NEXT MOVE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24634, 16 June 1941, Page 6

NEXT MOVE

THE NAZI STRATEGY EASTERN OILFIELDS IRAQ OR RUSSIA? Iraq and the Western Desert are being watched in Sweden and Finland as attentively as if they were on those countries' own doorsteps. The view is strongly held that their immediate fate decides whether the next stage of the war surges south or north of the Black Sea—whether Germany's next main thrust is aimed at the Eastern Mediterranean and the Mosul oilfields or at Russia and the oilfields of the Caucasus, stated the Stockholm correspondent of The Times recently. Months ago the view was heard in competent circles in Stockholm that Hitler had only two alternatives for 1941; to keep on inflicting reverses on Great Britain or to conquer the U.S.S.R. No other victories would be big enough for the German people's appetite. The programme was to initiate a most drastic campaign of strangulation by aeroplane, submarine, surface warship in the early spring, and to invade before midsummer if progress and the prospects were good enough. , Meanwhile Germany would prepare to switch on an alternative campaign in May and June should developments in the Atlantic and over Britain not encourage invasion. The preparations included the neutralisation of two Slav countries, Bulgaria and.Jugoslavia, to protect Germany's rear for an invasion of the U.S.S.R. Germany did not went a war in the Balkans at the present time, not even with the complete victory already achieved. The opposition of Jugoslavia, which precipitated thfl operations, seriously upset the German time-table, but also nroduced enticing new alternatives in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Across the Black Sea Unless the situation in the Western Desert, Iraq, and Syria develops in the manner most favourable to the Axis, the chances are, it is thought at Stockholm, that the Germans will switch on the second of their, original! plans and attack the U.S.S.R. It is believed that would attack not only along a front extending from the Norwegian and Finnish borders in the Arctic circle through the Baltic States, Poland, and Rumania to the Black Sea, but also by means of an invasion across the Black Sea. Various speed craft, submarines and special boats have been assembled in Rumanian and Bulgarian harbours, and it is alleged also that an expeditionary force, has been' organised in Bulgaria for several weeks, whoso special equipment suggested that the intention was to use the Black Sea as a by-pass to Asia Minor. The Germans, evading the British Fleet, .would land somewhere in Anatolia, or they m: v ?ht attempt to run the gauntlet from Greece to Syria. If it had been originally intended for Russia, it is difficult to • explain why this force should include camels — unless Hitler's horizon embraces the deserts beyond the Caspian.' Travellers all agree that never since the last war have there been so many troops between the Black Sea and the Ealtic on both sides of the Rumanian and Polish frontiers, and that the stage is set-for operations on the grand scale, as the ground in the. Soviet territories is rapidly drying since the- thaw. Although Soviet leaders frequently say that if they must fight they will, carry the fight into foreign territory, few expect the Red Army to take''the. initial offensive. Indeed, many believe that the Soviet Government is willing, 'if pressed, to make far-reaching concessions to avoid • an active clash,::but ; it is scarcely co»*f ceivable! that this willingness should' extend to giving Germany the con-; trol of the corn of the Ukraine, and. the oil of Baku. , *■ ; . The Ukraine Prospects y

Moscow's recent references to German military preparations, particularly the allegations about the passage of German troops through Finland, reflect the change in Moscow's ostrich attitude. Whether the Germans passing through Turku -were 12,000 —which the Finns have denied—or 1200—as the Finns admit—is not important; bul the mere reference to them in the Soviet press is most significant. Finland's attitude will depend on developments. Although some Finns' regard Germany as a potential protector against Russia, Finland will-not automatically resume fighting, even when the German-Soviet clash comes, but will fight only if attacked or pressed by circumstances. It must be remembered that the equipping of the Red Army has absorbed vast sums each year for more than a decade, and that the equipment certainly includes large quantities of heavy materials. In the war against Finland, geography played a great part. On a broader front the Red Army may be a serious obstacle, even to the Germans, if only by sheer weight of numbers—but the complexity, not only of military, but also of the internal and political factors robs all speculation of its basis. Travellers say that the Germans would not find much food in the Ukraine, as precautions had been taken, and any excess removed. Spring operations would be bound to destroy cultivation and the prospects of the harvest for 1941. , . Unquestionably a war against Soviet Russia would be popular in Germany, where it is believed that "once we havp got the Ukraine cornfields and the "oil of the Caucasus we can cock a snook at Churchill indefinitely. The Germans do not yet realise—as competent observers do here—that by invading Russia instead of England Hitler, whether consciously or unconsciously, abandons his faith in complete victory and henceforward plays merely for a stalemate.