THE ROME VISIT

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23704, 11 January 1939, Page 12

THE ROME VISIT

FEAR FELT IN BRITAIN AMATEURISH FOREIGN POLICY THE WANTS OF ITALY Count Ciano’s speech in Rome yesterday is not regarded here as a propitious preliminary to Mr Chamberlain’s visit to Rome (wrote the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian on December 1). It would seem to be a part of Italy’s anti-French campaign, a campaign that derived considerable momentum from the “ Munich settlement.” That “ settlement ” seems to have convinced Mussolini and his associates that they, too, must achieve a “ victory,” and one not limited to securing recognition for the Italian Empire. And yet Count Ciano’s speech would seem to reveal -a certain weakness. For why, if Italy is really strong, must she be made to appear even stronger? During the recent crisis there was good reason to believe that Italy would, in the event of a general conflict, support Germany. But she made no preparations for supporting Germany in full force, or anything like it, and when Count Ciano says that there was a “ secret mobilisation ” in Italy he is saying what is untrue. Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano did, indeed, want Italy to mobilise, but the mobilisation was prevented by King Victor Emmanuel and by the Italian public. In Northern Italy, above all, there was a strong popular movement against mobilisation and against taking part in a European war. Of this movement both Mussolini and Count Ciano were fully aware through the reports of their numerous secret agents. Gradual Intervention

Had there been a general conflict. Italy would, no doubt, have intervened little by little on the side of Germany, perhaps by a revival of “ piracy ” and the like. But there was nothing that resembled an Italian “ mobilisation,” whether open or secret, in those days. With regard to Tunis, it is believed here that the question has been emphasised by Count Ciano so that Italy may be the better able to bargain for concessions elsewhere —that is to say, in Spain. In spite of much propaganda and the activities of secret agents Italy has been unable to create a situation favourable to herself in Tunis. The growth of population. has been going against her. In 1931 there were just over 90,000 Italians and an equal number of French in Tunis; in 1936 there were 94,000 Italians and 108,000 Frenchmen. More and more Italians in Tunis have been applying for French citizenship—--222 in 1936, 367 in 1937, and 706 up to now in the present year. Many Italians in Tunis have become Tunisian in outlook and have no wish to fight for Italy. Many others are Jews and have naturally been made pro-French, or at least pro-Tunisian, by Mussolini’s antiSemitic legislation. Wresting “ Concessions ” The Franco-Italian agreement with regard to Tunis was renewed in 1935, but has not been ratified by Italy. It is believed that she will demand “ concessions ” in return for her consent to ratify the agreement. There is a strong tendency amongst the Italian political leaders to regard France as weak and to believe that “concessions” can be extorted if Italy makes herself appear strong and puts forward ever-increasing demands. Italy is constantly being encouraged in this tendency by the Germans. This is the reason the Italians are emphasising their “ claim ” not only to Tunis but also to Nice, Corsica and Savoy. They will no doubt be willing to forgo any “ claims ” of this kind in return for “ concessions ” that will lead to the defeat of the Spanish Government and will establish permanent Italian and German strategic positions in Spain. Such methods thrive on the policy of “ appeasement,” for if “ appeasement ” is an end in itself it is an advantage to those Powers, like Italy and Germany, which are not in the least interested in “appeasement," to make demands which can be satisfied in the interests of the “ appeasement” desired so ardently by the other party. It has become a regular German and Italian practice to invent grievances and “ rights ” —for example, the oppression of the Sudeten Germans, the “ right ” to the return of former possessions, and so on—and either to secure satisfaction of these claims or. if satisfaction is dented, to secure other advantages in exchange for the magnanimous renunciation of these “ rights.” “ Nothing 1 to Discuss ”

There is no desire in Paris to confer with Rome, for there is nothing to confer about. The view taken across the Channel, and shared by political observers here, is that the same is true of the impending. Anglo-Italian discussions. There is nothing to discuss except such claims as Italy will have worked up in the meantime. And if these claims are not satisfied then Italy will demand “ compensation," and is likely to get it, because if it is withheld the policy of "appeasement” will have failed. All political observers here and abroad are being struck more and more forcibly by the amateurishness with which British foreign policy is being conducted and by the evident lack of the most elementary knowledge of the many tricks and pitfalls that have been and are still being created by the Germans and Italians, in spite of the clear lessons of the last few years. The influence of those who are supposed to advise the Government on the 'conduct of forcing policy has been steadily diminishing. Time has shown, and continues to show, that they are right. But their advice, instead of carrying more weight for this reason than it used to do, carries less, precisely for this reason, as though being right were an offence. Observers Fearful

When two Powers have rival demands or conflicting claims a conference between them may have a purpose, but when one Power has nothing in particular to ask for or if it does not know what it wants or ought to want, while the other Power has concrete ambitions and is resolute in promoting them by skilfully exploiting the overpowering wish for “ appeasement ” entertained by the other party, then conferences such as the one that is impending in Rome is likely to be dangerous. These are the reasons why all critical observers, both here and across the Channel, are apprehensive of Mr Chamberlain’s coming journey. It is believed more and more strongly that if the conference produces any results at all those results can only be favourable to Italy as well as to Germany, who has been emphasising the strength of the “ axis ” more than ever in

tyju ax xi anticipation of the conference, and unfavourable to the Western Powers. i i If the conference leads to further “ appeasement ” it can only be at the expense of these Powers and of Spain.