As it is, Cronje and -the rear-guard of hisa'rmy Avere* sacrificed for the ' main body, and Avith that force the " Long Toms " that were at Magersfontein and also those that have been bombarding Kimberley for so many months will be found. It is unreasonable to suppose that Cronje would have delayed his retreat and risked capture because Ms oxen were tired out if he had no other object in vieAv, for he could have marched much faster than, the British infantry could have folloAved had he decided to abandon his stores. It is even within the bounds of reason to belieA-e that he could have carried off the six light guns that Avere captured at Koodoosrand had he chosen to have gone, after destroying his ammunition and abandoning his Avaggons. But he had set himself the task of saving the main portion of his army, with their guns and train, by delaying the pursuit until they were beyond the reach of the pursuers, and then he expected the fleeing main body to receive heavy reinforcements, and come to his aid. Disappointed and disheartened at last by the failure of relief by the~ forces that he expected from Joubert, there remained for Cronje onfy two courses to choose from, , and he accepted surrender as the" easier ofthe tAVo, as further resistance Avould have meant, the annihilation of his followers who composed his rear-guard! "' .

The question now is, Has Cronje by/his stand ■ for so many days at Koodoosrand. succeeded in giving his main army time* to ~ escape, or have they waited at a place (not specified) some 30 miles from Bloemt fontein for reinforcements, from Joubert, which the last-named promised but -could, not send? Is Cronje'a main .-force still' Avaiting to be joined by the 20,000 men that Joubert was to have despatched to reinforce them, or has it renewed its flight to the north in an endeavour to place "the Vaal River -in its rear before another attempt is made to stop the progress of the victorious British? These questions are all of particular interest just now, as the cable informs us that General French is once again in the saddle, and that his destination is Bloemfontein. Very little fighting need be expected- in the vicinity of that toAvn. There is every probability that the Boers have retreated toAvards the north, leaving A r ery many deserters on the way, as it is hardly possible for the Transvaalers and the rebels from Cape Colony to so Avatch the discontented Free Staters that deserters Avill not noAv be numerous.

The . capture of Pieter's Hill, in the vicinity of Pieter's station, about 7^ miles from Ladysmith, by the Dublin Fusiliers on the 27th ultimo gives General Buller a magnificent position for his artillery to enfilade the enemy's position on Gropler's Kloof,- to the south- Avest of Pieter's, Avhile at the eartie time he commands- the line of railway to the north past Nelthorpe station, and the hills towards the Avest. This is the hill described as- the enemy's main position, but in reality it is naturally inferior in strength to the hills about Grobler's Kloof and Onderbroek. The t capture of Pieter's Hill is of much greater importance than either of the -other places named Avould be on account of its strategic A r alue, as it is placed in such a -position that guns placed on it practically flank Grobler's and at the same time command the railway to Colenso on the south, and by turning their fire towards Ladysmith the British Avould be enabled to have complete control of the .raihvay to Nelthorpe. At the" same time, the guns of General White's batteries can SAveep the line to the south,thus leaving a very short section only of the line just to the north, of Nelthorpe that is under the control of'the Boer batteries. The position that" seems to be giving General Buller the greatest possible

trouble to capture is that about Grobler's, Onderbroek, and Brakfontein. Languerwacht's Spruit is a small stream that drains the country about the Kloof, $nd empties itself into the Tugela to the west of the railway. The country along its banks, and particularly to the west, is very rough, affording the enemy magnificent cover for his riflemen and offering many opportunities for laying traps and ambuscades against advancing troops. The ■withdrawal of the Inniskilling Fusiliers Ifrom this part of the line of attack was Sprobably prompted by the successful capture of Pieter's Hill, as the possession of the last-named position will enable General 'Buller's artillery to shell the banks of the spruit in such a way that it will be unnecessary to throw away the lives of such soldiers as the Inniskillings have proved themselves to be. It will be easier to shell the position from Pieter's to drive 'the enemy out than to do so by a direct attack in front. It is to be greatly regretted that the gallant Irish Brigade, under General Hart, has lost so heavily "during the war, but perhaps it is well that it should.be so, as their gallant conduct in the field is the best •■ possible reply thatcould' be" made' to ' those who dare to itraduce the .honour of the Irish soldiers "by asserting that they are disloyal. Acts of. heroism of English, Scotch, Irisji, Canadians, and others are especially men- * tioned' #0111 -day to day, showing that all parts of the Empire are furnishing those ■who are ready to die if necessary to prove their loyalty, but amidst them all none nave excelled the Irish regiments. March 2. The relief of Ladysmith is glorious news to write about, yet it could not surprise anyone who followed the movements of General Buller's army from day to day. The object General Buller had in view by holding the forces of Joubert in Natal until Cronje was defeated and a prisoner having teen accomplished, and the rout of that general's scattered commandos com'•nlete. there remained nothing else for

