NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2398, 15 February 1900, Page 24

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Major Kennedy. February 6. The fourth cavalry brigade is reported to consist of 2528 men, with six field and five machine guns. To make matters x>la.in, this force must be considered to be made up of one battery of Royal Horse Artillery, and three regiments of cavalry, with five machine gun sections. If we estimate the other cavalry brigades at the same strength we find 10,i12 men, and to these must be added the sth Dragoon Guards, the sth and 9th Lancers, and the 18th and 19th Hussars — a total of about 2500 men. So that we have at least 17 regiments of cavalry of the line and one composite regiment of three squadrons of the Household Cavalry, either in active service or ordered? out — a total mounted force of about 1300 men. including five batteries of Royal Horse Artillery. This would leave 24,800 mounted troops to be_prov.ided by colonists and mounted infantry to make up the 37,800 men that the Under-Secretary for War stated would be mounted by the middle of this month. It is quite evident that the fourth cavalry brigade will not; reach South Africa before March 1, and I consider the other figure.s quoted by '"the Under-Secretary are guess-work and nofi based on actual count, and that no deductions are made' from the force on account; of sickness, killed, wounded, and prisoners; or deaths through disease. As showing the number of cavalry and horse artillery; which are available at Home to reinforce the troops on and ordered for foreign service, I might point out the fact that seven, regiments are sewing in India, one in Egypt, 17 in South Africa, and seven on. home service. Of the seven on home service, the three regiments of the Guards: have each furnished one squadron to make up the composite regiment that I have previously mentioned. To come down to actual fycts, we have three regiments of

cavalry of the line and three skeleton regiments of the Household Cavalry, and, as the Indian establishment has been depleted of ita regular complement of cavalry by the withdrawal of the sth Dragoon Guards, the sth Lancers, and the 19th Hussars, it is on the cards that the three line regiments may be called on for service in India at any moment, thus leaving the 'United Kingdom practically without a single regiment of cavalry to reinforce the troops on active service.

Of the Royal Horse Artillery, 11 batteries are always kept in India, five batteries are either in South Africa or under ordeis, and five batteries remain at Home to act as a reserve wherever required and to train the raw recruits that will make the future gunners and drivers of the smartest artillery force on the earth. Looking at our cavalry and our horse artillery as they exist to-day, it is far from creditable to the country that those arms have been allowed to remain stationary all these years. It may be added that the reason these two branches of the service have been allowed to remain in their present condition is entirely due to financial difficulties, as it is only natural to suppose that the cost of their support is much greater than that of field artillery and infantiy. - Eegarding the statements made as to ■the movements of General Buller the less said the better until he has completed the ■manoeuvres necessary to place his forces in positions to attack the enemy.

The news that the enemy has been reinforced by arrivals from tke north that are being detrained before Ladysmith fully confirms the opinion I expressed some time ago that General Buller would find his advance through the enemy's centre a much more difficult operation now than it would 3iave been at the time General Lyttelton first crossed the Tugela. I am of opinion ithat General Buller on that occasion desired to accomplish too much with the forces at his disposal. I believe that he tried to capture the bulk of the'" enemy's forces, and that Colonel Dundonald's cavalry were moved to the west for that purpose, at the presence of such a powerful cavalry force on the right of their position would hay r e made it impossible for General Joubsrt to attempt to' retreat in that direction, and escape for his army by any other route would have been difficult and dangerous, to say the least, aud would have involved the loss of the bulk of his artillery and supply Irakis, as well as flic chance of having his troops captured by General Buller's mounted troops. Had General Buller been content to cut the enemy in two by moving from the Tugela to the north on the 20th ult. Ladysmith would have been in communication with the outside world without any serious loss of our troops. Although the accomplishment of this manoeuvre would not have very materially shortened the w.ar, still it would have considerably disheartened the enemy anel would have added to British prestige.

As an act worthy of a brave soldier the release of Commandant Pretorious by Lord Roberts may be said to be just what might be expected from " Our Bobs." The release of Pretorious at this time will help to show the Dutch in the whole of South Africa that, while British soldiers are fighting for their Queen anel country, they are men filled with compassion for a wounded enemy that has proved himself a worthy soldier. But as Lord Roberts has shown an act of gracious mercy to the brave and honourable Pretorious when wounded and a prisoner, so surely will he require severe punishment for the murderous hounds who have treacherously misused the white flag, and the rebel colonists, Dutch and British alike, •will be sure to curse the day they fell into the hands of the British under Lord Roberts.

The numbers of the enemy's forces must ■be rapidly increasing, as large reinforcements are reaching General Joubert at Ladysmith, and 20,000 are reported to be between General Methuen and Kimberley. Nine thousand two hundred are said to be at three places in front of General Gatacre, and 7000 o,re reported to be hemmed in by General French, in the hills about Colesberg. How many are in the balance of the Colesberg district is not reported, anel we are left in the dark regarding the numbers that are in front of General Kelly-Kenny about Middleburg and Rosmead Junction. The numbers must be large, as General Kelly-Kenny's division consists of about 8600 men. Of the other scattered forces of the enemy it is hard to estimate their strength, but I am confident that at the rate British troops are arriving .in South Africa it will take some months before we have an "army equal in numbers to the enemy.

