THE FEAR OF WAR

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22738, 26 November 1935, Page 14

THE FEAR OF WAR

RAMPANT IN EUROPE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY COULD HITLER MOVE? It is scarcely necessary to say that Europe, and more especially France, is under an oppressive strain and expecting great calamities, says a Paris correspondent of the New York Times. Everywhere people are asking each other: " Have you got rid of those rags in your garret? Have you got plenty of sand in front of your cellar steps? Have the members of your family learned how to use gas masks?" Talk to any man in the street and he will raise his hands to heaven and demand to know whether he should bury his gold in his back garden or use it to buy industrial stocks of the type that go up when war comes. It would be going too far to speak of panic, but it is no exaggeration to say that in countries where the gold standard still remains there is plenty of anxiety. Even in England, despite an apparent gaiety, the spirit is no better. During the past six months I have travelled in all parts of Europe, going as far south as Andalusia and Naples and as far north as the Baltic States and Moscow. I have also spent weeks in Germany, observing all manner of things, and I have concluded that there is danger, but not of the type we imagine it to be. This danger is the result of a peculiar mental tension which may well lead to intolerable incidents —incidents of an organic economic disease tliat may create inequalities impossible to stand in the long run. FEAR OF HITLER. When we worry about war danger, we generally imagine that some day Adolf Hitler, after certain bold declarations, will shout: " I attack! " and order his air and land force towards one or the other of the Reich frontiers. Now, such a development is quite improbable, unless there should arise some domestic calamity threatening to disrupt Germany. Then the dictatorship would be as safe in war as it would be in peace. Eitler must first be menaced by internal defeat, economic and financial, and this defeat, to Hitler, must spell the end of his power before he would undertake a war of aggression. And then—against whom? Everything points to the probability, that France, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia will won be united in a common pact. In a few weeks Central Europe will probably be bound together by a defensive system in which two well-consolidated groups, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, will participate under the double iegis of France and Italy. Air treaties are being prepared to bind Paris, London, and Moscow, and in addition Rome, the Balkans, and Bucharest. Technical dispositions of a very advanced order are being carried out. And to my way of thinking, whether for prevention of war or actual defence, it is the dispositions and not the actual signatures that really matter. THE CASE IN 1914. There was no signed alliance between France and England in 1914, but the high command of both navies had studied a comprehensive plan of collaboration for the defence of the English Channel and the North Sea. This included the planting of buoys, the cooperation of the various types of ships, signals and mine fields. Everything was so well prepared that only a few hours were necessary to set the entire machinery in motion. That is exactly what should be done and what is being done for aviation. At the first sign of German aggression a telephone call will suffice for the

British aerial fleet to carry out ceitain manoeuvres in which the French t.nd Italian air fleets will collaborate with careful distribution of objectives and means of attack, from the technical as well as from the geographical point of view—and this plan extends as far as Moscow. For anyone who reflects, it \s somewhat surprising to eee that in all these security negotiations the quarrel remains on one point only —the nutting into effect of the promised assistance. There lias even been talk of the automatic operation of the pact. What does this mean? Is there any possibility of automatic action when it is a question of swinging into motion ■ all the forces of a nation? And what signature could any Minister invoke before a Parliament when it is a question of launching a nation into a struggle in which its very existence is at stake? I shall go even further; even a dictator cannot invoke a legal engagement in order to force his subjects to go to war. Whether it be at Moscow, Rome, or Berlin, he must appeal to a vital interest and imbue his people with the idea that this supreme step is inevitable. MANY OBSTACLES. To my way of thinking, it is of little importance to stipulate that the Council of the League of Nations must be consulted. If a war is justified it will be legalised later. If it is an arbitrary action it is a pretty nasty matter even for a dictator unless there follows immediate and triumphal success. Any premeditated war, conceived as a means of ameliorating a country's condition, faces for the next six months obstacles that would make the most determined man hesitate. No possible preparation could place Germany on an equal rank with the four great European Powers, reinforced by eight or ten smaller ones, if those Powers have placed their air forces at convenient distances from the vulnerable parts of Germany, and if they have equalled Germany inihe quality of aeroplanes and surpassed her in numbers by three and four times. If these plans arc to be executed, any German attack would be sheer folly, and the characteristic of folly is that it is not committed in cold blood. A real European treaty which would keep Germany respectful would consist of a few phrases by which it would be understood that all '.he air forces of the peaceful nations would be utilised in case of aggression in a common plan and under common direction, and that upon the point of armament the Powers had decided to construct at least three times as many planes as Germany. i Unless the diplomats complicate the negotiations by verbal chicanery, practically the whole of Europe, united more solidly by a common sentiment of fear than by any treaty, will soon be on the defensive. This is the result of Stresa, and it is difficult to conceive how Poland could break away and unite with Germany. Although a coalition has been organised technically, it would be very unwise to conclude that all dangers of war have been brushed away. While Governments and general staffs are discussing peace means, public opinion is not directed. The press of nearly all European countries, without wisdom or discipline, attaches itself to superannuated formulas. With few exceptions, it obeys private or collective interests, and it does not cultivate the essential quality of sang-froid. WRONG DESPATCH. Only a few days ago a French correspondent in Berlin who did not understand the German language sent to his newspaper the news that the French Note protesting against conscription had been rejected. The German word " abgelehnt" had been translated incorrectly. But all Paris thought for an hour and a-half that the document had in some manner been hurled in the face of the French Ambassador, and the result was great excitement in the newspaper offices and on the boulevards, which recalled tragically the effect produced 05 years ago by the falsified despatch from Ems which announced an affront to the Ambassador of France. Such carelessness is not' only a danger; it is a temptation. The Germans cannot have forgotten

the advantages they took of that strategem in 1870 and the embarrassment in which they were placed by their brutality of attack in 1914. Another factor may start a war —the economic factor, which, in my opinion, will not begin to appear for several months yet. It would arise if Germany found herself unable to procure raw materials. The gold reserve of the Reich has fallen to 75,000,000 marks. In reality, only the name guarantees the money. There remains commerce, and a favourable commercial balance is a vital necessity. Since December, 1934, the deficit has been constant. Three million Germans are still unemployed. The Budget deficit is more than 2,000,000.000 marks and the gigantic programme of public works»is financed only by shortterm loans, which fill the vaults of the great banks. Germany has resolved grimly to live upon her own resources, but an impasse is certain and bankruptcy almost inevitable. So it is that, in spite of all our calculations, the Hitler Government may one day be forced into a war adventure.