WAR IN BALKANS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24449, 7 November 1940, Page 10

WAR IN BALKANS

THE ATTACK ON GREECE STRATEGY OF AEGEAN IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL POWER The Italian invasion of Greece (writes the military correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald) poses at a stroke the whole question of Balkan strategy. It was the logical, indeed the inevitable, military corollary of the German occupation of Rumania, for it integrates Axis clans in the Middle East and in Egypt. Whatever the immediate upshot in Greece, the latest act of depredation makes that peninsula a theatre of war. The Greek Army is admittedly not very strong. It consists of four corps, comprising 13 infantiy divisions and one cavalry division: but the large number of reserves is based on the idea of local defence of a largely guerilla character. Pdfle and machinegun eatiipment is adequate, and the Greek Army has more than the normal proportion of light mountain-guns. But the heavier field-guns are mostly Schneider and Krupp. and there is a shortage of the heavy Krupp 6.2-inch. It would be entirely misleading to consider the Greek forces as well equipned in a modern mechanised sense. Any effective fighting will take place in the mountain regions and will depend on rifles, machine-guns, and light batteries of mountain artillery. The Air Force is oarticularly weak. Normally it consists of 30 flights, each of four aircraft. There has been difficulty in obtaining modern aircraft. Greece has less than 7000 trained airmen in all, including ground staffs and reserves.

The Greek Navy is a defensive organisation of light craft, primarily developed for police work in the archipelagoes. She has one 10,00 C-ton cruise* and one 2400-ton “ cruiser.” both of them almost 30 years old; 10 destroyers. 13 torpedo-boats, eight minelayers, six submarines, and perhaps four destroyers in the completing stage, two in British shipyards, two more at her own yards of Scaramanga. Such a navy can be described as a token force only. It will thus be obvious that Greece depends to a large extent upon outside aid. In making a stand her strongest ally is in her own topography: but her greatest weakness is the liability to an intensive Italian aerial attack. If Italy uses terroristic methods and launches a mass attack on Athens. Larissa. Salonika, and Kavalia. Greek resistance might find the strain too great.

Routes of Invasion Most of the country is mountainous; and the Italian strategy would be to paralyse the big towns from the air and then to move land forces from Albania down the gaps to Salonika, the real military objective of the land campaign. Despite the highly mountainous nature of the country round the Southern Albanian border, there are two places where -Greece can be invaded along good roads in relatively easy country. One is the way to the plateau from Corfu. This is the Janina road to Larissa and thus to Athens from the north, and it takes advantage of the Greek natural folds and the Peloponnesian railway. In taking this line of attack, the Italians would meet with negligible gradients, and would find a road sufficiently good for their land sledges ” or mobile machine gun units. The other road open to the Italians is down the valleys that lead to the Vistritza River and thus to Salonika. It is true that they have to cross an initial piece of bad territory here before they reach the river, and that it would be easier if they could ignore the Jugoslavian border and cross South Serbia into the Vardar gap; but, if they have to confine themselves to Greek territory, they will have to cut across the extreme western end of Macedonia to the less easy Thessaly River gap. In taking this route, the invaders would, from the borders ,of Lake Ochrida onwards, be following the old Roman highway, the Via Ignatia, which has been used by all invaders of Greece for 2000 years, and which proved so useful in keeping contact between the Salonika front and the Adriatic sector in the GreafWar. Although these two roads are good military highways and although the new Greek railways completed last April favour an invader, the Italians will find that, if it comes to land fighting resolute defenders can take heavy toll of advancing troops in these mountains, and mechanised advantages may very well be neutralised. „ If ever there was a country fashioned for guerilla warfare in the passes, it is Northwestern Greece, and all experts have agreed that the Italian military machine is deficient in striking power in the face of strong opposition. British Naval Aid An important part may be played by the British naval units based, on Alexandria. The Italian irruption into Greece has not been entirely unexpected, and the British must have made preparations for the contingency. British strategists have fully realised the importance of the Greek ports, especially the naval bases of Salonika. Salamis. and the two ports in northern Crete. In Crete both Suda Bay and Mirabella Bay are highly fortifiep, and a glance at the map will show the role these Cretan ports arc bound to play on the naval routes of the eastern Mediterranean, now that Greece is m the war. , . „ , The Dodecanese Islands have pioved a broken reed to the Italians, and there is little doubt that, by now these Italian outposts must be short of food and water. But the possession of Crete and the eastern Greek ports would enable Italy to harass the British at Alexandria, to menace the British positions along the north Egyptian coastline, and to hem in Turkey Conversely, if Britain strikes first, the process of hemming in is reversed, and the possession of Crete and the mainland ports will vastly strengthen Britain’s naval position in the eastern' Mediterranean. That is why it is so essential, the moment Italian troops cross the Albanian frontier, for the British fleet to proceed to Greek ports.

> Control of the Aegean The establishment of bases at Crete and Salonika should be a first step. All the experience of modern war—especially the lesson taught in Norway —gees to prove that the Power first in occupation of such posts enjoys a great advantage. .. . i The British fleet should help to peisuade the Turks to make a stand. Mastery of the Aegean is theirs for the taking, and it follows that whatever happens in the land fighting in the Greek mountains, the Axis plans for a Middle Eastern drive will be checked from the outset. Given an energetic forward policy, sea-power can neutralise land-power, and it is far from certain that the Italians m Albania can force a way through the Greek guerillas. If Greece fights, as there is everv indication that she will, the Italians have undertaken an intensely hazardous enterprise. Militarily speaking, by putting the Italian armies to the test and by placing the Italian fleet in a position where it will either have to risk open battle or abnegate all hope of controlling the Aegean, the latest Fascist aggression has simplified the strategical position in the southern Balkans and the adjacent seaways. The unresolved factors will now be clarified, and the problem of the eastern Mediterrean may henceforth be considered as a military problem, freed from trammelling poll, tical considerations.