THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.

Otago Witness, Issue 1915, 3 August 1888, Page 11

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.

In the first number of that splendid publication, »< The Universal Review," Sir Charles Dilke, who for some time past has been pouring out in the "Fortnightly Review" article upon article on the deficiencies of the British army—and not ineffectually, ifc will have been noticed — returns to v The State of Europe," his previous seven articles on which, published as a book last year, form an indispensable manual to every student of international politics. This new contribution equals, if it does not exceed in interest BD y of the previous ones, and we can only present our readers with the briefest resume of the mass of information which it conveys. In spite of appearances to the contrary, Sir C. Dilke considers the risk of war has rather decreased than inerpased during the 15 months since he last wrote on the subject. More attention has been called to the appearance of affairs on the Galiclan frontier, but there is really less danger in that direction as Austria is strengthening her defences, and a surprise has become more difficult. The idea that Prince William's accession to the German throne will seriously affect the settled policy of Germany Sir Charles scouts altogether. " Russia only ctn begin a » war," though the liberal truth of this statement might be violated by her provoking Austria into taking the first step, which she would ooly do as a matter of absolute necessity. In such a war, Sir Charles thinks that France and ' Germany would keep each other in check, and! that Russia would probably be able to take and keep Bukowina and Galicia against Austria, Turkey, Italy, and Roumania, but could advance no further. But this movement i* rendered very improbable by the Central Alliance. As regards Bulgaria, who is gradually but surely strengthening her position, Russia will continue to intrigue, but is not likely to attempt a military occupation, because she can only enter Bulgaria by crossing Roumania and exposing her flank to Austria, or else from a naval case, which would bring more enemies upon her back. The least unlikely war, he considers, is a sudden attack by Russia upon Turkey, which would combine an invasion of Asia Minor from the Caucasus with a sudden rush upon Constantinople ; but this is less likely than it was a year ago, owing to Italy having taken up a more pronounced attitude of opposition to any disturbance of the status quo in the Mediterranean or Black Sea. This opposition is due to a growing feeling on the part of Italy that the Russian occupation of Constantinople, and the almost necessarily consequent Austrian occupation of Salonica would not be compensated by any territory that ib likely to be offered to her, whether Tripoli or Rhodes, or both together. Turkey, with the aid of Italy, could blockade the Russian coasts, if Russia were unaided, as would probably be the case, and both Italy and Turkey would do all in' their power to bring England to their aid. The English alliance is'bhe main object of Italy's policy at present, and the difficulty of arriving at any reliable agreement with England her great anxiety. In any possible war against France the English navy could alone protect Italy against invasion by sea, or at leasb the capture of many of her great cibies, her own navy, though the third in Europe, being vastly inferior to the French, and her seamen inefficient.

The tone of the article is, it will be seen, very strong as to the probability of peace for the present. But Sir Charles Dilko proceeds to emphasise his previous warning that war is certain to break out between Russia and England before the end of the century, and adds to this warning reasons for thinking that England may have to fight single-handed againsfc France and Russia, and that there is a distinct danger of England stumbling into a w.ir with France which Russia would naturally uso as an opportunity for her projects on India. These reasons, if not conclusive, are certainly interesting. As England is and will remain unable to definitely join the Ceutral Alliance, the Central Powers will not feel any necessity for helping her in case she is attacked. The Russian reason for attacking her is obvious, and it will probably suit Germany very well for France fco turn her warlike ambition in the direction of England. General Boulanger's newspaper is loudly proclaiming an anti-English policy, and the instability of French internal politics adds to the probability of France seeking an outlet for her energies iv war along the line of least resistance. Why are France and Russia building fast cruisers m such " enormous numbers," unless the avowed purpose of attacking our trade in the event of a war with England is the true one ? In a Franco-German war the navy would play no part, and cruisers are nob the kind of ■vessels needed for an Italian invasion. As regards the immediate cause of an AogloTreuch war, Sir Charles points to the Tamatave incident as showing how easy it is to find a pretext for a war it there is any disposition in that direction, especially with such a changeable and sensitive nation as the French. Russia would prefer delay, as her Central Asian railways are not far enough advanced to give her much chance of a successful attack on India for some years to come. But she would hardly like to miss such an opportunity as would be afforded to her by a war between England and France, and the objections which she would feel against acting with democratic France agaiu6t reactionary Germany and Austria do not apply equally to co-operation against liberal England. The prosDects of a succesf ul Russian invasion of India Sic'C. Dilke (lues not think highly of. At present such an invasion would be almost sure to fail; and even when the railways are further advanced India should be safe if England makes counter preparations. But the danger to British trade and Colonif s iv a single-bauded War against Russia and France would be very serious. Our navy Sir Charles considers to be about equal to that of France and Russia combined ; but the coasts aud tmde we have to defeud are enormous, and France and Russia are, according bo Lord Brassey, already considerably ahead of England in fast cruisers, and now making strenuous efforts to add to that strength. In the 20 knot class France aud Russia have ab present 5 cruisers to our 2 ; iv the 19 knots, 18 to our 5; in ihe 18 knots, 27 to 16; in the 15 snots. 44 to our 41 ; in the 14 knots, 61 to our 47. After this exposition we can hardly avoid agreeing with the reviewer's conclusion that || the naval aspect of a contest between ourselves <( 0u the oue side and France aud Russia upon ( tho other is not an agreeable one to coutem1 plate" — particularly in these Colonies.