General Buller to do but to allow General Joubert to retreat' with his beaten followers while he and his officers and men entered Ladysmith and elapsed hands with the gallant heroes who have so nobly defended British prestige and the honour of the army for so many months. It is too true that the loss of many a gallant officer and man might have been averted had General Joubert been allowed to withdraw before Cronje was driven to the wall. A combination between Cronje and Joubert's forces might have had disastrous results for our army, and prolonged the campaign for months, and this would have added to the death roll very much more than did the tactics that kept Joubert occupied until his appearance in the Free State will be of -little use in any attempt to stop the progress of Lord Roberts's army in its march on Bloemfontein. To add to the good news, and as a result of- Cronje's defeat, Colesberg has been evacuated by the Boers, and from ' the northern districts of Cape Colony the rebel allies of the enemy are hastening northwards, hoping to junction with De La Rey and the main body of Cronje's army before General French with his cavalry ' blocks the . way. It is very unfortunate that General Clements, in command of the division operating around Colesberg, has so few cavalry or other mounted forces with iiim, and, to make matters worse, General Gatacre's division, further to the east in the Stormberg district^ is also practically without cavabTy. But on the right of the British lines, General Brabant, with his brigade of Cape colonial troops, will be able to pursue the' defeated Boers, and render their flight anything but pleasant. It is a great pity that Brabant's force is so far awjay to the east, as it will keep him from following the enemy up as he could and would do if he were nearer their main laager. His position on their extreme left flank will enable him to harass their retreat on Aliwal North, and, :f he can gain possession of that place, and the railway bridge over the Orange River at that point before the bulk of the enemy's forces from Stormfcerg and Burghersdorp reach it, he will have done very valuable service, as the cavalry forces with Gatacre's division will probably, try to get possession of the bridge across the river at Bethulie. The occupation of these two points by strong British forces before the enemy secures a safe retreat to the north of the river would ensure their being cut off from the north, and their capture would soon be effected. The difficulties experienced by General Buller's forces attacking an enemy strongly entrenched, splendidly armed and commanded, and operating in a country offering every advantage to the attacked force, were numerous. In addition to all this the climate might be said to be the strongest ally that the Boers could possibly have in fighting against our army, unseasoned as the great bulk of our young soldiers were when ordered to take the field. But in spite of climate, superiority of arms, elaborate entrenchments in impregnable positions, our officers and men have shown the world that British pluck is still the great distinguishing feature of our army, for in spite of being placed at enormous disadvantages they have carried one position after another with a determination and gallantry that is unsurpassed in the whole glorious past history of our race. The attack on Fort Wylie on Sunday last by the Boers shows of what good material the Boers are made. They have shown throughout the campaign that they are foemen well worthy of being ranked with the bravest the British troops have ever met, and it is all the more praiseworthy that our (soldiers have been able to meet them on such uneven terms, and defeat them again and again. Cronje's laager was found to be of great strength when inspected by General Roberts. It is said to have been impregnable to assault. The reception given by Lord Roberts to Cronje is what might be expected under the circumstances. " Bobs " is just the man to recognise courage in a foe such as Cronje has been, and to do all (that he could to make the situation to Sfiaoh the fortunes of war had reduced him

