BASES IN PACIFIC

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23081, 6 January 1937, Page 4

BASES IN PACIFIC

BRITISH MOVE FAILS AMERICAN ATTITUDE With the objective of retaining full freedom of naval action in the Pacific, and pending further negotiations, the United States has been unable to accept Great Britain’s proposal for an extension of Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, freezing fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific at the status quo (says a writer in the Christian Science Monitor). Inability to accept the proposal as presented was communicated to the British Foreign Office late in September, but was kept a closely-guarded secret in the United States until afterelection day to pi-event its becoming an election issue. Actually, it is learned, Britain knew of the American refusal before word that the proposal had been made was given out in London. Disclosure of the speed with which the decision was taken by the State Department throws into sharp relief the apparent determination of the Roosevelt Administration to regain the complete freedom of naval action in the Pacific which prevailed until the 1922' naval treaty forbade any further development of fortifications or naval bases in that area.

This action is believed to be conclusive so far as any proposal to extend the status quo as an isolated question is concerned. It does not necessarily, however, preclude further negotiations along broader lines. The United States would be willing 19 discuss the status quo if it were linked with neutralisation of the Philippines or a new general settlement of the whole Far Eastern question to replace the battered wreckage of the old. But it will not consider extension of the status quo as an isolated subject. The inhibitions of the 1922 treaty expire with that treaty on December 31 of this year. It was Britain’s suggestion that, with an amendment permitting modernising of existing naval facilities, this provision of the old treaty be extended by joint action of itself, the United States, and Japan. Whether Japan ever expressed an opinion on the question cannot be learned, but it is believed in some quarters that Japan originally initiated the British proposal. However, official American opinion promptly crystallised around the thesis that the question of naval fortifications and bases was an integral part of the general Pacific settlement of 1920, including ns well the 5—5—3 naval ratio and the guaranty of the territorial integrity of China. Since those other features of the settlement have been scrapped by Jhpan it is contended that the United States cannot consider a proposal to extend the single feature of that settlement which is looked upon here purely in the light of a concession by the United States. What the result will be in terms of American military activity in the Pacific is not yet definitely established. The army high command has long since come to a definite conclusion that all efforts to hold the Philippines by force should be abandoned. The general board of the navy, its policy-

making agency, is now studying intensively the question whether it i 3 desirable in case of war.

The alternative is a complete military withdrawal to the American sector of the Pacific bounded on the west by the arc from the Aleutians to tha Hawaiians to the Panama canal. There are, in fact, two conflicting schools of thought which tend to set the army and navy strategists on opposite sides.

More important in the decision to reject the British proposal >than tha Philippine question is that of the Aleutian Islands. In the form presented here the British proposal would have permitted modernisation of the Philippine defences. But it would not have permitted any steps being taken towards developing naval or air bases in the Aleutians—a step which the navy has been considering for several years and to which they have become increasingly devoted of late. The desire to obtain a free hand in tha Aleutians is believed to have been important in reaching the negative decision.

However, the broader reason is one of general Far Eastern policy which may become far more prominent during the second Roosevelt Administration than it was during the first. The State Department feels that American interests will be best served in the Far East by an attitude which might be described as non-aggressive firmness. By this is meant careful abstention from any aggressive or unfriendly acts towards Japan. But behind every possible form of diplomatic conciliation would be sufficient force to discourage a less conciliatory attitude on the part of Japan. In maintaining such a basic firmness it is felt that both impressive naval force and a free hand in fortifications is desirable.

The navy is already on its way to complete modernisation. The navy high command wants bases adequate to permit effective use to be made of this modern fleet. And President Roosevelt appears to have given his consent. . ',

Among qualified observers it is felt here that rejection of the status quo may prove the key to future'American policy in the Far East. It represents a complete abandonment of the hojie embodied in the Washington treaties of achieving an absolute and permanent settlement of the Far Eastern question. Instead, the new policy recognises that the Far East is in a fluid state and that only flexible policies are suited to its needs. They consider a free hand in fortifications an indispensable part of a flexible policy. In addition, naval experts have assured the State Department and the White House that when the limitations of the status quo are removed there is nothing Japan can do which would significantly strengthen a military threat to the United States. They believe Japan has already made the fullest possible use of its potential Pacific bases. In other words, the United States has nothing military to lose by lapse of the status quo. On the other hand, the strategists consider that the American military position can be enormously improved.