IMPERIAL POLICY.

Otago Witness, Issue 905, 3 April 1869, Page 2

IMPERIAL POLICY.

If any doubt remained as to the policy of the Imperial Government with regard to our Native disturbances, it is now dispelled by the Queen's Speech on the opening of Parliament. The Speech, we are told, regretted the New Zealand atrocities, but expressed a confident hope that the Colonial Government and the people would prove equal to the occasion. Such an intimation is unmistakeable. The language put into Her Majesty's mouth expresses the deliberate opinion of the Cabinet. In that respect, it carries infinitely greater weight than the despatch of any Secretary of State for the Colonies. On such a question as the employment of Imperial troops, it must be regarded as a definite settlement of the question. Had there been any disposition to assist the colonists in suppressing rebellion, some expression of the impending necessity for doing 1 so would necessarily have been made. The emergency in which the colony is placed, and the urgent demands for Imperial assistance made by a large section of the colonists, were well known to Her Majesty's advisers when the Royal Speech was under consideration. The Poverty Bay massacre was then exciting the sympathies of the British public. In the midst of this sympathetic sensation, the London press 'counselled the people of New Zealand to rely upon themselves/ The newspapers and the Ministry were evidently of one mind upon the subject.

This announcement of the Imperial policy will not create any feeling of surprise. The policy itself has been evident for some time past. On the arrival of the last mail, we pointed out that the question was virtually set at rest by the utterances of the English Press. This opinion was called in question ; and the countermand of the Himalaya's orders was brought forward as a proof that the Imperial Government was only waiting. to be asked for regiments. The facts that Earl Granville was absent from London when the intelligence of the Poverty Bay massacre arrived, and that he did not return until after the Australian mails were made up, were considered a satisfactory explanation of the countermand referred to. It did not appear j to us that the retention of the 18th Regiment indicated any change in the I policy of the Home Government, or that there was any probability of additional forces being despatched to the North Island. To remove the few companies at present stationed in the colony at so critical a period, would have been an ungracious act, and one from which Earl Granville might have reasonably shrank. But there was no reason to suppose that, in the face of the distinct expressions of opinion on the part of the English Press, any change of policy was indicated by the telegram, which reached the commander of the Himalaya at Galle. It is absurd to suppose that the massacre at Matewhero would alone suffice to induce the Imperial Government to send out troops to New Zealand. That event was the natural culmination of a long series of disasters which had overtaken the colony. The unfitness of the colonial forces to meet the emergency that confronted them, had been rendered evident many months before the massacre occurred. Each successive mail made it known in London that our forces were routed in all directions, that the rebellion was becoming formidable, and that the colony was utterly unprepared to face it. The need for disciplined troops was as evident in the first stages of the rebellion as it wjas in any subsequent stage — if not far moi*e so. The necessity of extinguishing the rebellion at the outset instead of allowing it to flourish unchecked from month to m,on#Jj

could not have escaped the attention of the Home Government. Yet month after month was suffered to pass by, without the least indication of any intention to assist us. The prayer of the Legislature, endorsed by the urgent representations of the Governor, was curtly refused. In the absence of an expressed determination not to interfere in the struggle, the Home Government could hardly have manifested its intentions more clearly.

The rumour in Bombay, reported in the Suez telegram, to the effect that an expeditionary force would probably be despatched from India to this colony, is an unexpected item of intelligence. The rumour must have had some foundation of an official kind. New Zealand affairs do not usually attract attention in India, and rumours of military expeditions to our shores are among the last jwe might expect to hear. Nor are there any independent military organisations in India, which could look to New Zealand as a field for the display of mercenary prowess. Possibly the General Government have acted on Mr Cracroft Wilson's suggestions so far as to negotiate with the Indian Government for the assistance of a regiment. No idea of desjiatching an expedition from India to this colony would be entertained, without some preliminary negotiation with our Government. Whatever the value of the Bombay rumour may be, we are strongly disposed to think that Indian soldiers of the Ghoorka stamp would answer our purposes better than the British, Savages require savages to deal with them; and European life, moreover, is too valuable to cast away in a protracted struggle with enemies who unite the intelligence of men with the ferocity of wild beasts. However highly we may estimate the military qualities of our own race, experience has shown us that British regiments, aided with all the muniments of war, are not always successful against the Maori. Disciplined European regiments, accustomed to field manoeuvres, are not necessarily qualified for bush warfare. Perhaps their discipline is to some extent a disqualification for it. Of all European soldiers, the best fitted for a war with savages are the French. But their history in Algeria reflects as little credit on their arms as the history of British regiments in New Zealand. The last mail informs us that an army of 1200 French soldiers was completely defeated by 2800 Algerian rebels. British regiments would be most usefully employed in the North Island, in performing garrison duty and in cutting roads ; while the bush should be taken by forces specially fitted for that service.