THE ITALIAN SOLDIER

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22742, 30 November 1935, Page 18

THE ITALIAN SOLDIER

MEMORIES OF THE PIAVE IN 1918 By XIV Corps. When we said “ Addio ” to Italy early in 1819 we had had about two years and a-half experience of the Italian soldier in war and peace, in victory and defeat in trench warfare, and in moving warfare. The British divisions (five of them) and the French were moved about from one part of the line to another, and we always had Italian infantry on our flanks or Italian batteries in our rear, and other Italian units mixed up with us. We had therefore every opportunity of judging the character of the men and their worth as soldiers.

Our own division were all “ old army ” or territorial units, but very few of the personnel which composed the divisions in 1914 still remained, and the units comprised in the main young men of 19 years and upwards. A 1 physically, but raw as regards warfare, they were stiffened with a percentage of "veterans” of 1914 to 1916, and pre-war regulars. Under the command of Lord Cavan, we dug in on the south bank of the river Piave, where most of our men made their first acquaintance with the Italian soldato. A number of our six-inch howitzer batteries had, however, served with the Italians ever since the latter entered the war in 1917, and before we arrived they had participated in the disastrous rout at Caporetto, where the Italians Lad suffered a terrible defeat and had been driven back for many miles. The manner in which our batteries had brought their guns put of this disastrous battle in spite of difficulties of terrain and in face of terrific fire, would make a, story in itself. It was on the Piave, however, that most of us had our first experience of Italians, and later we fought alongside them on the Asiago Plateau and again at the crossing of the Piave in . October, 1918, »

The country in the north of Italy may not be so difficult as it is in Abyssinia, hut it is quite bad enough. From some of our observation posts, the country appeared rather like the view from the top of Ben Lomond at Queenstown, looking north and west. The Italian Arditi and Bersaglieri are trained in that sort of country and are born mountaineers. Every drop of water, every round of ammunition, every pound of rations and forage had to be laboriously brought up from the plains and, to accomplish this, the Italian engineers blasted roads out of the solid rocks; they built “ telepherici” (aerial wire ropeways), built mountain railways and, of course, used pack-mules. They are born road makers. They made broad two-way traffic roads in every possible place and in some places where the uninitiated would say roads were impossible. And the roads were not steep either. The grades were easy, and could be negotiated by our three-ton lorries and Fiat trucks with the greatest of ease. The “ telepherici ” were stretched across \ every conceivable valley, and some of them were carried on posts for miles, the trucks with forage and rations crawling slowly but surely along 24 hours every day. Accidents happened, of course, but “doles far nlente 1”' Trenches and gun positions had all to be blasted out of the solid rock. Mud was unknown.

The Italians got accustomed to this sort of business and it does not need a big stretch of imagination to realise that it took many months of hard work to consolidate a position amongst those rocky heights; and the result was that once the Italian .had made himself comfortable he said, “ Now I’m * set,’ and here I remain.” That was where the trouble began. The Italian did not wish to advance, and so long as he got his rations and his "vino” regularly he was not particularly anxious for the war to end. The natural sloth of the semi-tropical races asserted itself and the Italian lost all interest in the war, and would have perhaps carried on like that for a bit longer if the British and French had not come on the scene and started to make things uncomfortable for the Austro-Geman forces over the way.

The Italian private soldiers were rather good chaps when properly led, particularly those mountain troops mentioned above and the Arditi (or storm troops). The ordinary regiments were poorly led in 1917 and 1918. The officers did not, in fact, lead their men in action as the French and British did, and the officers sometimes never entered the front line trenches, but took up residence in comfortable quarters in the support trenches and left the leadership to senior non-commissioned officers. A French officer with whom the writer had a long conversation the morning after a very large raid on the Austrian trenches stated that he came across a Icaderless platoon of Italians at the commencement of the raid who appeared hopelessly unaware of its plan or purpose. The French officer added them to his own platoon and they did good work under his leadership. He gave it as his definite opinion that the Italian infantryman was all right if he had anyone but an Italian officer to lead him.

Under Mussolini’s regime things may have altered and—who knows? —the Italian officer may have adopted the lessons he learned in 1917-18. If so, then the force in Abyssinia will be a formidable fighting machine. The sanitation of the Italian army was sadly at fault compared with the hygiene of the British forces. It is not necessary to say any more, except that if the climate had been tropical in the Italian Alps in 1917 disease would have been rampant and the hospitals would have been full of typhoid, jaundice, etc. It is strange that the Italian is so systematic in other things and yet' in this most important thing he lagged behind other modern armies. Perhaps he will have learned this lesson, too, by this time. My impression was that many of the Italian soldiers lacked mental stability in certain things and ranked as of first rate importance matters which the average healthy-minded man would dismiss for a time when more serious matters occupied his attention. In most other ways I found the Italian soldier and junior officer rather like ourselves, keen on his job, ready for a bit of amusement, and not the least bit interested in politics, except that he hated the Tedeeco with an all-consuming hatred and (mum’s the word) not particularly fond of the French.

Our own men were very friendly with the French, being old comrades, but the Italians never liked the French —ever since Napoleon’s time when they invaded northern Italy and laid it waste! The French rather scorned the Italians, and as a rule a British unit was put between French and Italians to ensure pleasant relations.

Mussolini may have altered the spirit as well as the fighting efficiency of his regiments, and it is probable that many of the shortcomings go noticeable to us have been repaired eince 1918, but whether they have or not, it is a big mistake to underestimate the fighting ability of the Italian army at present advancing into the mountains of Abyssinia.

The country will be nothing new to the Italians and they will be every bit as much at home as are the Ethiopians. Even when they can no longer use their tanks and aeroplanes they will still be a match for the natives.