The statement made by the Sydney Morning Herald's correspondent that the colonial and Imperial troops do not fraternise is in direct contradiction to the statements by the various correspondents of New Zealand newspapers with the troops at the front. The letters published from troopers serving in No. 1 contingent all 4ell of a spirit of comradeship from the date of the arrival of our men in Capetown up to the last news we hove had from Arundel. Our men speak in the ■highest praise of the help given them iby the men of the cavalry corps that camped with them from time to time. The circulation of such reports is bound to do liarm in the long run, as the report is sure to become known in the camps in course of time, and possibly some ill-feel-ing will be the result. I pin nry faith to the letters of our own correspondents.

The news that Laelysmith is amply provided with provisions and that fresh meat is still in such quantity as to be obtainable eveiy day is very good. This tells its own tale, and shows plainly that the task that has been accomplished by General White up to the present is wonderful, for in order to provide pasturage for his live stock he has been compelled to protect a .very extensive line of defence against an overwhelming force of the enemy, and this, too, in spite of the small nixmber and inferior range of the guns with which his .troops are armed. • The New Zealanders are doing good service with French's column, and ere another jMhth. passes I kojsjie $0 Kectfrd the baptism

of the second contingent under Major Cradock. I am more than pleased that at last the people are awakening to the necessity of despatching such additions to the forces as the occasion demands. lam of opinion, however, that at least 1000 infantry ought to be forwarded, or at least offered, to the Imperial Government. The return of these would give this colony a thoroughly equipped and disciplined nucleus on which we could pattern our future defence iorcc. The experiment would well pay the colony by the return of trained defeiideis. February 7. Having reviewed the horse artillery anel cavalry branches of the army, it may be of interest to see how far the mounteel infantry can take up the r'nties of the 1-iHer arm, and carry out the work that must of necessity be done by some other force, when the cavalry are too weak in numbers to efficiently provide the army with the necessary intelligence regarding the enemy — his position, forces, and movements. The mounted infantry are peculiar in the fact that they are an unknown quantity in European armies. The system of mounted iniantiy or lines is essentially Britisli, and was born of necessity, as our officers found that when fighting an enemy possessing the mobility of the Boers it was necessary to fight them with a force that was . equally mobile, and, as cavalry was not available, it became a question of suffering heavily or of being able to move as quickly as possible with infantry. Naturally it could be seen that to do so all "we had to do was to secure horses and saddles and choose as many of our infantry as could ride, and place them under instruction to learn the duties of scouts. Now the mounted infantryman is very good in his way, but he is not a horseman purely and simply, and can never be the equal of cavalry for the work they have to do, as their period of training is far too short to enable them to be the equal of cavalry for scouting. As a fighting force 25 per cent, of all mounted infantry have to remain outside the zone of fire in all engagements, as every fourth man, the number three of the section, becomes a horse-holder until relieved. Consequently the mounted infantay battalion of 1000 men only puts 750 men in the line of battle. Although the mounted infantry have horses, they do not fight as horsemen, but as infantrymen, using their horses only to enable them to march rapidly from one point to another. Although they possess advantages over the ordinary infantryman in mobility, they are at a disadvantage by having to leave so many of their fighting strength to lake care of the- horses. Then again they are unequal to cavalry when mounted, as they are practically unarmed when advancing or retiring, as the moment they get into the saddle they have no weapon they can use effectively against the cavalry sabre or lance. The bayonet fixed on a rifle i 2 an unwieldly weapon on horseback, when it lakes one hand to guide the horse, and even if the soldier could give both hands to hold and direct his riiie and bayonet, lie would cut a sorry figure against a lancer or dragoon when his hoise is in motion. It is in South Africa that the mounted infantry slime, as it is there, and there only, that all the conditions exist that called them into being, as thej' meet an enemy armed and mounted as they are, or there is no danger of being attacked by cavalry when on the march. There is no chance for cavalry to defeat infantry as long as they are unbroken by artillery and have ammunition, and it is equally useless for mounted infantry to attempt to resist cavalry unless they dismount anel fix bayonets or open fire after dismounting.

Reconnoitring can be done very effectively by mounted infantry or rifles in a country where the enemy has little or no cavalry, but could not be safely undertaken when the enemy possess strong cavalry forces, for if the reconnoitring force should happen to be overtaken by a large force of the enemy, and be compelled to retire, the enemy's cavalry could ride the mounted infantry down without danger to themselves. This is the main reason why none of the great Continental Powers possess mounted infantry, and it ought to be considered necessary for Great Britain' and the colonies to follow the example set for us by Germany by providing cavalry for cavalry work, and let the mounted infantry merely support the cavalry and horse artillery in all manceuvres where great force is required quickly. Armed with the infantry rifle and being able to move as quickly as cavalry the mounted infantry can be of great service on many an occasion. If Colonel Dundonald had been reinforced by 5000 mounted infantry on- the 14th ult., I feel sure Ladysmith could havebeen relieved on that or the following -day, and we would not have had to record the retreat from Spion Kop and suffer the losses that must be inflicted on our army before the enemy's position at Onderbroek is turned.

If Ladysmith is to be relieved by a direct attack from the front Onderbroek must be flanked and taken, and Grobler's Kloof must be in our possession before our troops attempt to cut the enemy's second line of entrenchments about Arnot Hill and Dewdrop.

