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THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF PORT ARTHUR:

WHAT IT MEANS TO THE AUS-

TRALASIAN COLONIES.

[By W. S.]

I am extremely surprised that this matter is receiving so little attention from the political leaders both in the Australian colonies and New Zealand. Queensland is very much concerned about the land grab in New Guinea, bill the grab oi \v\\a. ojoiu xv.j jo si xpxi\.\\ 'jnrpjv W°d importance to all the colonies, is completely lost sight of.

While the Imperial Government is dealing .with this very grave question — one •svlnch concerns the well-being, and even me very existence of the Australasian colonies — . instead o)' joining all our forces in support of Lord Salisbury's policy in regard to China, our leading men only make incoherent and irresponsible utterances tuab are oi no value, as they only embody sentiment. In this case vre must say definitely what we will do. The feeling in England i.s that tlie colonies must make some decided move, boiai in the matter of their own defence and in the defence of the Empire. Our political men complain that no definite scheme is proposed. From the nature of the ca^e it will be much wiser that the colonies should :-ay what they are willing to do. The first thing required is thai the Australasian colonies wake up to the gravity of the situation. Until this is accomplished nothing of any importance will be done. There is a vague feeling abroad that we are nol as safe as we should be; but there is no corresponding resolve that matters must be made safe at whatever sacrifice. There are several causes for this incliiference, the chief ones being (1) dial the danger is still at a distance ; (2) it takes some effort of thought to think it out ; (3) the great difference of opinion that exists upon all matters concerning Russia. The last cause requires considering, as out of it Russia makes considerable capital. The Biitisli Empire is pre-eminently commercial. Therefore anything that will disturb trade will be' unpopular. Commercial men know the value of Russian trade, and know also what a break would mean lo their interests ; and their training leads them to look at matters

only from the commercial standpoint. This causes them to regard the opinions of naval and military men, whose training leads them in quite a different direction, as visionary, alarmist, &c. This is just what we should naturally expect. The more need, therefore, that we make sxire of the qualifications of each to speak upon the matter at issue, and also how far interest is concerned. Now naval and military men have to consider the different aspects of national power in all its bearings and details, and this training obviously enable? them to s> c clearly the terrible power lliot is steadily ai.d rapidly increasing under tin Russian Uovi.r'i-ment—-a Government that doos not allow anyone lo be at liberty within its bouncHms who dares lo criticise its actions. It is 'his solidity of opinion and action lh.il nnke-5 Russia &u.jh a menace to thu j'tMce of li-c world. Ido not, think il r.ccc-- l i iy to iu\mc al! (he diuereut liiyh a'tfumi; :•_•'-. <,',!>•> It we spoken and ■written upon the d p for of allowing Russia, to gain a fvlinic ii 1 ' Chini. The opinion of Mr Ta\lor Jlea'lnv «, wLi.'h you gave in the Ol.igo J3..il\ 'limes <>f .july 14, is the view every one is forced lo t:iko 'wlio will look the facts srniaieiy in Ino face and lias any common sense to guide them. Lord Wol-eley and Lord C iJorw foi-d have also expressed ihe«vulverf inmu:h the same w&y, and many others. Now Riu.pia lias got possession of Poib for purely strategical purposes, and a'so such n position in Manchuria as will, if she is allowed to mature her schemes, give hi r the complete command of China. Hi c would then with her dominant power mov\! south and west until all At,ij would fall under her influence. And I fail to see hoy/ sea power can do anything lo prevent il if she is once allowed to get po&&es3ion of the millions of China. Tho question suggests itself, What will be the results of this Russian ascendency? It means the loss of all our noble heritage of freedom. With any of the other great Powers it would only mean a loss of property, and perhaps other -civil rights ; but with Russia ifc is far otherwise — thai is, the result of absolute defeit. But that will take some considerable time. The effect in the meantime upon the Australasian colonies will be to force them into a continually increasing expenditure s-pon defence. We will find ourselves forced jnio the same position as the countries of Europe are groaning under at present. The effect of this upon countries that are only doveloping -will be disastrous. Now. if those are Ihe rocks that we are drifting upon- -a. id I caimot see how we can get away from the fads, however unpleasant they may be--it is surely more than lime that we were bestiring ourselves to a veil these danjjprs that are certainly ahead of us. If oir leaders will not move, the people and iLe press must demand that steps be taken lint will give some hope of Fafety for ourselves and those who are to follow us. At present the matter is still in the diplomatic stage ; but ive are doing nothing lo strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government, allhvjgh the whole business is of such vital imp>rtance to us. We should bring cur utmost pressure lo bear — we should demand that Port Arthur be a free port and unfortified, and the complete integrity of China ; oi.cl we should be prepared lo fight to the leaUi for it if required. We should assure the Imperial Government thai we will saad our last man, and spend our last shilling, in forcing Russia to withdraw from China. If we are prepared lo do this, the probabilities aie that the ertd may be gained without the appeal to force But v.c must be in earnest: nothing of the nature of bluff will do, as Russia, through her system of secret police and intelligence department, is probably kept better posted up Hipon all our sayings and doings and intentions than any of our own departments are upon any one subject.

The best policy for New Zealand lo adopt •would be something on the following lines (die other colonies would have to do something the same, but at present they are much ahead of us) : The fir&l step we should take is to find out how many men vre have fit for service — i.e., all included in the first pnrt second militia ; also how far we can officer and equip this force. Having done tliis, we should then approach the Imperial Government with an offer something like the following : — We have so many men and officers and so much equipment (if any). We are not able to equip this force fit for service, but we will place it at your disposal, lo be used where most required, and in the event of war we have plenty of food suppl'iC;, that Aye can supply in payment foi the help affoided us. Some such offer lam certain would meet Avilh approval, as it would let tlic Imperial Government know exactly ho-.v much help we can give, and how much thsy can rely upon us. It would be something definite. This, of course, is a direct depart me from our present defence poLcy, which only aims at defending our cliief ports — a policy which rests upon the assumption thai Ure-it Britain may be engaged in a war that did not immediately concern us, ond that if we keep safe ports of refuge for ships of war 10 run lo in lime of need, and also keep cur cliief towns from being placed under contribution, Ibis would be' all thai was required of us. Fiom what lias been said it is surely evident thai in this case very much more ii necessary. If we intend to make Russia recede from China, either by diplomacy or force, we must be prepared to stnke her at the vital points, and not sit waiting to be attacked. This i^ al?o the safest policy of defence. If we intend lo let matters drift as they are, we had better ask ourselves how we intend lo repel an attack of seveial million Chinamen trained and led by Russian officers.

The charges against Richard and Elizabeth Es.-ex of laying tote odds, heard at the Court at Palmersfcon N., were dismissed. All the witnesses refused to give ovi'lonre, and the magistrate said it would be difficult to pro\e these cases until the law provided that witnesses giving evidence should be protected from prosecution.

When the little boy was saving his catechism, they afckcd him what wa-s the chief end ot man. lie said : " The end what's got the hat on." You do got the bald truth from youngsters at limes. Ask a child, for instance, what's good for coughs and colds : " Why, Woods' a Great Peppermint Cure, of course." They know ; all tho New Zealand youngsters of four years old and upwards know thai*

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/OW18980804.2.167

Bibliographic details

Otago Witness, Issue 2318, 4 August 1898, Page 54

Word Count
1,544

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF PORT ARTHUR: Otago Witness, Issue 2318, 4 August 1898, Page 54

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF PORT ARTHUR: Otago Witness, Issue 2318, 4 August 1898, Page 54