“ENGLAND AND THE MAORI WARS”

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23466, 2 April 1938, Page 4

“ENGLAND AND THE MAORI WARS”

“England and the Maori Wars.” By A. J. Harrop, M.A. (N.Z.), Ph.D. (Camb.). I llustrated. London: New Zealand News. 12s 6d. Reviewed by E. Allan Aubin.

The decade 1860-1870 was probably the most critical experienced by the colony of New Zealand,«and the events of. that period have left an indelible mark on our history. The Maoris, recovering from the influence of the first impact of civilisation, had established a new unity for the preserva-f tion of themselves and their ancestral lands. Opposing them, a large body of settlers was ready to go to almost any extreme to gain possession of those lands. The clash of the two parties gave ■ opportunity for the exploitation of theories of colonial government, which led to a complete revision of the accepted standards of inter-Empire relationships and to the ultimate evolution of the present Dominion independence, which is, nevertheless, wholly dependent on indissoluble ties with the Mother Country. The policy of the English Government in these years of chaos is set out by Dr A. J. Harrop in “ England and the Maori Wars.” The work is chiefly interesting in its disclosures of the building up and framing of the Colonial Office despatches. Particularly worthy of study is the role played bv Sir Frederic Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford) in the formulation of these despatches. “ England and the Maori Wars ” is essentially a book for students, and as such will have a rather restricted circle of readers. The despatches are linked with the briefest of narrative, in which there is little critical and independent analysis or explanation of subjects of the utmost importance. In this extensive correspondence between the colonial governors, influenced by their advisers, and the Home authorities, who based the majority of their decisions on these reports, we can trace the shaping of

our country’s destiny. Without a thorough knowledge of the relevant facts, however, these papers often tend to give a distorted perspective.

The Waitara Purchase This is apparent in the treatment of the involved question of the Waitara purchase, which precipitated the war in Taranaki and subsequently led to the Waikato and elsewhere. Dr Harrop makes no mention of a previous knowledge of the claim of the chief Wiremu Kingi (Te Rangitake) to the disputed territory. In 1859 Governor Gore-Browne visited Taranaki, where a native named Teira offered to sell, on his own initiative, a block of land at the mouth of the Waitara River. “Wiremu Kingi,” wrote the Governor, “ then rose and. while asserting no claim to it, said he would never permit the land to be sold.”

Of course, Kingi would not make a personal claim, nor would he consider it necessary to repeat the claim of his people, whose mouthpiece he was, to the block. Fifteen years before, he had written from Waikanae that he had intended eventually to return to Waitara, and he assumed this, as well as other intimations, to be sufficient. His intention was widely known. Sir George Grey during his first term as Governor had taken strong steps to prevent the proposed return, apparently fearing complications. That Kingi assumed the knowledge of these facts is evinced by his letter to Gore-Browne, in which he says: “. . . I will not agree to our bedroom (Waitara) being sold, for this belongs to the whole of us. Do not suppose this is nonsense on my part. No. For it is an old word. . . .” In this he is obviously speaking for a r umber, and the Governor had previously given an assurance that no disputed land would be bought. Again. Dr Harrop draws attention to the comment that at the parliamentary investigation Sir Donald Maclean and Archdeacon Hadfield contradicted each other in* almost every particular. But at this inquiry Donald Maclean admitted that the large body of Ngatiawa (Kingi’s tribe) living at Waikanae had never been apprised of the proposed purchase. It was obvious, in fact, that Maclean was relying entirely on the reports of the District Land Commissioner, Robert Parris, who, as one of ’ the Plymouth Cpmpany’s settlers, would almost certainly lean to the policy current at ;New Plymouth of the immediate seizure of the land. The settlers were certainly deserving of some sympathy. They had been promised areas for settlement, and could hardly : be held responsible for the ‘ farces carried out by the New Zealand Company, their parent body, under the name of land purchases. Maclean’s long acquaintance with Taranaki must have qualified him to refute personally the point emphasised by the Governor that the Ngatiawa title was extinguished by the Waikato victory at Pukerangioa. The subsequent defeat of the Waikato invaders at Ngamotu and Moturoa was widely known, Europeans had participated, in fact; thus the Waikato claim was scarcely tenable. Maclean’s evidence at the inquiry was also hardly in accordance with his previously-expressed statement that in general no Maori held an individual title to land. The papers revealing the facts mentioned in this paragraph should be introduced into any discussion on the Taranaki war.