The despatch of a strong column to siege Norval's Pont is one of 'the best moves that has been attempted since the war started. I have more than once pointed out the advantages that our army would possess if they had control of the railway bridge at that place. The requirements of the day demand the concentration of a force of 60,000 men to cross the Orange River by way of Norval's Pont, and, as in the past, I am still of the opinion that a strong force moving by this route will succeed in raising the siege of Ladysmith without the necessity of having to drive the enemy from naturally strong positions, made doubly so by the skill of the best engineer officers that money could employ, and defended by the most modern position, field, and machine guns. I cannot understand why General Buller massed such a powerful army on the Tugela, nor why he changed, or for the time being helcl in abeyance, the plan of sending a large force into the Free State ; but I can see that in the move by General French's division ph Norval'f/ £<siiij>" jfeoyd Roberta ia|anS'-io

create a stir in the enemy's camps on the Tugela and Modeler Rivers. It is lo be hoped that the War Office and the Horse Guards alike will bestir themselves in getting out reinforcements, so as to enable the Commander-in-chief to cairy out his clesigns, for there is little good to be obtained by exposing our grand old soldier, " Bobs," to the fatigue of a campaign extending over many weary months that he can and will finish in six weeks 'f given the necessary forces.

The action of Great Britain in reHnqui^hing her right of control over the Nicaragua Isthmus, held by her jointly with the United States by the terms of the ClaytonBulwer treaty, gives promise of the future stand the two Anglo-Saxon nations will take up in all matters wheie their interests are challenged by the Poweis of Europe. In surrendering to the Unileel States the right to control the canal across the isthmus Great Britain does not of necessity relinquish her sovereign rights over the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua, as she is bound to protect the rights of Chief George and his tribesmen. The effect of coming to an understanding ts ith America on all questions will cause the Pow ers of Europe to hesitate if they should want to interfere with the final settlement of our difficulties in South Africa.

The burning of the grass by the enemy so as to enable them to see our men at greater distances might have been expected as soon as the grass became dry enough for the fires to run, but it is a" game that two can play at, as the British can watch for favourable opportunities, and when the wind is right they can set the grass on fire over extensive tracts of country, and thereby destroy the chances of the enemy to obtain food for their horses and cattle. The destruction of the grass will do the enemy far more danvge than it will do to the British, as new grass will not spring up ofllr the burnt surface until the next rainy season sets in about October. In the meantime the Boers will have no feed for their animals. If the British are allowed by their officers to fight the enemy withy fire a few raids by small scouting parties into the Free State to burn the grass would cripple the retreat of the Boers and their friends should they desire to do so. I expect that the only reason why Are have not heard more of the grass fires in the past is on account of the danger that the families of the Boers would be placed in by reason "of the fires. It is an a,nnual custom in South Africa to burn off the grass about August or September, so that the first rains bring up a new crop of sweet grass over the veldt, free from the old grass that has gone sour. It is the custom of ifearly all the Boers to drive their cattle and other stock to the low veldt or bush for the winter and return in the spring to pass the summer on the high veldt, thereby escaping the fevers of the low country during the rainy season.

February 8. The statement made by the correspondent of the London Standard" that General Macdonald's Highland Brigade, with artillery and other supports, had occupied some kopjes to the north-west of Spytfontein is exceedingly good news, for it means that the enemy has had his right flank turned. My readers will remember that previous lo the battle of Magersfontein I sjave a description of the country from flic Orange River to Kimberley, in which was slated the elevations of the principal ridges, kopjes, etc. I also pointed out that in my opinion it was unnecessary to attack the enemy at Spytfontein, as I considered it ' to be very much better strategy to draw ■him out on to the level veldt by moving to his right flank, to the west of the railway, as the country is all level to the west | and is just such ground as would best suit our cavalry.

It will be remembered that a mounted force some little while ago moved north around the right flank of the enemy, and engaged the enemy just south of Kimberley at Rooi Pan. The result of the information furnished by that column of scouts may have been the cause, directly -or indirectly, of General Macdonald's enterprise. Kimberley should soon be again in communication with the rest of the world. -

"A great movement is pending." So reads the cable ; but where this great movement is to take place the censor has not allowed to pass. We are also told thai Kruger is dissatisfied with the inactivity of General Joubert, and that General Joubert, becoming sarcastic, in reply, invited the old Boer to come out and see for himself, or, as the cable puts it, "to look at Buller's guns."

Scarcity of transports is said to be delaying the despatch of the yeomanry regiments to South Africa. Where is the fleet of troopships that are laid up in ordinary, and that some years ago successfully carried all the reliefs from India and the colonies, manned by crews from the Royal Navy? Can it be possible that with thousands of splendid mercantile steamers flying the British flag that the necessary number to carry a few thousand troops is unobtainable after so many weeks' notice? If the cable is correct there must have been some bungling somewhere, for it is ridiculous to suppose that, with the magnificent mercantile navy of Great Britain, sufficient transport vessels could not have been secured.

The despatch of 90 additional guns from Pretoria to the front is cabled. What number the British have in the field anel on the way I am unable to state, but we were told that Lord Roberts seemed highly pleaseel to hear that the A Battery of the New South Wales Artillery had airived in Durban. If this slioavs anything, it points out the fact that he consielers artillery reinforcements especially welcome.

The despatch of the Channel squadron to Gibraltar to relieve the particular servico squadron is significant, for, with the Channel and Mediterranean fleets combined, the supremacy of the British interests at sea cannot be disputed in that quarter, even by the combineel fleets of Europe in that sea. The particular service squadron combined to the Cape squadron will be more than enough to hold their own in South African waters. Tli,e sending of the Channel .4cjUadtoji lo Gibraltar points ftut that *-„-*=.^ -'" n "~ijL. — *_~! ~J7" ~3^' ' * '~v - ft* -- — *^" — __ —

the coastguird and reserve squadrons have been quietly mobilised for service in Home waters, so that we may rest assured our navy will not be caught napping if Fiance and any allies she can induce to join her throw their glove into the ring. We may thank Providence that Admiral Eeresford stirred up naval matters 10 years ago, or we would have been without such an efficient navy to-day.