as bearable as possible. It was a tribute of respect that he offered as a brave soldier to his equally brave but fallen enemy. Britishers throughout the Empire can by this act of inviting the Boer general to breakfast get' a glance into, the unassuming character of Britain's greatest general and the idol of her army. The refusal of the aid of British doctors to assist in treating the Boer wounded prior to the surrender of his laager by Cronje is what might be expected under the circumstances, as, like all Dutch South Africans, he was suspicious that the surgeons would bring back to the British general full details of the state of the Boer camp and its defences. Suspicion is one of the beat developed traits of character to be noted in every Dutchman born on African soil. It is a race characteristic born and bred in them, and is the result of constant contact with the Kaffir tribes for generations. The result of this is to be seen in their every-day life on their farms, in the positions they build their houses, in the way the roads that traverse the veldt follow the tops of the ridges when possible instead of taking the more easy grades along the water courses, as they usually do in other countries. The average Boer is ever suspicious, and he cannot Ue made to believe that it is possible for one man to do another a- friendly act unless 'lie has some ulterior object in view. This suspicion has been fostered by force of circumstances, and is directly chargeable to the isolated life he and his fathers lu-vo led^ on the veldt from one generation to another. In a lesser degree the Anglo - African that has been reared up amidst the Kaffir tribesmen has developed the same suspicion of strangers.

Particulars of the condition under which the garrison and inhabitants of Ladysmith have been living are conveyed to us by means of a very brief cable message, but few though the words be they contain a great deal of information to tho&e who know what a rough existence life on a steak of horse or mule flesh and a little maize meal means. It is wonderful how General White held the position so long. Not much reliance can be placed upon the yarn of a supply column reaching Ladysmith while the engagement was in progress at Spion Kop. General Buller is not likely to have stormed a position of such strength with the intention of drawing off the enemy so as to allow the convoy to enter Ladysmith. The story is- as improbable as it is unreasonable' to suppose that Joubert left his batteries on Inhlawe and Isimbulwana Mountains unmanned, or his guns and entrenchments at Grobler's Kloof, Pieter's Hill, Onderbroek, Brakfontein, and Arnot Hills unguarded and unmanned, while that battle was in progress. Had Joubert weakened his forces holding the trenches commanding the line into Ladysmith, our troops, and not merely a convoy of supplies, would have entered the town and would have cut the Boer lines.

The withdrawal of the Boers from Ladysmith will probably be directly to the north, those on the south-east and east sides of the town moving via the road leading past Isimbulwana to the back of Lombard's Kop, where they will strike the road for the north, past Elandslaagte, en route for Newcastle ; while those from the west of the railway will move from Grobler's Kloof, Brakfontein, an 3. Onderbroek over the road leading past Dewdrop, crossing the railroad to the west of Besters, thence across the Klip River, where they would join forces with their troops holding "their lines on the northAvesfc of Ladysniith. By this route they would pass close to the scene of their defeat at Reitfontein, and thence over the same route as that pursued by the rest of the column towards* Newcastle. The objective of the force in retreat will probably be the seizure of Laing's Nek, and, should they reach that locality before our troops overtake them, it is very probable they will destroy the tunnel to prevent the use of the railway by the British for the invasion of the Transvaal. It is possible, that there are now in the various passes of the Drakensbergs a force amounting to probably 5000 or 6000 men, scattered in the various passes to hold them against surprise and capture by the British. But it is equally certain that these, too, will retire simultaneously with those about Ladysmith, but their natural line of retreat would be via Harrismith, in the Free State, and from thence almost directly north-west over the new line of railway constructed 'to Wolvehoek, about 20 miles south of Viljoen's Drift on the Vaal River. It may be stated by way of explanation that this is probably the new line of which we have heard in the cable as having been constructed to Kronstadt. This line was surveyed and made a part and parcel of the Free State Government railway projects in the year 1896, and the greater portion of the grading was completed in 1897, it being understood by the terms of the besluit (law) passed by the Free State Raad that the line should be commenced and finished out of the surpluses earned by the main line and its branches then in operation. It is probable, however, that the value of the line for military purposes ,has forced President Kruger to furnish the material to the Free State to finish the line, and that this was part of the price paid by the Transvaal to the Free Staterf for their assistance. Wolvehoek is some 66 miles nearer the Vaal River than Kronstadt.