The Survey Commenced

The Governor, persuaded by his advisers, and with the approval of the Colonial Office, determined to continue wifh the survey of the block. His request for 3000 troops was regarded as absurd by Sir Frederic Rogers, although this number was to be exceeded many times. The Secretary of State’s reply was:—"A policy which requires the continual presence ■of a

CONFISCATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

large force carries, in most cases, its own condemnation. I cannot refrain from observing that neither your despatches nor Mr Richmond’s memorandum indicates any definite intention on the part of. the colonists to contribute to the expense of the troops they demand,” The question of payment for the forces was the subject of much haggling between the two Governments. Many settlers welcomed the soldiers because of the enormous expenditure on commissariat involved, as well as the moral effect of a considerable military strength behind them in their land schemes. The Colonial Office, however, preferred the imposition of a more self-reliant policy on the colonists and grudged the concentration of soldiers in a distant dependency. The Times in supporting this attitude, remarked: “We would rather see the organisation of the volunteers extended than the establishment of the regulars increased." Meanwhile in the Waikato the King movement had come to a head in the electioVi of Te Wherowhero (Potataul as king of the federation of tribes opposed to the further alienation of land. Kingi had remained aloof from these intriguings, but after he had been attacked and his pas destroyed he accepted the proffered help from Waikato. The Duke of Newcastle touched a tender spot with the colonists when he wrote: “ Great consideration was due to a native chief standing up for what he has always accustomed to consider the right of himself and his followers. The duke would above all things deprecate the making of a war of this kind a means of enriching the colony by the confiscation of lands.

The Taranaki Herald had already given a hint of the colonists’ hopes: “Their (the Natives’) lives and lands are forfeit ... we devoutly trust that no mistaken leniency will allow of these natives escaping at least the latter penalty. ...” In March, 1861, General Duncan Cameron took over the command of the armed forces, and Maclean was sent to Taranaki with the terms for the cessation of hostilities —terms which were a direct affront to the courage and intelligence of the Maoris. Sir George Grey’s Return Gore-Browne’s successor was Sir George Grey. Dr Harrop makes the interesting disclosure that Sir George volunteered for the appointment. The Duke of Newcastle eagerly seized the opportunity of sending out a man with, as he thought, unique capabilities and one who was capable of bringing the strained situation to a satisfactory conclusion. So confident was he that, on receipt of a report from Grey referring to the Waikato, he wrote- “ This and others are only the overture to the grand opera which I presume Sir George Grey is preparing.” Little did he realise the cacophony which was to ensue.

Yet it was 18 months before the new Governor applied himself to the trouble at Taranaki, attempting in the meantime to restore his former personal authority and influence amongst the Maoris, and to prepare his plans for dealing with those who might thwart him. He continually petitioned the Imperial Government for money and forces to strengthen these schemes. In view of his previous knowledge of Wiremu Kingi’s claim to Waitara, it is surprising to find in his despatches to the Colonial Office a confession that new facts had been brought to his notice which determined the justice of Kingi’s claim. Whatever these facts were they could have been no more convincing than those already brought to light. This letter was dated April 27 It was not until May 27 that Grey - , in a proclamation dated May 11, announced that the Waitara purchase would be abandoned The Governor, however, had left New Plymouth without giving any official indication of his intentions, and it is rather noteworthy that hostilities had been precipitated at Tataramaika and Wiremu Kingi forced to fight before this proclamation, three weeks ante-dated, became known. The action followed swiftly to the Waikato, where Grey’s plans had been Well laid and where, in the face of overwhelming odds, the Maoris were beaten back step by step. The action at Orakau was the last major engagement in that territory in which the King federation was unitedly engaged. The Confiscation Policy

