BATTLE OF MIDWAY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27541, 8 November 1950, Page 7

BATTLE OF MIDWAY

“ The Hinge 01 fate ”

Memorable American Victory

By Winston S. Churchill.

No. 22,

In the first encounter in history between carriers, the Japanese lost 43 aircraft and the Americans 33. This episode in the Coral Sea was but a prelude to the memorable battle of Midv/ay, in which the American forces scored a decisive victory.

The advance into the Coral Sea was only the opening phase in the new Japanese policy of expansion. Even while it was in progress Yamamoto, the Japanese admiralissimo, was preparing to challenge American power in the Central Pacific by seizing Midway Island, with its airfield, from which Pearl Harbour itself, another thousand miles to the east, could be threatened and perhaps dominated. At the same time a diversionary force was to seize useful points of vantage in the Western Aleutians. By careful timing of his movements Yamamoto hoped first to draw the American Fleet north to counter the threat to the Aleutians and leave him free to throw his main strength against Midway Island. By the time the Americans could intervene here in force he hoped to have possession of the island and to be ready to meet the counter attack with overwhelming force. The importance to the United States of Midway, the outpost of Pearl Harbour, vS'as such that these movements must inevitably bring about a major clash. Yamamoto felt confident that he could force a decisive battle on his own terms, and that with his great superiority, particularly in fast battleships, he would stand an excellent chance of annihilating his enemy. That was the broad plan which l he imparted to his subordinate, Admiral Nagumo. All depended, however, on Admiral Nimitz falling into the trap, and equally on his having no counter surprise of his own. The American commander was vigilant and active. His intelligence kept him well informed, even as to the date when the expected blow was to fall.

During the last week of May the Japanese forces allotted to this great enterprise, comprising the main strength of the Japanese Navy, began to move from • their bases. The first to go. was the Aleutian diversionary force, which was to attack Dutch Harbour on June 3 and draw the American Fleet in thaj. direction. Thereafter landing forces were to seize the islands of Attu, Kiska and Adak, farther to the westward. Nagumo, with his group of four carriers, would strike at Midway the following day, and thereafter on June 5 the landing force would arrive and capture the island. All this was expected to be achieved without serious opposition. Yamamoto with his battle fleet would meanwhile lie well back to the westward, outside the range of air search, ready to strike when the expected American counter - attack developed. Meanwhile at Pearl Harbour the greatest activity prevailed. The Enterprise and Hornet arrived from the south on May 26. The Yorktown appeared next day, with damage calculated to take three months to repair, but by a decision worthy of the . crisis within 48 hours she was made taut and fit for battle and was rearmed with a new air group. She sailed again on May 30 to join Admiral Spruance, who had left two days before with the other two carriers. Admiral Fletcher remained in tactical command of the combined force.. At Midway the airfield was crammed with bombers, and the ground forces for the defence of the island were keyed to the highest pitch of expectancy. June 4 broke clear and bright,.and at 5.34 a.m. a patrol from Midway' at last broadcast the long-awaited signal reporting the approach of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Reports began to arrive thick and fast. Many planes were seen heading for Midway, the battleships were sighted supporting the carriers. At 6.30 a.m. the attack came in hard and strong. It received a resolute reception, and probably one-third of the attackers never returned. Much damage was done and many casualties suffered, but the airfield remained serviceable. There had been time to launch a counter-attack at Nagumo’s fleet. His crushing superiority in fighters took heavy toll, and the results, of this gallant stroke, on which great hopes were set, were disappointing. The distraction caused by their onslaught seems, however, to have clouded the judgment of the Japanese commander, who was also told by his airmen that a second strike at Midway would be necessary. He had retained on board a sufficient number of aircraft to deal with any American carriers which might appear, but he was not expecting them, and his search had been half-hearted and at first fruitless. Now he decided to break up the formations which had been held in readiness for this purpose and to rearm them for another stroke at Midway. In any case, it was necessary to clear his flight deck to recover the aircraft returning from the first attack. This decision proved fatal, and although Nagumo later heard of an American force, including one carrier, to the eastward, it was too late. He was condemned to receiving the full weight of the American attack with his flight decks encumbered with useless bombers refuelling and rearming. Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, by their earlier cool judgment, were well placed ot intervene at this crucial moment. They had intercepted the news streaming in during the early morning, and at 7 a.m. the Enterprise and Hornet began to launch a strike with all they had, save for those aircraft needed for their own defence. The Yorktown, whose aircraft had been carrying out the morning search, was delayed while these were recovered, but her striking force, too, was in the air soon after 9 a.m., by which time the first waves from the other two carriers were approaching their prey. The weather near the enemy was cloudy, and the dive bombers failed at first to find their target. The Hornet’s group, unaware that the enemy had turned away, never found them and missed the battle. Owing to this mischance, the first attacks were made by torpedo bombers alone from all three carriers and, although pressed home with fierce courage, were ’unsuccessful in the face of the overwhelming opposition. Of 41 torpedo bombers which attacked, only six returned. Their devotion brought its reward. While all Japanese eyes and all available fighter strength were turned on them, the 37 dive bombers from the Enterprise and Yorktown arrived on the scene. Almost unopposed, their bombs crashed into Nagumo’s flagship, ■ the Akagi, and her sister, the Kaga, and about the same time another wave of 17 bombers from the Yorktown struck the Soryu.