Everything now points to the Vaal River as the next line of defence the Boers will take tip. Their lines of retreat all seem to tend in that direction, and Nature lias fitted it to be just the position that best suits the Boer mode of fighting. Should they reach the north side of the Vaal with all their artillery we may look for a stiff defence. It is probable, however, that General French will be able to cub off the bulk of their forces which are now retiring from Cape Colony. If he should do so it may weaken the strength of the enemy to such an extent that Presidents Kruger and Steyn may decide to sue for peace, and the collapse of the enemy's plan may come about sooner than at present is expected. If the enemy succeed jut reaching thei River on the hr\&

hand and Laing's Nek on the other, a position of great difficulty for the British forces to turn will be easily created. This is particularly so in view of the fact that across the Vaal River, via the western line of railway running towards Mafeking, the country is very dry. From Mafeking to Krugersdorp, 17 miles west of Johannesburg, the country is almost a desert — in factj there is one stretch of about 80 miles without a single stream of water in the dry season. It was the lack of water that the defeat of Jameson's party in the famous raid may be attributed to. Had it not be 311 for the thirst of both man and bea&L they would never have reached the place where Cronje trapped them in to coming within short range of his guns at Doornkop. It is a 'matter of history that Jameson and his men were so completely worn out by the terrible strain under which they had continued their forced march that they were unable to continue further without water, and their horses were suffering terribly. This is the sole reason why they wheeled to their left and passed within range of Cronje' s ambush. Had it not been for want of water Jameson could have continued his march over the level veldt two miles further south, and would have entered Johannesburg practically unopposed, as the Boers at tihat time were only armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, and could not have successfully resisted Jameson's men armed as they were with Lee-Metford magazine rifles and Maxim guns, backed up with the best field guns at that time in South Africa. The route from Mafeking by way of Krugersdorp to Pretoria has many advantages, however, for an army invading the Transvaal if the water ' difficulty could be overcome, as the country is mostly level and offers none of the conditions that are suitable to the Boer system of defence, while all other conditions save . water are decidedly favourable to the British ; yet this one drawback will probably count more against such a route being pursued than all the other favourable conditions will count in its favour. March 4. The Boer officers captured at Koodoosrand state that Cronje has lost 8000 men during the campaign, and that there are still 75,000 Republican troops in the field*. This does not quite agree with the statements made by our Agent-general, in which the latter would appear to cast a slur on the bravery and effectiveness of our troops in the field. The question is, Whose statements are we to believe V Are we to accept the statements of the Boer officers who have fought our troops bravely and lost, or are we to accept those of MiReeves who tries to make the best showing he can for the Boers. It is hai'd to believe that he represents the Government and the people of this colony. If we did not know that he cost the New Zealand people a goodly number of thousands of pounds per annum it might be supposed he was fche representative of Kruger, Leyds, Steyn, Schreiner, and Co.,* of the would-be Dutch Republic.

In connection with the statement that Cronje has been imprisoned on the flagship Captain at Capetown, there is a mistake somewhere, as the Doris, a cruiser of the second class and of 5600 tons displacement is the flagship on that station. Rear-admiral Sir R. H. Harris, C.M.G., flies his pennant on that ship. It is also a fact that the navy does not contain a vessel named Captain, and it is very likely that it will be many a year before that unlucky name will be seen painted on a British naval vessel^ The last vessel of that name in the navy was a splendid vessel (a sister .ship of the Sultan, still considered good enough to be classed as a third class battleship of the A division). T-he Captain was commissioned in 1870, shortly after being launched, by Captain Childers, son of the First Lord of the Admiralty of that date. She left England in company with th,e Channel fleet for Gibraltar, but having outsailed the other vessels of the fleet it was supposed she had reached that port in safety. Such was not the case, as when the fleet arrived at the anchorage the Captain was not there. Search was made for the vessel, but several days elapsed before it was learned that a party of British sailors had reached the Spanish coast in an open boat, and, upon inquiry being made, these proved to be the sole survivors of the crew of the ill-fated warship. It appeared that the ship was top heavy, and that during a squall she capsized and carried her crew of over 500 of Britain's bravest to the bottom, the small party that escaped to the shore being all that was left i to tell of the disaster. The writer was stationed at the Raglan Barracks, Devonport, when the news reached England, and can well remember the gloom the sad news cast over the entire sister service. It was rumoured that efforts would be mad© to raise the vessel, and divers were sent out to examine her as she lav on the bottom off Cape Finisterre, but grumblings were heard in the various ships' companies of the navy, and it was deemed advisable to leave her where she lay, as it was very doubtful about the chances of being able to get men to r-erve on her if she could have been restored to the navy. In fact, seamen and officers ut a long time thereafter did not like to serve on a central battery ship (of the Captain class), as they were all condemned as being top-heavy. The rigging of these ships was afterwards cut down, thereby removing the cause of complaint. It is probable that Cronje will be put on board, one of the hulks at Simonstown, as the bay there is outside of the jurisdiction of the Cape Government, it being a naval base under Imperial control.