The report conies from Sydney that a correspondent of some Indian newspapers has written charging the men of the Highland Brigade as being insubordinate since the battle of Alagersiontein, and that the men refuse to salute General Lord JMethuen and blame him for blundering and causing the eleath of Captain Wnuehope. Now il is very^ curious to be told such things at this time, when the name of the writer and the papers he represents are not stated. It seems to be another case of the Indian critics that in the es'i'ly stages of the war condemned General White. When I am informed who the correspondent is and the newspapers he represents, and have his testimony supported by good reliable parties, I will believe these reports against the good name of our Highland regiment's, but until then I have too high an opinion of the British soM;er>, regardless of the regiment they may belong to, to charge them with deliberate breaches of discipline, even though they might consider that their General had made a mistake. The story is improbabi. — yes, impossible. What thi!- unknown correspondent knows about military camps and the value or otherwise of the position occupied by General Methuen's troops on the Modeler is of little worth, as il is very evident that the enemy's engineers thought it a most advantageous one, since they riskeel an engagement on its site, and only abandoned it after about 15 hours' hard fighting. It is also significant that although Cronje has about two men for every one in General Methuen's lines he does not show any inclination to attack, and this is strong evidence of the defensibleness of the position. In regard to the closing of the Robinson Bank at Johannesburg, I may state that it was located at the corner of the Chains and Market square on one of the finest positions in Johannesburg. It never did much business outside of the group of mines under the control of Mr Robinson and a certain amount of Transvaal Government business.

The news of the junction of Generals Gatacre and Kelly-Kenny's divisions at Thebus, on the line of the railway running from Rosemead to Stormberg Junction, is good reading. It will effectively slrat the enemy off from the south, and, as our troops are reinforced in these districts, a gradual advance of our forces to the north will .soon drive the enemy across the Orange River or effect their capture. News that General Buller is advancing across and to the north of the Tugela has just arrived, but as particulars are wanting at the time of writing it -is tiseless to attempt to explain the situation. February 9.

TKe latest cables from the Modeler River are very contradictory. A cable in Wednesday's paper ran as follows* — "The Standard states that General Hector Macdonald's Brigade, with a field battery and the 9th Lancers, occupied with scarcely any opposition a number of kopjes and a clam northwest of Spytfonlein, Ms position commanding the roads to Khnberley, Hopetown, and Douglas. The movement prevented the junction of two large Boer commandos." This would show that General Macdonald's position was on the right flank of the Boers' position, and in the open country, where he could move directly north-east over level, open country into Beaconsfield, or he could change front to the right and strike the enemy on his right and rear. Douglas, spoken about in the cable, is a very small place on the south side of the Modeler River to the west of General Methuen's position, about 20 miles west of the railway. The waggon road from Kimberley to the south passes through Douglas, and on the south to Hopetown, on the Orange River. To-day's cables, however, state that General Macdcnald is entrenched on both sides of the Riet River, and that the enemy, though in strong force, fell back on his approach. Now, the Rict River rises in the Free State, the head of the south fork being about three miles south by east of Jagersfontein road, and the north branch, about 20 miles further east, a little to the north of that place, and about 25 miles due west of Helvetia. Both streams run in a north-westerly direction for 15 or 20 miles, and when in the vicinity of Deput the north fork is joined by the Kaffir River, and flows in a western course until joined by the south fork of the Riet, and the river continues its course to the north and west until it flows into the Modeler River, about one mile west of the Free Slate line, and about nine miles east of the Cape and Buluwayo railway. It is obvious that one of these cables is altogether wrong, as the Riet River is south and cast, and the position given in the first cable is away to the west and north. The question is : Which of the two is correct? If General Macdonald is Avhere the Standard says, he has flanked the enemy. If he is. where the last cable places him, he cannot have flanked them.

The cables dated Durban, Bth inst. , state that General Buller on Monday made a feint of crossing the Tugela at two places, but that at about noon he withdrew from one of the places, and that in consequence the enemy claim a victory. His troops, however, succeeded in crossing after experiencing the heaviest cannonading during the war. The naval gunners opened fire, supported by six batteries of the artillery, and covered by three battalions of infantry, making a feint attack on Brakfontein. The Boer artillery fire proving too accurate, compelled the infantry to , retire. Meanwhile Buller forced the fighting, and succeeded in establishing himself in the Brakfontein range of hills, capturing what may be termed the key of the position, Krants Kloof, and coveiing the hills and ridges in the vicinity. The British guns at Swartz Kop bombarded the enemy's position heavily, and our infantry then crossed, completely fcurjgrisin^ the (feiiomyi jWlaeri

