INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26352, 6 January 1947, Page 2

INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY

Special to the Daily Times by W. N. Ewer.

It iff a curious irony that by general assent the most important achievement of the United Nations Assembly was' the disarmament resolution. For when the Assembly met, disarmament did not figure on its agenda; nor does it seem to have been notably in the minds of the delegates. The resolution grew from a tiny beginning—the Soviet request for information on the strength and disposition of armed forces maintained at the moment by the members of the United Nations in the territories of other members of the United Nations. Whether that request reflected a genuine anxiety on the part of the Soviet Government, or whether it was part of a too familiar policy of “pinpricks” directed against Britain and the United States, is a point perhaps better left undiscussed. There seems to be no doubt that the Soviet Government had been led to believe that Britain and the United States, for whatever purpose, maintain and intend to maintain, large forces outside their own territories. Whereas, in fact, these forces are so small as to have no strategic importance or significance and are being reduced as rapidly as conditions will permit. British troops have already—since the question was first raised in the spring—left Indonesia, Syria, and the Lebanon. The conclusion of the Italian Treaty will enable their withdrawal from Trieste and Venezia Guilia. Britain is trying to negotiate a new treaty with Egypt which will provide for the withdrawal from that country after nearly 70 years of occupation. There will then remain only the small forces in Iraq and Transjordan which are there by treaty, and—the one controversial case—those in Greece. In addition, there are the forces of occupation in Austria, Germany, and the Italian colonies and Japan'. Britain is anxious for a withdrawal of all Allied troops from Austria as soon as possible and for a general reduction of the forces in Germany. As to the Italian colonies, the British garrisons and military administrations must necessarily remain there until the future of the territories has been decided —which should be this year. Japan is a parallel with Germany, but the Commonwealth force there is hardly more than a “ token ” one. Process of Accretion This matter then, that the Russians raised, was, against the general world background, almost a trivial one. But the effect was rather as when a crystal is dropped into a supernaturated solution. A small question grew by a process of accretion until it had become the whole great question of dis-

The Disarmament Issue

armament. Nor was that accidental, or even due to the logic of debate, leading first from troops abroad to troops at home, and then from troops to arms. It was due, beyond question, to the underlying desire in all, the peoples of all the United Nations for relief from the burden and the dangers of great armaments. Once the issue was raised even by accident no delegation conscious of public opinion at home, could even, had it so wished, have withstood the urge, That is not to say that disarmament or a sweeping reduction of armaments is “just around the corner.” The difficulties as we learned from 1932 to 1936, are complex and immense. There can be no disarmament without a sense of security and a confidence that war is at any rate a contingency so small that the risk of it can be faced with something like aquanimity. But the Assembly has for the first time since the Second World War voted and expressed the desire of the people to disarm. And that is of no small importance. How far have the Assembly and the simultaneous meeting of the Foreign Ministers helped to restore or to create that mutual confidence especially between the Great Powers which is the only real basis for security and so for disarmament? It is a hard question to answer. Certainly, as Mr Bevin'said on leaving New York, they have “cleared away a good deal of the debris of misunderstanding and conflict.” • The Acid Test How much remains: how much especially of that baseless but deep-seated suspicion of the Russians that Britain and the United States are planning what Mr Molotov once bluntly called an “ offensive against the Soviet Union? ” The Security Council’s discussions on the Greek complaints against their northern neighbours and the British claim against Albania—which seems almost certain to come before the Council—will help to provide the answer. But the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on Germany will be the acid test. The German problem must at the best be a difficult one. For at the bottom It is this: How to devise a common economic policy for the four zones administered by the four Allied Governments, of which one is Communist, one Socialist, one individualist, and the fourth, probably a coalition of diverse views. Pending the Moscow meeting, both the “fusion” of plans and the policy of socialisation in the British zone go forward simultaneously. One may add that there is not a word of truth in the reports that Mr Bevin has been urging the postponement of the socialisation policy.