QUESTIONS ASKED

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25736, 6 January 1945, Page 6

QUESTIONS ASKED

ENEMY ACHIEVES SURPRISE

ABSURD SELFTONFIDENCE OF ALLIES

(N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent) LONDON, Jan. 4. Why did Rundstedt break through? Why did he fail in his attack? Are there going to be changes at Supreme Headquarters? Were the Allies overconfident? Why should the winter delay our forces, but Rundstedt win a battle? Those are some of the questions now being asked about the western front. Several attempts are being made to answer them. It has long been admitted that the Allies were completely surprised by Rundstedt’s attack in the locality used by the Germans, not only in 1940,- but also in 1914 - , 4 ~ The Daily Express commentator, Mr Alan Moorehead, discussing the queries, says: “After the Normandy break-out, General Eisenhower made two prodigious decisions—first, to take the field command himself; secondly, to bring all his armies up to the Rhine together. While the German line solidified, the Allied armies toiled painfully up to the Rhine, and Supreme Headquarters found itself conducting the battle from 150 miles away. Frqm the Mediterranean to the English Channel six armies were deployed, and there was no real cutting edge anywhere. Soon the individual commanders found that even if they did make a breach in the German line they had no reinforcements on hand to back it up and go through. Faced with this evenly-spread pressure, the German line was able to be held intact, which was the state of affairs by the end of November. Rundstedt’s Secret Moves

“It then became difficult for the Allies to get news out of Germany and follow the rear movements of the Wehrmacht, while Rundstedt, with Germans and German sympathisers behind the Allied lines, found it easy to get information. He marshalled the Sixth Panzer Army north of the Ardennes and discovered that green American troops had been moved into the line in the American First Army. In the second week of December, when there was no moon, he took the Fifth Panzer Army from the line opposite Liege and slipped it quietly down opposite Luxemburg, while the Sixth Panzer moved into positions vacated by the Fifth. When the weather was suitable he struck at a weak spot in the American line, and, largely due to our policy of keeping our divisions well forward, found that at one burst he was through into comparatively vacant rear areas."

Mr Moorehead praises the reaction of the Americans, and goes on to comment: “For many, many months now we have abandoned the use of surprise in our planning. We have simply packed troops up to the line and slogged ahead in fairly obvious directions." He says that there is much support for two ideas —first, the appointment of a field commander, British or American, would do a great deal towards getting quicker decisions and more adaptability into the line; secondly, the need one day to mount and supply one definite spearhead to pierce the German front and exploit beyond. Other correspondents also comment on the fact of the Supreme Command being too far back and on the dispersal of Allied strength. It is pointed out that if the earlier system of the fighting command being in the hands of a specialist like Field-marshal Montgomery. ns in Normandy, had been maintained, the set-back might have been averted. Confidence in Eisenhower At the same time it is generally remarked that there is every confidence in General Eisenhower. Discussion on these lines seems fairly general, but messages from New York declare that the chance of Field-marshal Montgomery being promoted commander of the Allied land forces under General Eisenhower are “ remote." As regards other questions, Strategicus,” in the Spectator, remarks: "What was at fault was the absurd self-confidence which has characterised the Allied outlook ever since the exploitation of the Battle of Normandy, and the tendency to be convinced by one’s own propaganda.’’ He asks: “ What, save this self-confidence, can explain the ease with which the Germans concentrated in secret and then over-ran some 70 miles of Allied front?’’ . Correspondents on the western front and Switzerland are expressing the opinion that the Germans “fooled the Allies about their petrol shortage, and by using horse-drawn traffic deliberately built up reserves for the offensive, which aimed at capturing enough Allied petrol and oil to sustain the drive through to Antwerp. It is declared that petrol was, in fact, one of the chief objectives of the offensive, but there is no doubt that after three months’ hoarding the Germans had enough for the present battle plan. Berne reports state that observers m Berlin are convinced that the Germans had far greater stores of petrol than the Allies believed, while synthetic oil is still being manufactured. At the same time, the Wahrmacht is “ thirsty ” for petrol. It is likely that questions on Rundstedt’s offensive will be asked and answered when the House of Commons reassembles on January 16.