CAUSE OF FIRE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26748, 17 April 1948, Page 8

CAUSE OF FIRE

CURRENT THEORIES COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS BALLANTYNE'S INQUIRY P.A. CHRISTCHURCH, Apl. 16. It was virtually impossible after a great fire to prove mathematically or scientifically the cause of the fire, said Mr T. P. Cleary, counsel for J. Ballantyne and Co., in his submissions to the Royal Commission of Inquiry today. Two current theories, Mr Cleary said, were the dropped match of a careless smoker and a defective electric cable. There was no evidence to support the first theory. Fires often started through electrical hazards, and the cable in question had far from negligible faults. The evidence would be that the fault of current escaping from the cable fired combustible gases emanating from the heated cable. There was no staff drill for the evacuation of the premises, but in what establishment in the country was there such a drill? asked Mr Cleary. Ballantyne’s should not be subjected to adverse criticism because they had not maintained staff fire drill and evacuation as in the E.P.S. Extent of Danger Whether proper steps had been taken to safeguard the staff depended on the knowledge of the extent of danger, said Mr Cleary. No warning for evacuation had been given by the fire brigade. This did not absolve the management, but the fact that there was no warning showed a lack of appreciation of the danger, and the commission should be slow to attribute to Ballantyne’s a less appreciation of danger than the fire brigade. Company’s History The history and extension of the company was explained by Ronald Haynes Ballantyne, joint managing director of the firm. When asked by Mr Cleary about building permits, he said the firm had never concerned itself with permits for alterations, which were dealt with by the builder or architect. Before the fire it had not occurred to him that openings made in the buildings when the firm extended were a fire risk. That matter had not been discussed by the Board of Directors. Explaining the fire precautions, Ballantyne said the buildings were never unattended. Two nightwatchmen were employed, and one was on duty all night. In addition there was a chief custodian whose duty it was to take over from the nightwatchman in the morning and hand over to them in the evening. The custodian, night and morning, made an inspection of the buildings. Smoking was prohibited throughout the building, except in the cafeteria, and the use of wax matches and cigarette lighters released by springs was not allowed. An automatic fire alarm system was disconnected in 1925 because there were numerous false alarms and because the firm disliked the method of testing by an open flame. To Mr B. A. Barrer (for the three unions) Ballantyne said he did not recollect a visit in March or April, 1945, by Mr F. Gilmour, advisory engineer to the Council of Underwriters, who pointed out that the buildings were a bad fire risk and who recommended the installation of a sprinkler system. Cable in Cellar Questioned by Mr Barrer on the installation of a main cable, he said that as far as he knew the firm was not advised by the underwriters against putting a cable in the cellar. Ballantyne told Mr J. D. Hutchison (for the Fire Board) that before the war the staff of the firm had had lectures by fire brigade officers, and assistance had been given in deciding the site for fire extinguishers. There had been more assistance from the brigade before the war than since. Mr W. R. Lascelles (for the City Council): Has your board ever considered systematic evacuation? —No, only during the war. Balantyne agreed that the building presented a somewhat special problem for fire prevention, but he added that such a fire had never been contemplated. There was a plan for first aid and fire-fighting, but it was not comprehensive. The person nearest an appliance was expected to use it. The commission adjourned until Monday.