WAR SABOTAGE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24773, 25 November 1941, Page 7

WAR SABOTAGE

THE RUSSIAN POLICY WRECKAGE BEFORE RETREAT LITTLE LEFT FOR GERMANS

(Rec. 7 p.m.) RUGBY, Nov. 23. The extent to which Germany will be able to derive practical benefit from the very considerable territorial gains her armies have made in Russia has been the subject of much speculation in London. One of the most informed discussions on the subject appears in the current issue of the journal Economist. The paper points to the formidable difficulties which will face the Germans as the result of widespread destruction caused by the recreating Russians, destruction which was planned as comprehensively as any previous schemes of construction. Only in those districts where they were able to advance suddenly and rapidly did they succeed in salvaging the harvest or industrial property. . " The most serious side of sabotage in agriculture follows from the fact that Russian farming is very heavily mechanised," the Economist states. "It is hard to say how many of Russia's 7000 tractor stations the Germans captured intact, and if the sum of agricultural and industrial wreckage is added up all the Germans can hope to secure this year is some grain—probably not as much as the Russians exported to Germany last year—flax and hemp crops and oil seeds. Coal and iron ore are available if they can be mined, but Gerrr.any is not in great need of either, and the iron is 2000 miles from the nearest smelting works. There is manganese, but the Russians supplied the Germans very fully in previous years. As for next year, everything depends upon the degree of reorganisation possible. It is not likely to be high, but nevertheless the Germans' power of restoring a country devastated by war sabotage should not be under-estimated. Behind the front line the whole army to a man is occupied in immediate reconstruction. There is an army of economic troops who make an inventory of captured foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery. Behind them technicians, many hundreds of thousands strong, and a corps of engineers and skilled workers repair water works, power stations, gasworks plants, and factories. Parallel with and complementary to their activities is the work of an organisation which may well number 500,000 men. Its work is the building of roads, railways, aerodromes, factories and housing. Behind them again are millions of navvies in labour corps, and among them are prisoners of war."

The Germany army which was used in the reconstruction of occupied France —light tanks were used instead of tractors, for instance, for the autumn sowing—is in'Russia, but is not available since the battle still continues. Germany has to rely; therefore, very largely on the co-operation of the local population. Some support could be obtained, particularly from the Baltic States and East Poland, where collective farming is not two years old, if the Germans reverted to individual farming, but the Economist points out that production would inevitably fall as a result. If the Germans divided up the land into small holdings the result would be not only no surplus for Germany, but not even subsistence for the Russians. This would not, however, hold true as regards industry, and the Germans have already set up industrial companies in Russian occupied territory. Summing up, the Economist says: "There are no machines, the railways groan under military traffic, the roads are quagmires, and the towns are gutted. To keep even a faint pulse of economic life is all the Germans can hope for this year, or perhaps next. ' Collaboration' did not get under way in France until February, 1941, and there were thousands of industrialists, large and small, with whom to work. Russia must by every count entail a slower schedule."