NAZIS PREPARE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24205, 25 January 1940, Page 11

NAZIS PREPARE

WARFARE IN THE AIR SYNCHRONISATION OF STRATEGY PROBABLE REASONS FOR LONG DELAY Scattered military events in the west are steadily fitting into one ominous pattern of Nazi strategy. The increasingly audacious reconnaissance flights over Britain, the terrorism of bombs and machine gunning from aeroplanes :'n the North Sea, and, lastly, the massing of 1,000,000 men along the frontiers of Holland and Belgium all dovetail together (wrote the military correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald on January 16). The aim would seem to be a drive through the low countries as a prelude to obtaining air bases from which Great Britain can be easily invaded. If so, the German High Command is not relying on a sudden Blitzkrieg so much as a carefullyprepared " knock-out blow by land and air," coupled with "a machine gun blockade," to clear the seas. As a plan of aggressive strategy, it certainly threatens to be formidable. When the war started, aerial strategy was governed by a series of factors that, by the nature of things, had never been- adequately tested in practice. Germany was believed to favour an immediate "lightning war." Exaggerations had led the public to expect that thousands of planes would be hurled against a single objective. The saner experts, however, discounted this idea in advance.

They believed that the losses in large-scale raids and the fear of reprisals woulo, rule out a " Blitzkrieg ; and they maintained that practical considerations necessitated a long period of preparations before big attacks could be launched, and that, even then, taking into account the number of losses that Germany could possibly contemplate, a heavilly-defended area like Loi.don was unlikely io be faced with more than 500 machines a day, sent over in relays of 30 or so. The bulletin of the Air Raid Defence League presupposed one ton of bombs per raider and 50 casualties per ton, but hastened to add that raids on this scale could not be maintained for very long. Superiority of Defence It should be noted that Germany's last aerial manoeuvres before the war started, conducted, by the way. just off the Dutch frontier, demonstrated that the defender had an unexpected superiority over the attacker. The most effective work was done by small groups of planes as against the larger aggregations., but. in each case, the interceptors made a very good showing, even though the attackers took advantage of flying over neutral country. These manoeuvres, which took place only a few weeks before war broke out. are said to have played an important part in modifying German ideas of aerial warfare, but. in themselves, would not account fo.r the four months' delay in launching a heavy air attack. Three factors would sufficiently exolain the delay. The first was the unexpectedly large loss of machines in the Polish campaign, when results were obtained irresuective of cost. Germany thus learnt that an initial numerical superiority could easily be taken aw.ay by over-wasteful tactics in the first few weeks of a major war. While these losses were being made good, the second factor came into operation. The fear of reprisals took on a new form when British reconnaissance patrols penetrated the German defences so often. Germany must have realised that at least half her industries were close to her western borders, so close, indeed, that they were within half, an hour's flying distance, and it was known that the French had their air bases close to the frontier. Britain, of course, was also vulnerable in this connection, because of her large cities and the aggregation of her industries in compact areas: but unless Germany obtained bases on the Dutch coast, her raids on these centres would have to be distant ones from the Frisian coast. France was much more favourably situated, for her industries were, with the exception of those in Lorraine, far inland. Those in Flanders were not far as the crow flies, but Germany would have to violate the neutrality of Holland or Belgium to get at them.

Weaknesses in Design The third reason for Germany's delay was the need of making certain vital changes in design. Major Robertson, the well-known aviation authority, holds that this particularly applied to their bombers, because they adhered to a tactical theory that we discarded and which the actual fighting has proved wrong. The Royal Air Force adopted the policy that bombers must be able to defend themselves. For this reason British bombers were fitted with gun turrets operated from the power of the engines. By thus overcoming the rush of air, fighting was made easier. The Germans, on the other hand, relied on speed and evasiveness; and they have turned to power-operated turrets for their bombers onlv since actual hostilities have, demonstrated the worth of the British methods. ' British bombers have sometimes shot down German fighters; and the famous raid on Borkum. a landmark in aerial warfare, demonstrated that unaccompanied bombers could reach distant objectives and could get away by their own efforts. The British bomber is thus by no means a flying arsenal that lumbers along incapable of protecting itself. It is a fighting unit; and the Germans have undoubtedly been trying during the winter months to adjust their production to this new concept* of the bomber. Experts also maintain that British fighters are individually superior to the German, particularly our new eight-gun machines. Only experience can provide the final evidence on such matters, but Major Robertson does not mince matters in saying that the success of our new fighter types was "greater even than we had hoped. He holds that the Curtiss and Morane machines used by the French have outfought the Messerschmitts, and that our Hurricanes and other types are still better.

A Race in Adaptation

This in itself cannot be a final estimate, because types change so rapidly, especially under the stress of actual warfare. Aerial superiority 1 is essentially fluctuating. In any case, where the rivals are approximately evenly matched, control of the air is almost certain to alternate, because so many factors about planes, pilots, groundwork, and general tactics operate to create a permanently fluid position, until the enemy forces are finally grounded. The weight of fire in our synchronised machine guns, for example, is giving us an advantage at the moment, but developments of the 22mm cannon which the Germans have mounted in the Messerschmitts may alter this by giving them certain advantages in so far as range is concerned. One critic has said that victory in the air will go to the Power that has the most efficient industrial organisation for profiting by the errors in our own construction and by the good points in that of the enemy. Aerial warfare is a race in adaptation. So far, the honours have gone to the Allies, but it must always be remembered that the Germans have not yet exerted their full effort in the air. The initial attack on the Heligoland Bight developed into a series of " security patrols " that went out against the German seaplane bases night after night. Although some critics maintained that this strategy was of doubtful value in view of the losses involved, we have to put on the credit side the psychological effect both on our own Air Force and on the Germans. Simultaneously, the early "leaflet raids" over western Germany have grown into reconnaissance flights that reached their peak in recent sensational flights. Rightly described as the outstanding aerial feat of the war, these flights took our observers over Vienna, Prague. Bratislava. and Munich. They showed that British machines can range over the most distant part of eastern and southern Germany, and return safe and unattacked. It is difficult to see why the raiders were not intercepted when they were more than 500 miles within German territory. Theoretically, if a proper warning system existed, they should have been cut off from a dozen different directions; but apparently they were only once detected as enemies. Growing German Activity As against this, the Germans have confined themselves almost entirely to raids on our Scottish bases, apart from larger reconnaissance flights. They have not penetrated British defences very far, and, again and again, they have been beaten back from the coastal region. It should not be assumed, however, that enemies in larger numbers would not get through. Much larger" detachments launched simultaneously at a number of scattered points would constitute a more formidable problem, and German strategy may well be to crash through in many

consecutive waves of heavy machines, even if the British know they are coming. The other scene of German activity has been the North Sea, and here the accounts of the heavy damage wrought by comparatively small bombs strongly suggests the use of a new and more powerful explosive. The toll taken of individual ships by small bombs and mines has been much greater than during the last war, and numbers of vessels have sunk so suddenly that the crews have been unable to get away. Since the German activity everywhere else has been according to a steadily growing plan, it seems reasonable to assume that the unfortunate fishing vessels and tramps of the North Sea have been used as bait for the testing of Germany's new weapons.

When these various considerations are inter-related, the conclusion that Germany must be nearly ready to issue her real challenge in the air seems irresistible. Only the problem of bases remains. She might conceivably hazard attack from her existing bases; there can be little doubt that she would swiftly do so if she could seize bases on the Dutch coast, less than 200 miles from London. For behind everything is the quantitative problem, which every month is solving itself in fayour of the Allies. Hitler must attack before the time-lag can be made up by the Allies and before the tide of production turns against Germany.