night came, Buller had obtained the ad* vantage, and on Tuesday our guns opened fresh on the enemy. Our infantry held the ground they had won, and, in spite of a, determined effort 01 the enemy to recapture the position, our men advanced along the ridge. From I. he cobles to hand yesterday, we ive enabled to locate the position of General Eulle'-'ss att'ick on the enemy's lines. It is btated that General Lyttellon is on the British rigLt, and we know that he occupied a position jusl north of Potgieter's Drift ever >ince he crossed the river on the 16th ult., consequently we know the right of our lines is just a little to the west of Brakfontein and south and west of Onderbroek, while the left Hank under' General Fi'ayne lies to the west about Venter's Spruit; ■v hile the centre lies just to the north of Swartz Knp, wheie the naval, mountain, and field batteries are massed, concentrating their fire on the enemy's trenches. The fight ; ng on Monday and Tuesday seems to have been of a most stubborn character, the enemy showing great tenacity, as when our troops gained an advantage the enemy moved up and recaptured a part of the ground they had lost to General Lyttelton's Brigade; but. they only wasted their energy, for our men retook the position at the point of the bayonet;. The enemy are concentrated in a semicircular position, their right flank on Spion Kop, and extending back to Acton Homes, with their outposts pushed forward in front of General Buller's lines, their centre curving around in front of the British lines, and their left occupying Onderbroek, Brakfortein, and Grobler's Kloof. Looting at the two positions from a military point of view, I have no hesitation in saying that on tne east and west — that is, on both flanks, the enemy -possess very strong positions, splendidly placed for flankiiK' purposes, but on the centre he is com. paratively weak. On the other hand, the British are unquestionably strongest on their centre, and if they can break through the enemy's lines in front of Swartz Kop without too much risk of being flanked on the west or left of their lines, then 'all will be well, as once our trdops are able to penetrate to the north about four miles-. Gene* ral Lyttelton can take the enemy's posltions at Brakfontein and Onderbroek .11 flank and rear without serious delay or loss as he would be able to change front to the right without any danger of exposing his flank, which would be coveredakby the brigade on his left in front of Amot Hill. The position at present occupied by ou? forces is the one I have frequently pointed! out as offering the greatest possible chance of success of piercing the enemy's lines by a front attack, as the positions occupied by the enemy are very strong all along their entire front, but Nature has done less fov them along the six or seven miles of courtry that lies between Potgietier's and Trcharl's Drifts than at any other point?. But it must be remembered that to attack an enemy in front in a strong position thaa he has had plenty of time to entrench is^ a dangei'ous experiment at best, evert! if a success crowns General Buller's- efforts, the cost in life will be very heavy. But it! must not be forgotten that it is a part ofl the price Britain has to pay on account of the policy of retrenchment in army expen-j diture, whereby we fail to keep sufficient cavalry and transport to enable our generalsto move any distance from a base so lhafc it is almost impossible in the present struggle in Natal to avoid making an attack in front. If it has to be made at all, I ana convinced that General Buller would have preferred to have made an attack by moving towards Weenen from Estcourt, and following the Main road across the Tugela towards Allenholm, when he would have wheeled to his left and followed the road leading past Umblami, Umquendu, and' Quanquand Mountains, through vasfc stretches of open country, and on past Isimbulwana Mountains, flanking the enemy's position at that point, and joining the head of his column with General White's forces just south of Lombard's Kop. But lack of transport and mounted forces prevented General Buller from attempting such a flank attack, and then he tried the movement of turning the enemy's right flank at Spion Kop, only to find the position was far too strong to be taken, so lie has at last risked all on an attack on the enemy's centre.

Taking all the circumstances into consideration, I consider that if General Buller penetrates to Ladysmith the enemy will retire to the mountain passes of the Drakenbergs, and will leave enough men, say, about 20,000. of General Joubert's army, to hold the British forces from advancing by any of these routes from Natal ; while the balance of their forces will join Commandant Cronje and the other Boer commanders that will oppose the advance of Lord Roberts's armies that the cables inform us he is massing on the centre. One great advantage that General Buller will have in his present lines of advance will be the enormous^ number of guns that he will be able to bring to bear on the enenvy in his front, as it is hai'dly possible that the enemy will be able to mass tint number of pieces on their centre and at the same time hold their positions on their flanks. Besides, they must have a good number of guns south of the Tugela on Inhlawe Mountain, and must keep those abound Ladysmith in position and manned to prevent General White attacking them in the rear. General Buller has the advantage of having his entire force available to support his advance at any point where required, as his entire front being at most seven miles in length he can throw an overwhelming force on to any portion of the enemy's lines thiifa he may find weakest, and to be able to do so is an advantage of great value, as in almost every general engagement there are opportunities presented where the ability of being able to throw even another battalion against a weak place in the enemy's defences will decide the day. The writer, like all other military men of experience, does not approve of front attacks, particularly so in cases where the enemy occupies strongly entrenched positions with long stretches of level or open country in front of their rifle pita and batteries, as was the case at Colenso and Spienx, Kojs,. in fact*, I sni of opinion that hil^i

