THE POSITION AT NETTUNO

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25457, 11 February 1944, Page 2

THE POSITION AT NETTUNO

It is probably a true summarisation of the position on the AnzioNettuno beach-head, established a fortnight ago by British and American forces of General Clark’s Fifth Army, that was given this week by an Allied broadcaster from Naples. The German position, he said, was extremely strong, with the advantage of interior lines. When the Allied troops' landed they could have taken a chance and pushed inland towards Rome. Instead “ they were ordered to consolidatef and.are still consolidating.” There had been, he added, no significant extension of the beach-head, while outside it the German forces were still growing. The grounds on which the operation is being criticised, by both British and American newspaper commentators, are fully contained in the Naples broadcast. It has been pointed out that the original landings were aided by all the advantages of surprise. The enemy, it stems clear, was caught unawares, and was in no position to bring air opposition in any strength against either the landing forces or their covering naval and air escort. This absence of opposition was no doubt due in large part to the punishing and sweeping nature of the preliminary bombing, but that essential preparation does not in itself explain the fact that for four days after the landing the Germans made no serious attempt to counter it. The fafcts are probably as they were earlier given, that von Kesselring was faced with the immediate choice of loosening his hold on the main front further south by transferring some divisions swiftly to Nettuno, or holding his hand at the beach-head in the hope that time would permit him to reinforce his positions there from Rome or Northern Italy. A bolder strategy might have prevented the arrival of these reinforcements, as has been suggested, by the quick organisation of deep raids from the

beach-head with the object of disorganising the German lines of communication. These tactics were, however, not favoured, for reasons which may be, no doubt will be, later explained. The decision to postpone any attempt at penetration while the bridgehead was being consolidated must have been taken by the Allied Command in the full knowledge that the enemy would make good use of the time given him to prepare his defences. And, indeed, it is apparent from the comment of one correspondent on the spot that von Kesselring reacted to the new danger with the coolness and skill of a proved leader. He not only held the perimeter of the beach-head with seasoned troops, says the correspondent, but he also contrived to adjust his main-front line while bringing up new forces to bolster the Nettuno defences. The gravity of tlie situation that has developed at Nettuno obviously should not be minimised. One estimate is that if the Germans can be beaten back the road to Rome will yet be opened and the trap, as originally planned, sprung on something like 100,000 enemy troops. The advantage, however, is clearly with von Kesselring at the moment. He commands interior lines of formidable strength in difficult country, while the Allied forces Dre still confined to a narrow beach-head which must cramp opportunity for manoeuvre. There is every prospect of a bitter struggle, in which the enemy will be seeking, apart from military gain, the political victory that would result from a compulsory abandonment of their beach positions by the Allies. In the fighting that is imminent Allied air operations must play an important, maybe a vital, part, and for that reason it is reassuring to learn that a fighter airstrip has actually been established on the bridgehead.