THE NAVAL POLICY OF GERMANY.

Otago Witness, Issue 2240, 4 February 1897, Page 12

THE NAVAL POLICY OF GERMANY.

The Berlin - correspondent of the Standard, writing on the 19th November, says:—"The Military Weekly has published an article by Baron Liittwitz, Captain & la suite o? the Great General Staff, entitled 'The Naval Policy «nd Strategy of., Germany.' The writer's object is to apply to this country the principles of Captain Mabao's work on 'The Influence of Sea Power on Hutory.' His conclusions have been somewhat adversely criticised by the German paptrs, on the ground that his article is nob a fair account of the mutual relations of England and Germany. I give the following extract from the essay: — • Germany came too late for the first partition of the world in the last century, but a second is preparing. We have only to bear in mind the decay of the Ottoman Empire, the opening up of China —that new India in the Fast East — and the unstable condition of affairs in some of-the South American States, to recognite what rich opportunities yet await us. In order not to let them slip we need a fleet. We must be 80 strong at sea that no State feeling itself secure against our land forces 'shall dare to overlook us in the negotiations as to the new division of the world; and for this I here is no time to be lost. The money we now devote to the purposes of the fleet will bring us interest, aud compound interest, in the form of colonial accessions. It is not enough for us to be strong on- land and to have political alliances. We cannot engage in a great war for the sake of every piece of country in distant lands, 'however important ita possession may be to us. In view of the great uniform armament of the European States, the' second partition of the world will probably be a peaceable one. We shall, however, be deprived ef all right to further colonies unless we have the naval capacity to "take possestion of and to keep them. History has always shown that every Government 'needs a vigorous foreign policy, if only to pfovlde t an/jiiterest and an object* for the national' energy, which is so easily inclined to disunion through' domestic quarrels. We shall come quite spontaneously tor a colonial policy of ' the grasping hand.' And in this direction it is 'always the same adversary that w.ill' bar ,our path, wherever it may lead —viz , England. The Englißh nation is, by its whole origin and' development, excessively sensitive to any competi 1 ion in the commercial and political field. The historical period treated by Mahan shows this clearly and strongly. It bus always gone straight for every rival, and in turn suppressed Holland, Spain, and France. It haß of late acknowledged that Germany is its most serious competitor. Perhaps, also, a foreboding is dawning in the mind of the nation that vital dangers to Teutonic races can only proceed from themselves. How much more trouble has little Holland given to England than powerful France ? At all events, there is evidence of a growing animosity against us Germans | in Great Britain. It is doubly dangerous in a country with a pronounced parliamentary form of government, in whioh the Govern- j ment is at the mercy of popular passions. No English Minister has ever possts ed such absolute power as Walpole in- the first half of the Eighteenth Century. He was averse from military enterprises, but the hatred of the Eoglish for Spain and France, arising out of commercial policy, compelled a war and swept his Ministry cut of effice. We have seen the force of the patsions of tbc British people during the excitement over the Armenian question. The clamour of tbe commercial worid and of local interests has of ten compelled the English Government to take action against its will. How long is a policy of repression likely to last now i The leading trait of the English character is \ etubbornnebsi and resolution. The Briton pursacs his goal relentlesßly. As soon as he has recognised (tat. we are his really dangerous competitor?, h. will come to terms with ail the othfcr natioi o, bub it is we whom he will ultimately fighs That everything has passed off peacefully iv tho differences which have already occurred' cm only be ascribed to the fact that the general political situation has been uncommonly favourable to us. England will endeavour 4o isolate Germany, and then take the opportunity afforded by some controversy which has arisen naturally, or been artificially got up, to send a new 'Flying Squadron" to sea. Or else a captain prepared to take the responsibility on himtelf will be found on the distant seas whe will fire the first »hot v -Great Britain has never wanted for such men. Ib would be a fatal mistake for us to make too light of the danger threatening us from England. Too much combustible matter has already accumulated, and bur conflicting interests are opposed too sharply. In the face of danger from England, no reliance can be placed on alliances or political constellations. They change too quickly, and other countries, leaving France entirely out of the question, would rejoice to Bee a commercial and political rival humiliated. The only thing that can help us is out own right arm and a strong fleet of battleships, able to protect our North Sea ports from blockade, to go in quest of the enemy, and keep them in check while the conveyance of the transport fleet to the Island Kingdom is proceeded with. We have also, in the Eoglish peril, an index ef the size to which, in case of necessity our fleet must attain. Our navy must be of sufficient strength, after allowing for cruisers on foreign shores, to cope successfully with those English squadrons whioh ire in their home«vaters.. This is the great point, for, In the first place England cannot, under present political conditions, altogether leave her other *pheres of interest to take care of themselves, and in the second place, there Will, at the beginning of the war, be rapid £nd probably decisive actions, in whioh distant fleets will not be able to take part. It is only tyhen we have a navy of this strength that i Tre ehftll be secure against oppression.

We' certainly do not senk a quarrel; we ] will, however, fight it out honourably if it b3 i forced upon us. The German nation should j beware of the great responsibility it would j incur by neglecting the equipment of its navy while it has yet time for preparation. May it not happen with us as it did once to the Dutch, who poured oat money only when the* danger stared them in the face ; or, as with France in the Eighteenth Century, which only concerned itself ,with her navy and maiitimo interests when the moment for U9ing them with good effect had passed forever.' As may be readily imagined, this article, having appeared in a semi-official paper, has attracted considerable attention. It is possible, however, that it is merely an elaboration of a theme given to the officers of the general staff. The squadron commanded by Prince Henry of Prussia, consisting of four large ironclads, is to strengthened iv the spring by the addition of the Deutschland. The new 24, 21, and 15 centimetre quick-firing guns for the German navy have the largest calibre of any weapons of the kind. AU the new ships are to have triple screws, and the number of engineers will probably have to be largely increased. The construction plans for the cruisers provided for in the Budget of 1896 97 have just been finished, and will be sent to the dockyards as soon as they are sanctioned by the Emperor. The ironclad Kouig Wilhelm has left Kiel to make experiments with Schuckert'a searchlights, which have been fitted to her &tern and to both her sides. Up to the Ist ultimo the Emperor William Canal had bean used 461 times by German warships and 18 times by foreign men-of-war, which ] have to obtain permission through diplomatic'" channels. Five of the latter went from the North Sea to the Baltic, and the remainder, including eight which had been built in German dockyards, traversed tho canal in 'the other direction. Six were Rus»i«qf, five Chinese, two Dutch, two Austrian, and the others Swedish, Brazilian, and Turkish.