In a few minutes the decks of all three ships were a shambles, littered with blazing and exploding aircraft. Below, tremendous fires broke out, and it was soon clear that all three ships were doomed. Admiral Nagumo could but shift his flag to a cruiser and watch three-quarters of his fine command burn. It was past noon by the time the Americans had recovered their aircraft. They had lost over 60 in all, but the prize they had gained was great. Of the enemy carriers only the Hiryu remained, and she at once resolved to strike a blow for the banner of the Rising Sun. As the American pilots were telling their tale on board the Yorktown after their return, news came that an enemy attack was approaching. The enemy, reported to be about 40 strong, pressed home the attack with vigour, and, besides being heavily mauled by fighters and gunfire, the Yorktown suffered three bomb hits. Severely damaged but with her fires under control, she

carried on until some two hours later the Hiryu struck again, this time with torpedoes. This attack ultimately proved fatal although the ship remained afloat until sunk two days after by a Japanese submarine. The loss of the Yorktown was avenged, even while she still floated. The Hiryu was located at 2.45 p.m., and within the hour 24 dive bombers from the Enterprise were winging their way towards her. At 5 p.m. they struck, and in a few minutes she. too., was a flaming wreck, though she did not sink until the following morning. The 'last of Nagumo’s four fleet carriers had been smashed, and with them were lost all their highly-trained air crews. These could never he replaced. So ended the battle of June 4, rightly regarded as the turning point of the war in the Pacific. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this memorable American victory, not only to the United States, but to the whole Allied cause. The moral effect was tremendous and instantaneous. At one stroke the dominant position of Japan m the Pacific was reversed. Reflection on Japanese leadership at this time is instructive. Twice within a month their sea and air forces had been deployed in battle with aggressive skill and determination. Each time when their air component had been roughly handled they had withdrawn from their chosen objective, even though on each occasion it was within their grasp. The men of Midway, Admirals Yamamoto, Nagumo and Kondo, were those who planned and carried out the bold and tremendous operations which in four months destroyed the Allied Fleets in the Far East and drove the British Eastern Fleet out of the Indian Ocean. Yamamoto withdrew at’ Midway because, as the entire course of the war had shown, a fleet without air coyer and several thousand miles from its base could not risk .remaining within range of a force accompanied by carirers with air groups largely intact. He ordered the transport force to retire because it would have been tantamount to suicide to assault, without air support, an island defended by air forces and physically so small that surprise was imposible. In general, the rigidity of the Japanese planning and the tendency to abandon the object when their plans did not go according to schedule is thought to have been largely due to the cumbersome and imprecise nature. of their language, which „ rendered it extremely difficult to improvise by means of signalled communications. One other lesson of these events stands out in sharp relief. The American intelligence system was successful in penetrating the enemy’s most closely guarded secrets well in advance of events. Thus Admiral Nimitz, albeit the weaker, was twice able to concentrate all the forces he had in sufficient strength at the right time and place. When the hour struck this proved decisive. The importance of secrecy and the dire consequences of leakage of information-in war are here proclaimed. Copyright 1950 in USA by the New York Times Company and Time, Inc. (publisher of Time and Life); m the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation • Press Services, Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.