The declaration that the Boers are concentrating 50,000 men to defend Winbury may be considered to be without foundation, as the position could be too easily flanked and would therefore be indefensible. There is absolutely nothing to stop the British mounted troops from occupying the railway and roads to the north and cutting off the supply of ammunition and other stores that would have to be sent from Pretoria. It would be another Magersfontein, and Joubert will not tempt Lord Roberts by offering him such a chance fif ?tS3^ oajting the Boer lines of coipi]uii«

cation. Such tactics may seem all right in Brussels, but will not work in South Africa. It is very doubtful if an army ol 50,000 men would be able to get sufficient water in that district in the dry seas-on that will set in next month.

The news that 7000 Boers have concentrated on the right front of Lord Roberts' b army has been cabled. It is probable that these are part of the division of De la Rey's- army, and that they are waiting for the Boers that are retiring from the Cape districts to join them before they retreat to the north. The presence of this small force in close touch with General French's cavalry, and apparently in no hurry to escape, seems somewhat peculiar. They must expect heavy reinforcements shortly, or they would be on the move, as that number , cannot hope to combat the army of Lord Roberts unaided.

Colonel Albrecht in criticising the lactics of the British generals forgot to mention the mistakes that the Boers have made from the start, for if the Boer commanders had taken prompt action at the start they could have seized Durban and all the other places in Natal, and carried their flag to the suburbs of Capetown before General Buller's army corps had left England. Given a like opportunity, the British would have accomplished all the Boers tried to do ; and in consequence of this failure by the Boers Colonel Albrecht ought to be one of The last to speak of British tactics.

The Army Estimates published in the papers provide for 430,000 men and an expenditure of £62,000,000, or, to be more correct, within £600 of that sum. It is a plain indication that the criticisms on the former proposals have borne good fruit, and that Great Britain has woke up and now mepns to provide an army somewhat more in line with the requirements of her world-wide Empire. This item of news is an indication that Britain will in future have an army equal to the task that it may be called on to do. If this is one of the results of the war with the Boers, then the Boers must be regarded as our very best friends, as from them we will have learned the lesson we were too apt to leave unlearned until war taught us our shortcomings. An equivalent increase in our Indian army will bring the regular land forces of the British Empire up to something like the forces that the interest of the Empire require to have ready at a moment's notice. It is to be hoped that with the increase neiv methods of organisation and equipment will be adopted and the present system laid to rest without delay, and that new blood and new life will be imported into the departments over which the Secretary for War presides. A reorganisation of the colonial forces in accordance with the modern requirements of defensive and offensive measures is also a question that must be of first importance when the various Parliaments of the colonies next meet. "It is to be hoped New Zealand will do her duty, and provide means of defence for her people and their property. March 5. The mysterious despatch that caused so much speculation turns out to be a request for more troops. It is very evident that the decision to send the 500 men of the fifth New Zealand contingent was prompted by the receipt of a similar despatch received in Wellington. Had New Zealand sent 1000 men as a second contingent, as I strongly urged, they would have arrived in the Cape at a time when their presence would have been' of the greatest possible service, as it happens that the cavalry arm of the service is crippled after a period of hard work by reason of so many of the horses breaking down. The time has arrived when the promotion of Major Robin ought to be seriously considered, as the number of men composing the New Zealand forces which will be shortly in the field justly entitle this colony to the right to appoint an officer with the rank of lieutenant-colonel commanding. Victoria has an officer of that rank with her troops, and there is no good reason why New Zealand should be behind any other colony in any way, as in the number of troops on active service and preparing for service this colony outstrips Victoria considerably. The story of the sufferings of the garrison of Ladysmith told in the cables should serve the British cause by showing what British troops can and will endure for their country in discharge of their duty. It is to be hoped that when the war is over the British public will not forget what the soldiers have suffered, and how little they get, save glory, out of the work of maintaining British supremacy against Britain's enemies.