fighting is less dangerous to the attacking force than crossing a plain in front of .entrenchments. The advantages the enemy will have over our troops in moving across the low ridges between the Tugela and Ladysmith are very imu-. lessened by reason of the fact that the low ridges will offer just as good cover for our infantry as they advance as they will for the enemy ; while our artillery will be m such ftv\e w> to leave the enemy little chance of being able to save themselves from being cut m tvi o. Further news from the front of an interesting nature may be looked for t-hortly, although I would warn the public nni to expect too much from our sonny, but in be content with the result of 'rei.civl Lalicr's attempt to relieve Ladysrailh, wLvL'VC'- that may be. I'oLxudij Ji. The question is often a c \ed why General White allowed himself to be surrounded an L J dy smith instead of retiring south of the Tugeli 1 Eiver. An answer to this question covers a good deal of ground. Immediately after the Jameson raid reinforcements were despatched to Natal, consisting of three b'ltteries of field artillery, a battalion of infantry, and one regiment of cavalry. An artillery camp was lormed at Newcastle, to the, novlh of Ladysmith, while at Dundee an infantry camp was formed, so as to be in readiness shoxild anything occur in the Transvaal that" ■would demand the immediate presence of a British force. Some time later, about April, 1896, the 9th Lancer Regiment was also sent into camp at Newcastle, and remained there for some months, while the condition of affairs in the Transvaal was unsettled. About this time ofacerrf of the Engineer Corps were instructed by the general commanding the forces in South Africa to select a base for any future operations which might be necessary, and these officers, after considerable time and labour, selected Ladysmith as the best available site, as its location gave the force holding it control of all the roads leading from the Free State and the Transvaal into the lower part of Natal, and at the same time commanded tho railway leading to the north past Laing's Nek, and the western road to Harrismith, in the Free State. Having selected the site, military stores in immense quantity were hastily collected there, and, as tho situation did not improve, additions were made to these stores from time to time, as tlie threats of the Boers always indicated that their first attempt woulcr^ be on Natal, and that their great efforts would be put forth to drive the small British force out of that colony as soon as war was declared. But unfortunately the military authorities in Natal made little or no provision by the way of erecting forts or emplacements for heavy guns, and at the outbreak of war not a single piece of heavy ordnance was to be found in Natal capable of resisting the Boer siege train, and not one piece of any kind of ordnance was located at Ladysmith until batteries of field guns were despatched hurriedly from India and the Cape when war seemed to be unavoidable. So that, although we had immense stocks of food and ammunition at the base in Ladysmith we had no means of protecting it against the inroads of the enemy should he at any time choose to make an attack. Under these circumstances General White on his arrival in Natal determined to make some provision for the protection of his base, and collected the available forces as they arrived from the different quarters of the globe and such local forces as the Government of Natal placed at his disposal, and endeavoured to place Ladysmith in a state of defence. At the same time, owing to political influence at Pietermaritzburg he was compelled to despatch reinforcements to the officers commanding the troops in Northern Natal, which had concentrated in the vicinity of Dundee, the artillery and cavalry in the meantime having retired from Newcastle and taken up positions between Dundee and Glencoe. On the 11th October the enemy crossed the frontier, and occupied Laing's Nek, and slowly moved to the south, concentrating with the object of enveloping the small force of 4000 men under General Symons. Fortunately the enemy attacked from two different directions, and their main column failed to effect a junction with their forces coming from Utrecht, to the norfch-ea&t of Newcastle, and in consequence of this failure the gallant General Symons was able to defeat the attack, and, General Symons having been wounded, General Yule was able to effect a retreat and join forces with bis superior officer at Ladysmith, after one of the most difficult marches known in military history, as his small force (principally composed of infantry) were in danger of being surrounded b}' the Transvaalers marching from the north and by the Free Staters coining from the south and west by way of Reitfontein and Elandslaagte. " Immediately after the junction of the Dundee and Ladysmith gam- ! Sons at the latter place, the enemy moved from the north and Avest to the east in an endeavour to gain possession of the railway Isimbulwann, Mount, and at the same time a large force of the enemy attempted to move around to the south and west in an attempt to gain possession of the railway south of Ladysmilh for the purpose of cutting off General White's force from supports that might be sent up to his aid over the line from Pieteramutzourg and Durban. It will be remembered that in an attempt to stop the enemy carrying out their designs portions of t« r o of our infantry battalions and the 10th Mountain Battery were made prisoners by the enemy after a hard day's fighting at Nicholson's Nek, and the enemy effected their purpo-e, as. ov.ing to the small force at the disposal of General White he was unable to keep open the line of communication with the *mith and at the same time hold Lady.-milh. He had consequently to choose between two course^ of action — either to blow up the immense stores of munitions of war which h^cl bpeii collected at Lady.-mith and destroy the food supply intended to imintdin an army in the field for some mo itlis, and cut his way to the south acivps the TugeLi at Colenso, via Bulwer's bridge, or to reins in where lie was and protect the stores ond munitions at whatever cost, and depend upon .succour coming from Enghud and elsewhere to relieve him find lii-j .small &.iirison before tho enemy cotild reduce him to

such a state as to compel the surrender of the place. At the outset of the campaign there were not wanting those who condemned General White in no uncertain terms, and some so-called Indian critics were quoted jn the newspapeis all over the world as qualified authorities as to his unfitness for the position he occupied. But his defence of Ladysmith through the four months that have elapsed muco these criticisms appeared have fnlly iustrJkd the opinions expressed by iLe few friends and comrades that knew him to be the right man in that plice.

Under all the circumstances I venture the opinion Hint in the whole annals oi the liijti'-h army there is nothing grander than the defence of Ladysmith by General White pad his small garrison against, the overu helming numbers that were opposed to him, as, with tne exception of the two naval 4. fin guns, -winch ai rived at his camp at almost the last moment before he was surrounded, he had not a single piece of ordnance capable of replying en anything near even terms to the position and field guns of hi" besiegeis. And not only were his guns inferior in range and weight of metal, but they weie also greatly inferior in number, as, at the outside, 32 guns, were all he could muster against the 110 with which the enemy first went into the field. The question then is, Would it hive been better to have destroyed the stores at Ladysmith. or perchance allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy only partially destroyed, as their complete destruction so as to unfit them for u.se by the enemy would have almost been beyond the power of an army jn retreat, or to have' remained and defended them as General White has done. In my opinion General White looked both aspects fairly in the face, and determined to defend his base. That he has done so with credit to himself and to the British army every military tactician throughout the world is prepared to bear testimony. In this article I do not intend to call to mind the various engagements that the troops under General White successfully contested against the enemy's forces, as I only -wish to point out why Luly smith was deemed to be of such importance to the British in Natal us to cauve General White to determine to. defend it. when he knew that it be attempted to do so the enemy would be sure to surround him, and that once he was hemmed in weeks and possibly months must elapse before assistance could read) him from England, and that during this time he mu&t hold the place regardless of every consideration save his honour as an officer and a soldier of. the British army.