On December 17, 18G3, Sir George Grey wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: I ought to mention to your Grace that I believe I was the first to recommend the forfeiture of lands by those natives who took up arms against us, and I did so for the following reasons: Because such a proceeding is in conformity with their customs. It will affect the lands of those who had forced us into war, and leave secure to the native owners who have remained at peace their large-landed possessions in other parts of the island. Thus was commenced the greedy struggle for the fruits of victory. (How justified it was can be determined from the recommendations of two royal commissions that the dispossessed native owners should receive compensation. a recompense still refused by the Waikatos.) Dr Harrop rightly expresses astonishment at this action by Grey, so inexplicable in one who knew the Maoris well. But Grey was a deeply selfish man, and the tribes which were, after all, only struggling to

retain what was their own found that it was not profitable to thwart his plans., To the plan of confiscation forwarded by the New Zealand Ministers the Duke of Newcastle gave what appears to be a grudging approval. A passage in his memorandum on the subject explains possibly one reason which influenced his decision; “ The necessity for [military settlements, the members of which would receive the forfeited land] must soon cease. ... In a very few years the natives must become an insignificant minority.” The hope that the eventual dying out of the Maori race would solve the problem of itself was greatly cherished in some quarters at Home. The Maoris were fully alive to the power thus placed in the hands of the New Zealand Government, and the war assumed a much more sinister nature. The prophesies of Te Ua, the semiinsane originator of the Pai Marire (Hau-Hau) religion, provided a new rallying point, which was made the most of by the Maori extremist leaders. Nothing exemplifies the heights to which their fanaticism rose more than the murder of the Rev. C. S. Volkner at Opotiki and the horrible rites which accompanied it. Grey was now in a far from happy position. Intolerant always of restrictions, he was at loggerheads with both his advisers and the commander of the armed forces (General Cameron), who had come to the conclusion that he had been brought to New Zealand to fight a settlers’ war, and did not conceal his disapproval of risking the lives of his men for the- territorial enrichment of the colonists. His resignation temporarily eased the tension, but the relations between his successor and the Governor were not much better. Grey’s arrogance brought its own reward. Even if he considered himself justified in* pursuing a strictly colonial policy, the Colonial Office would not brook open defiance. Nevertheless, the despatch which informed him that his term of office was over was responsible for much deep thought before it assumed its final form. Sir George Bowen, who was appointed in his place, was bequeathed the . troubles born of the confiscation policy. The Hau-Haus were active on the West Coast and elsewhere, and on the east arrived Te Kooti in the schooner which he and other prisoners deported to the Chatham Islands had seized. Without attempting to minimise Te Kooti’s offences, Dr Harrop might have assisted the understanding of this Maori’s case if he had explained that Te Kooti, vaguely suspected of theft was arrested for treachery, deported without trial to the Chatham Islands for a short term and forgotten. He decidedly had a grievance, and on his return he was immediately set .upon by armed forces. He is loosely described by Dr • Harrop as a Hau-Hau, but such was not the case. His cult, the Rh.ga-tu, was widened to incorporate some of the Hau-Hau ritual, as reciuits from this religion joined him.

Further Assistance Refused

This fresh outbreak caused Sir George Bowtn to ask further military assistance of the Home authorities,-but they, having once got the troops 9ut of Ine country, showed no disposition to send them back. Lord Granville, who followed the Duke of Buckingham as Secretary of State, noted on a despatch: “ I doubt Sir George Bowen being a good man for this department.” Granville was adamant in. nis refusal to increase the military force beyond the one regiment already stationed there, and the Colonial Government, beset with tne , chaos and the widespread discontent which was the inevitable result of _ the rau-patu (the conquest—confiscation), was feeling far from secure on its self-erected pedestal ol military independence. In the face of the determined attitude of the Colonial and War Offices the New Zealand Ministers commenced to make commercial overtures to the United States. This distasteful measure, by tactful handling on the part of the Secretary of State, was soon overcome, and little more was heard of it. In his summing up of the Imperial aspect Dr Harrop is brief but adequate.Reverting to the land, problem, he Sii “ Possession of large areas of fertile land was necessary for the colonists. They were willing to pay a reasonable price, but as the Land League increased in influence it became almost impossible to acquire land by peaceful means.” Authorities argue much on this point, but Archdeacon Hadfield was almost certainly right when he stated that had the Government been content to wait a little longer, there would have been no difficulty in making further purchases. It must be remembered that by 1860 just.under 6,000,000 acres had been purchased in the North Island, nearly a fifth of the. total area of the island, “and these purchases included little of the thousands of acres of infertile land for which there was no sale.