RUSSIA AND POLAND

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25674, 24 October 1944, Page 3

RUSSIA AND POLAND

AN HISTORICAL PARALLEL

FATE OF THE 1815-1831 KINGDOI “Russia cannot have security witl out a good military frontier, and it of great importance to her to put a end to the unrest of the Poles. Unde all these considerations it is not po: sible to object to Russia making a aggrandisement that is demanded b justice.” „ These words, states the Economis have not been taken from any cor , temporary document. They come fror L». a memorandum sent by Czar Alexar I der I to Castlereagh in 1814. Lik I many things said or written during th 1 Congress of Vienna, they have noi I suddenly, acquired a new topicality The problem then discussed by the dip I lomats of the Great Alliance was th project put forward by the Russia: , Emperor for a Kingdom of Polanc That the Russian Emperor desired i ‘‘strong and independent Poland might have been said as often thei as it is written now—of Marshal Stalir Emperor as King In 1815 the Kingdom of Poland wa I born; in 1831 it was brought to thi grave; Poland was incorporated it Russia. Yet in his own way Czar Alex I ander was absolutely sincere in th< desire for “ a strong and independen Poland,” just as, in his own way, ii Marshal Stalin. That the Russian Em' I perior stood for a strong Poland— I strong in both area and population—j can be seen from ths fact that he 1 originally intended to unite all the Polish lands held by Austria, Prussia and Russia in a single Polish kingdom i His scheme met with strong opposition from Liverpool and Castlereagh, whc could not agree to a Polish settlemenl at the expense of their Austrian and Prussian allies. But the Emperor’s attempt to persuade the Poles to look for a favourable frontier in the west did not fail to meet with a response from the Poles themselves. True, the Kingdom oi Poland was linked to Russia by a dynastic union. The Emperor of All the Russias crowned himself as King of Poland. Yet in an era when monarchies by God’s grace had just regained stability and self-confidence dynastic ties between two countries did not necessarily involve the loss of independence for either. In the early years >after the Congress of Vienna the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed much more than nominal Czar’s Democracy As to Marshal Stalin to-day, so to Czar Alexander Hie strategic motive was uppermost. He took care to see there was a unity in the foreign policy of his Russian Empire and his Polish Kingdom. But otherwise he tried not to encroach on Polish independence, and not to allow any Russian interference in Polish domestic affairs. Nor was he willing to extend the Russian system of government to Poland. In St. Petersburg Alexander I was an absolute autocrat; in Warsaw he was a constitutional monarch. His Polish Government, consisting of great and devoted Polish patriots, was controlled by a Diet of two Chambers. Only Poles could hold jobs in the civil services. Polish was the only official language in Warsaw. A Polish Army was created which was independent of the Russian. The Polish Constitution—drafted by the great Polish leader Prince Adam Czartoryski—guaranteed to the citizens of the Kingdom personal liberties, freedom of religion and freedom of the press. In the judgment of Polish nationalist historians a century later that Constitution was “ in some respects the most progressive and liberal constitution in Europe." In the view of the same historians, the electoral system introduced by the Emperor in Poland was far superior to the English electoral system before the Reform Bill.” Progress Under Russian Rule The first years of the Kingdom saw intensive social progress. The educational system was enlarged and modernised. Mining industries were started under the direction of Staszic, one of the greatest patriots and spokesmen of the Polish enlightenment. A modern system of finance, culminating in the foundation of the Bank of Poland, was introduced by the able Polish Minister of Finance, Lubecki. The exclusiveness of the nobility was broken; and ' the hardships of peasant serfdom were nartly mitigated. Nothing could perhaps better characterise this period of progress than the fact that it was under the rule of Alexander I, that a university was founded in Poland’s capital. When the Czar, addressing the first Diet of the Kingdom in 1818, said j to the Poles: “ Your hopes and my wishes are being realised," the truth of his words could hardly have been denied. One of Poland’s most solemn national anthems, still sung to-day, was | written in honour of this same Russian Emperor and Polish King. 1 From this record it would almost seem ( that in Polish-Russian relations the Kingdom of Poland might be regarded as the best model to be imitated; and, indeed, a similar union between Russia and Poland, with the same freedoms and flexibility, might result again in a new period of intensive social progress. The Russian assurances that there is no intention to transplant the Soviet system of Government into Poland can be accepted. The political dualism—autocracy in Russia and constitutionalism in Poland —which Alexander I found possible, should not be beyond fhe political wit of Marshal Stalin. May be Exaggerated It might, therefore, be argued that the Poles’ present fears of losing their national freedom and political liberties may be exaggerated. Nor can it be doubted that the slogans of a westward expansion are likely to appeal to Poles now as much as they did 130 years ago. Marshal Stalin, too, could probably find collaborators among genuine Polish patriots; and lovers of historical analogies may almost be tempted to compare General RolaZymierski, the newly-appointed proSoviet Commander-in-Cnief, of the Polish Forces, with General Zayonczek, Alexander’s Viceroy in Poland. Before he became General Zayonszek, “ man of great courage and a weak character” had fought against Russia in the Polish Legion under Napoleon. General Rola-Zymierski was one of Pilsudski's first legionaries; in the last war he received twenty-one wounds in the first skirmish between the Polish Legion and the Russians. But this is only half the lesson v-f history. The experience of the Kingdom of Poland contained more sombre features. Some are grave warnings. After 15 years of existence the kingdom was blown up in the Russo-Polish was of 1830-1831. Two conflicts accounted for this sad end. Under the Constitution of the Kingdom the Poles had just enough freedom to demand more complete independence. The Czar possessed just enough power to obliterate Poland’s independence when Polish opinion became “ intractable.” Secret patriotic societies sprang up all over the country. At first they were not at all hostile to the monarch. Later on, unconstitutional methods, of repression drove them into an extreme anfi-Russian attitude. The working of the Constitution was obstructed equally by irreconcilable elements among both Russians and Poles. Polish secret societies established contact with the secret societies in Russia itself, who, ten years after the Congress' of Vienna, organised the Decembrist insurrection. Constitutional Breakdown