The cables state that owing to the severe losses that the enemy have experienced in horses they are forming infantry corps. If this turns out to be true the enemy will find it very difficult to effect a retreat in good order, and they will probably have to abandon many of their heavy guns, owing to lack of draught horses. ' I am always inclined to doubt siatements made by prisoners, however, and I can assure my readers that it is always good policy to be careful atfout what they believe in war times, as statements of this kind ore often made to mislead.

The fact that foreign military attaches are leaving Capetown for the front would seem to infer that important manoeuvres are about to take place, possibly with the central column that is composed of the divisions commanded by General French on the left. General Kelly-Kenny on the centre, and General Gatacre on the right. As near as I can judge by the meagre data furnished, this central force is about 22,000 strong, and Lord Roberts and his staff are engaged in an endeavour to bring it up to 30,000 men in order to make it effective. Assuming that this is accomplished, it will give us some idea of the correctness of the figures I gave regarding the forces in South Africa, as we are informed that Buller's forces number 34,000 men, the central column 30,000 men, and the western column (under General Methuen) 12,000 men— % to(al of 76.000 men in the three columns. To these add the garrisons of Ladysmith, 9000 ; other Natal towns, 5000 ; 'Kimbeiley, 12,000 ; Mafeking and Rhodesia, 5000 ; communication troops, 15,000 ; garrisons at Capetown and other places, including Do Aar, 13,000, and we have at most a grand tolal of 135,000 men. And from these must be deducted the killed, wounded, missing, prisoners, and sick in order to arrive at the fighting strength of our forces on service. In these figures I have allowed for the arrival of 4000 men of the seventh division in Natal to reinforce General Buller, and 7000 men of the same division to reinforce the central column in the Cape.

The retreat of General Hector Macdonald clearly points out that the enemy were too strong at the points his force were threatening, and that owing to lack of cavalry forces he was compelled to fall back in order to avoid the danger of being surrounded by the enemy's horsemen. The position as we close the week may be said to be brightened somewhat from what it was one week ago, as the bulk of the seventh division, if not all of it, is in South Africa ; but unfortunately there is more delay experienced at Home in the despatch of' troops owing to transport difficulties, and in consequence of this it will be well along in March before any considerable increase in the army in South Africa can be looked for.

February 12.

General Bnller's retirement from the north side of the Tugela after his third attempt to relieve Ladysmith by attack in front is the most serious news we havo received from the seat of war up to date. We of New Zealand should at once place regiments of infantry at the disposal of the Imperial Government for garrison and communication duties in the Cape, so as to enable the Imperial troops to be sent to the front, for it will need every soldier the Home Government can spare to meet the lenuirements of Lord Roberts for a field force to invade the Free State. It is evident that through the Free State mxi&l go the column that will relieve LadyEmith by crrnpelling the enemy to withdraw from Nfital in order to save his base. No partici'laiN aie given which would enable an estmn.tc to be ma'lo of the ]'j.s«e ci on either side in thi-j Ihiid attempt, but I am now fully convinced that it will be no u&o to

try and relieve General White by a front attack on the enemy in future, but that I^J.OOO men mu&t be concentrated and pushed into the Free State with the utmost ha<-te. No doubt General White's position i& by now veiy urmleasant and serious, and will' remain so until the Free State is invaded by a lnrge force, and the rear and flank of Joubeit's army seriously threatened. I have all along contended that the forces were inadequate for the work on hand.

On the western frontier, about the Modeler, General Macdonald's withdrawal is c.mple evidence of the superior strength of the enemy.