The bombardment of the positions held by the enemy between the Tugela and Ladysmith and the charges of our infantry recall the old-time days when the bayonet played such an important part in deciding every battle. It seems strange to read of so much bayoneting in almost every engagement that has taken place during this war, as we had been taught to look on the bayonet as an obsolete weapon since the magazine rifle and machine gun were said to be such life-destroyers that close quarters where the bayonet could be of service could never again be reached. Yet in spite of such teaching, British infantry have again and again crossed the zone that was swept by the enemy's fire, and have proved conclusively that the bayonet must be retained if our infantry are to be kept thoroughly efficient. The services rendered by the artillery must not be overlooked, however, and when we are considering the results of the infantry charges we must remember that the artillery had demoralised the enemy to such an extent that their shooting was of the wildest possible character, and that it was this that enabled the infantry to gain the enemy's trenches without severe loss and possiblo defeat.

The statement that Lord Roberts admits that he considered the relief of Ladysmith almost hopeless may be set down to mean that he did not consider ' that General White could possibly hold out long enough to enable him (Lord Roberts) to gathei a force large enough to defeat Cronje and so threaten Joubert's flank and rear as to compel the enemy to raise the glegOt There is in £his expression of

opinion the hignast p^ss'bX authority xotf the serious views which huve been oppressed regarding the o"look when, it was learned that General Buller had retired across the Tugela alter his fdilure at Spion Kop.

The reply of General White to the congratulation of her Majesty the Queen conveys to the world the feelings that actuate every soldier, regardless of his rank, that has the honour of wearing her Majesty's uniform. It is sentiments such as these, and a firm belief that the soldiers have in the impossibility of the regiments to which they individually belong being defeated, that makes, the British army superior iv everything but numbers to" all other armies in existence.

Onsland, the official organ "of the Afrikander Bond, seems to be in direct communication with the Boer military chiefs,as it seems to be able to give, not only, details of the past movements of ths enemy in their retreat from Natal, -but alscr to tell us of their future plans. It is careful, however, in giving the news to keep us in the dark regarding any details that rnirht be of .any use to our officers in the field. ' It is evident that the Bond is hand and glove with the enemy, and, although its leaders try to claim to be loyal,- yet discretion is sometimes thrown overboard, and they disclose themselves to our" gaze as rebels pure and simple. The Bond and its objects are now lully understood' in England as they liave been for years past in British political life in South Africa. It is only reasonable to suppose that as a fitting close to the war* the property of the Dutch rebels who planned the rising will be confiscated, and that loyalists of British stock will have a chance to settle on the properties taken by the State, so that in years to come a British loyalist; population may dominate the district's so as to keep the rebels out of power for all time to come. Great Britain owes it to herself, to the loyalists of South Africa, and to the colonies that are now spending their money and blood to .restore" British supremacy in the Cape, to continue tli6 struggle until Kruger and Co. sue for peace without asking either for terms oi the pensions that in their slim way the Transvaal Raad provided for the future oi themselves and their chiefs. Should Great Britain load the future of the Transvaal by recognising the claims of Kruger and Co. to pensions she will sow the seeds of sedition in the hearts of loyalists in Soulh Africa. British loyalists and not Dutch enemies must be considered in the settle ment of the struggle of Boer against Briton.

Kipling's despatch to the Argus is very clear, but- it only confirms what has been repeated in this column day after day since the campaign began. It is very likely that Major Robin's command are pretty badly off for horses by this time, and as an advance of the forces under General Clements is in progress it is almost certain that a great many more horses ■will be knocked up. This colony ought to ship 1000 extra horses, so that our contingents can b6 kept efficient, as there is hard Work still ahead, and it would be a pity to deprive our lads of the pleasure of being" in the final act of the war — the capture of Pretoria.