VISION IN DEFENCE POLICY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22905, 12 June 1936, Page 4

VISION IN DEFENCE POLICY

TO TUB EDITOR Sib.—Last week I had occasion to draw attention to the necessity for using vision in railway policy, and in this letter 1 would like to discuss the necessity for vision in defence policy, in which the suggested strategic road up the middle of the South Island might. form a part. The lesson of the conquest of Abyssinia should bring it home to us that we may be living in false security, and that it behoves us to be up and doinc to see what can be done in the way of the preparation of suitable measures of defence. ■ It requires little vision to see what would happen to little New Zealand should Britain be embroiled in a European war, and we were left (as undoubt-

odly we should be) more or less to our own resources. In such a happening our possible salvation might rewt on a contemporaneously waged war between Japan and either China or Kussia, which would keep potential marauders busy for a time, and possibly leave them weakened to an extent that would preclude them from seeking new adventures. This is only surmise, however, the wish being father to the thought. Human nature being what it is, we can readily assume that a number of nations in the East, and elsewhere, cast covetous eyes on this fair isle of outs, and the time for the lion to lie down with the lamb being as far off as ever it was. it may bo a useful exercise to cast our eyes around to see if our house is in order, and, if not, what we can do to make it so. In the first place, we can definitely aaeume that in the absence of the protection of Britain's sea-power our present chancesof putting up anything of a fight against a well-equipped naval Power arc somewhat doubtful. No amount of hiding our heads in the. sands of false security will prevent us from being bespoilcd and. enslaved and our women taken to grace the harems of the marauders, who certainly would have come ere this if they were not held in leash by the fear of the Mother Country and her fleet. The complete vulnerability of our chief towns hardly neede mention —it should be apparent to anyone—aa also the unfortunate position of having half our population residing within range of presentday naval guns. These towns (with Wellington, the seat of Government) are the centres of population control, and when they are in the hands of the enemy what, it may be suggested, is there to do but submit and make the best terms possible? Three . things of a practical nature can be suggested, however, as a measure of primary defence —the abandonment of a false security on the one hand and a defeatist attitud of mind on the other, and the putting in hand of an up-to-the-minute defence policy. The present Government seems to favour a policy of resting on what it considers a suitable air force, and it is possible that reasons of economy might have more bearing on the subject than reasons of efficiency. No fault can be found in the provision of an extra strong air force, especially as we have reason to suspect the, inadequacy of other means ot defence, and in this connection it is hoped that there are sufficient machines and pilots to form a strong attack, with sufficient reserves to riiake good the wastage that is bound to be heavy. To defend an island, however, especially an island' at a distance from other land that might serve as a taking-off place for long-range aircraft, the first line of defence should alw.ays be an adequate navy. While there seems room for" a difference of opinion as to the possible effectiveness of different types of fighting ships and their armament, there is none as to the advantage of having a strong and up-to-date sea-going force. Even if the Singapore base was full of fighting ships their use in the protection of New Zealand is somewhat problematical, especially in a smash-and-grab raid such as may'be expected. There is need of adequate ships in the close vicinity of the Dominion to be any protection. Last week Mr Paterson had occasion to draw attention to the deficiencies in the land forces (the third line of defence), and there is no possible doubt that his remarks,are timely. He spoke more particularly of the shortage of enlistments and the want of interest among the personnel, but a more serious deficiency is lack of that extreme mobility which .would be necessary to protect such a long coastline, and also the vulnerability of the transport routes which the force would need to traverse. After a possible reverse in trying to stop a landing due to inadequate artillery, the land forces would have to retire to the hinterland and leave the coastal towns temporarily to their fate, and then they would be hampered for the want of transverse routes for movement north and south, to effect that concentration of effort which would hold out the best chance of sueTo sum up, therefore, we should have: (1) A navy near our shores capable of giving us immediate and effective protection; (2) an air force of sufficient strength to give a good account of itself against the trained fighting airmen of a possible enemy force; (3) a particularly mobile land, force, strong enough to be effective against a landing force of at least 10,000 men; (4) the young women trained to take part in such, part of, the defence Of their country as may be deemed suitable ganisation; and-training of the Civil population to save them from gas attacks and other possible methods of warfare to which they may be subjected; (6) the accumulation of warlike stores and weapons. -I am, etc., Old Bill.