We are informed by cable that the forces in the field by the end of this month will total 190,000 men, including 20,000 militia. It will be remembered that on the opening of the Impend! Parliament the Under-s.ec-retary for War stated that the. forces in South Afiica would number 180,000 men by the middle of February, and at that time no account was taken of any portion of the Home militia forces that are now included in the estimate of 190,000 men r,o cabled. On the 6th inst. I questioned the iicciirocy of the Under-secretary's, .statement, and showed whit the foicos in South Africa and on the woy really mounted to. In Ur's estimate I ullowed a total force in Natal of 45.000 men, including the command of Generals White and Bnller, and the troops in garrison in that colony. I also enumerated the vaiious divisions operating in v ~e Colony, the troops in garrison at Kimberley, the Rb.ode.sian and BecmiDnaland garrisons, the number of troops then at serf, the garrisras at Capetown, and other places m Cape Colony, and the troops on lines of communication, bunching all together and miking a grand total for tLe western army of 80.600 men, or a grand total for South Africa of 145,600 men of all ranks and arms. Since that time we have been informed that owing to LfKk of transport the Imperial Yeomanry, which has so recently been formed, could not be shipped, and just now a cable has been placed in my hands stating that 5000 troops embarked on the 10tb ir,st. These 5000 embarking on the 10th can reach the Capo by the end of the month. But even if their despatch is expedited they cannot possibly reach pny of the divisions operating against the ppemy by that date. However, by that time they ought to be in the Cape, and for all practical^ purposes may be counted available for service in that country. But this at be&t gives only 140.000 men, or thereabouts, instead of the 190,000 stated by the cable, and how the 20^000 militia are to get there when transports could nnt % be found to ship the seven or eight thousand Yeomanry who&e presence in South Africa is much more desirable, I cannot understand, for if transports are not obtainable for the Yeomanry, how can they be obtained to despatch the militia. But even if it ir- possible to get the 20,000 militia to Capetown by the time stated, we would still be 30,000 short of the number cabled. In proof of the figures stated, I might point out that the Estimates providing for the expense of the forces in tne field are stated to be for a total addition of 120,000 additional men. Now, an army corps in the British army consists of three divisions of 31.000 men each ; or 11,500 men each, wi+h the full complement of the Royal Army Medical Corps, including field hospital and Aimy Service Corps, so that the total of General Buller's Army Corps only amounted to 33,500 men. Now, 120.000 additional men, as provided in the Estimates, aiict the 16,000 men who were in the Cupe and at Natal, including those who arrived from India, as a portion of General White's forces prior to the despatch of General Buller's Army Corps, would only bving the forces up to 170,000 men, so that -h e find that not only are the forces not i?ctually in the field, but no financial provision has been made for a force to exceed the 170,500 men provided for in the Estimates. I point out these discrepancies for the purpose of showing the public the true condition of affairs, and to show them tint our efforts must be continued, or rather redoubled, if we are to bring the war to a successful issue, for it seems to me that we are pursuing the same course that the French military authorities did during the Franco-Prussian war, and that our armies total very large on paper, but very small in front of the enemy. Looking at the actual numbers operating in the field in front of the positions the enemy have taken up, wo find that General Buller has about 34,000 men, the central columns under Lord Roberts total about 30,000 men, provided that the balance of the seventh division has reached tho northern districts, and the forces under Lord Methuen total less than 14,000 men, so that in reality we have only 78,000 men on the fighting line outside of the garrisons at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Maf eking, and the balance of our forces are required for garrison and communication duties. In order to relieve the numbers that are now kept on lines of communication and for garrison and police duties, I have from time to time pointed out the advantages that would ensue if the colonies would provide from their volunteer infantry sufficient troops to replace the regulars for garrison duty and on lines of communication, so that the regulars could join their comrades at the front. I advocate this because I have all alone; known that the number of regular troops available were not able to do the work required oi them if so maivy were detained in the rear of the operating columns, and I hold it to be the duty of the colonies not only 1o the mother land, but to themselves, to render all the aid that is within their power to bring the war to a close. It is now evident that colonists all over the woild realise tho gravity of the situation, and that they arc not only willing but anxious that their Governments should foiipport the Imperial authorities by offering every man that is available for service.

The number of the enemy's guns prior to the declaration of war is now stated to have been 250. Tho Avritor made a report on January 1, 1898, showing that thoj' had at that time 105 guns, field and machine, of modern pptiern*. and a number of gun's of on earlier period cliit were obsolete, This return did not include the

position guns that were imported to arm the forts at" Johannesburg and Pretoria. In 1899, prior to the outbreak of war, the additional purchases of guns made by the Transvaal were duly reported to the general officer commanding at the Cape, and by him to the War Office and the Horse Guards, so that there was nothing new in the matter as disclosed by this secret memorandum, as the number, calibre, weight, and range of every gun possessed by tho Transvaal was well known prior to the commencement of hostilities. The story that a balloon disclosed a dozen of the enemy's guns, cunningly masked, covering the road to Ladysmith, and the enemy hoped to entrap the British by allowing them to advance far enough to enable these guns to sweep the advancing forces, ought not to have caused our troops to retire, for if the balloons located these guns our artillery ouaiit to have been able to get the range, and ro;ike the position untenable for the enemy's gunners, i as. opposed to these 12 guns., General Uuller could certainly concentiatc the fn'c „of nine or ten batteries at least, and still have had sufficient guns to cover his forces at other parts of his lines. I can only state that the"sG mins were not the sole come of General Buller's retreat, but that these were only one link in the chain of fortifications that -the enemy have completed while our army weie marching and counter-marching in front of the enemy's lines from Colenso to Bethinv. It is painfully evident that all jGeneral Ballet*' s msmrvuvrinsj is valueless, and that it is only by pursuing (he same tactics the Boers, have adopted th-it we can hope fov success Let a force of 100.000 to 120,000 men invade the Free State and Transvaal, and secure possession of the railways, and particularly the line running from Elandsfontein, near Johannesburg, to - Charleston, Natal, and stop the Boer supplies of ammunition from o,oing to the south, and of necessity the enemy would be forced to become the as/s/rcs^ors, and thet) the British would turn the tables on the enemy by forcing them to meet our troops on ground of our choosing, and not on theirs. The Boer? in the Colesberg district are now reported to be perfectly free to nrinve to their rear, instead of being hemmed ,up in the hills iieav C'olcsberg, as stated some time ago. I pointed out "at the time that it wns most unl-kely tint Frpnch"s division' of 8000 men. with *a goncl quantity of infantry to make up that number, could surround 7000 mounted troops in an extensive district, and at the sacne time furnish a column to capture and hold Norval's Pont. '• The very idea was absurd. Now we have, learned the true state of the case, we find that the enemy control 30 miles of front, and have free communication with the F r ee State, in their rear, so that they are able to retire at their leisure if they desire to do so.