The other cause of contention between the King and his Polish subjects was Poland's eastern borderlands. In the first years of his constitutional rule in Poland, Alexander I promised the Poles to reincorporate into the kingdom several Lithuanian districts, previously annexed to Russia, including Vilna, Grodno and Bialystok. The Poles demanded also the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands in the south-east, including Kiev. This last demand was rejected from the beginning by the Emperor. But he also failed to honour his promise about Vilna, Grodno and Bialystok.

These two issues, the constitutional and the territorial, merged into one insoluble tangle of conflict. The head of the secret societies, Lukasinski. was unlawfully imprisoned in the Schluesselburg fortress, where he was to spend 40 years. The censorship of newspapers, periodicals and books was re-introduced. The liberal Constitution gradually became a dead letter. The Diet could in the end debate only in the shadow of Russian bayonets.

The Czar’s good and liberal intentions were frustrated because they were not liberal or good enough to make him really respect the aspirations of an old and proud nation. Looking exclusively for Russia’s security he took insufficient care to make Poland feel secure from Russia.

In the words of Byron the Czar was Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw, _ But hardened back whene'ef the morning s raw.

llow nobly gave he back to Poles their Diet, Then told pugnacious Poland to be quiet. But in 1830, under the impact of the July Revolution in France, Poland was no longer quiet. The coat of arms of the kingdom—the Polish White Eagle on the breast of the Russian doubleheaded Black Eagle, was torn asunder. Warning From the Past

Critics may view with justifiable distaste the streak of romanticism that runs through Polish history. But realists must draw their lessons from history and pay attention to the peculiarities of nations. The analopv with 1814 and after hardly needs further elaboration. Russian diplomacy—which now seems to take its cue from history much more carefully than it did some years ago—would probably be well advised to balance prudently its intentions toward Poland against the historical logic of the relations between the two countries. It ought not to overlook how much the Czarist policy toward Poland did to dig the gulf that in the 19th century separated the liberal and progressive West from Russia. The Polish issue was one of the centres of Allied dispute during the Congress of Vienna. The Poles could then lay no claims; and their appeals could have little effect on the decisions of Allied statesmen; in tl«: Napoleonic wars they had fought on Napoleon’s side. At the peace conference the three Powers that had already partitioned Poland were the victors. Poland’s Peace Claims

Even so, British opinion then was neither indifferent nor silent on the fate of Poland. In a letter to Castlereagh, Liverpool wrote in November, 1814:

“ We must likewise not conceal from ourselves that we shall have a hard battle to fight against public opinion in defence of any arrangement of which the independence of Poland does not now form a part.” At the next peace conference Poland will appaer with the weighty titles of its seniority in the Alliance, its sufferings since 1939 and its manifold contribution to the Allied war effort. Can it be doubted that “any arrangement of which the real independence of Poland does not now form a part” would this time provoke a “battle against public opinion ” much more strenuous and exacting than that of tvhich Liverpool wrote?