THE BATTLE FOR COAL

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25240, 1 June 1943, Page 2

THE BATTLE FOR COAL

The given to the British public that “the nation must be prepared in the forthcoming autumn and winter to face a serious 'decline in cogl production” was doubtless anticipated by Mr Churchill last week, when, in a personal message to British miners, he appealed for an even greater effort to maintain output at a level which would provide minimum requirements for home consumption as well as for export. The of Fuel and Power, Major Lloyd George, reviewing the production and consumption position in the House of Commons last October, quoted figures which show the nature of the problem with which the Government is confronted. In 1938, he said, the output of the collieries totalled 227,000,000 tons, of which exports absorbed 45,000,000 tons. In the year ending with Dunkirk—during which man-power sharply declmed and the domestic demand as sharply increased —production reached 230,000,000 tons and exports again amounted to 45,000,000 tons. At the'end of the first five months of the 1942-43 coal year—beginning on May I—output stood at a figure that would represent less than 200,000,000 tons for the year, and the decline was accompanied by an increase in the industrial demand estimated at 20,000,000 tons. The country was thus shqwn to be producing less coal, while the demand for essential purposes, including a growing obligation to export, was rising. It is towards the improvement of this critical situation that the recommendations of the Parliamentary Select Committee are directed, and the expedients suggested include measures to deal with what is described as “ avoidable absenteeism,” the continuance of experiments in fuel economy, and a further reliance on the rationing of domestic users and the curtailment of non-essential demands. The committee’s report speaks of its conclusion regarding the probability of a further decline in Output as being inescapable “in the absence of new conditions, such as the further release of miners from the services.” That there was small likelihood of the position being improved by the returning of more miners to the pits was indicated very plainly by Sir John Anderson during the October debate. He recalled that when the man-power problem presented itself early in 1941 decisions were taken which resulted in some 33,000 men being restored to the coal industry, the process, he added, being stopped only When the mines were saturated. Early in 1942, however, 16,500 additional men were returned, half of them being from the army and the remainder from other industries, the Air Force, and the civil defence services. Of the 105,000 ex-miners registered at employment exchanges in July, 1941, a total of 40,319 had reported back to the mines by September, 1942, practically all the rest being unfit or unsuitable. Sir John Anderson concluded that it was untrue that a great untapped reservoir of skilled miners still remained in the armed services or in industry. The number that might be released, even if the Field Army in Britain were drawn upon, . was between 3000 and 4000. The position thus was that demand for man-power exceeded the supply, and if future needs were to be met thefe must be a general cutting down, with each industry making its fair contribution, as the War Cabinet had ■decided against any further withdrawal of miners from the army at

present. The problem of shortage is one which the Government has continually under review. Despite the fact that the Government was roundly accused of muddling the rationing and reorganisation proposals last summer, > the winter passed without grave shortage being experienced—a fact that was attributed in part to the comparative mildness of the season and in part to a helpful reduction in non-indus-trial consumption. But the manpower situation has deteriorated since the beginning of the year, and the payment of output bonuses has not had the effect of boosting production to the extent that was obviously hoped from it. Technical reorganisation on lines contemplated last, year, and to some extent recommended again by the Select Committee, will doubtless now be attempted, for, if there is any development of the conditions of acute shortage that are threatened, industrial output must be seriously affected at a critical phase in the prosecution of the war.