ABYSSINIAN WAR

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22718, 2 November 1935, Page 26

ABYSSINIAN WAR

CAPACITY OF THE NATIVES SWEDISH GENERAL SPEAKS GREAT NATURAL FIGHTERS The Abyssinian warrior does not at all know the danger he is running in a tight with a modern equipped European army, states General Eric Virgin, the Swedish political military counsellor of the Abyssinian Emperor, who has left Abyssinia owing to ill-health, in an interview with the correspondent of the Stockholm Tidinggji in Addis Ababa, rdprinted in The Times on October 2. He will attack without fear or trembling, even when he is to advance against tanks under the protection of fire from machine guns and artillery. His strength lies in hia indomitable courage, the general says. If it were merely a matter of human qualifications, this army would be able to take up the struggle with any European army whatsoever. It is arms and ammunition which settle the problem of war for us. It will not do to judge the Abyssinian Army from the European standpoint, but experience shows what unique capacity for co-opera-tion these people have —often incomprehensible to us who are brought up on nuite other systems and according to different traditions, and who represent quite a different mentality. CONSTITUTION OF ARMY.

Three different categories constitute the army which in the last few months has been gathered together in Abyssinia. The old original annv was formed, like the present one, by chiefs and officials in different parts of the country. They are quite the same lines on which the feudal armies were formed in mediaeval Europe, when the vassals joined up with their men. Abyssinia is divided into 14 provinces, which correspond to the kingdoms or dukedoms or. principalities of which the country at one time was formed, and each province is ruled by a governor. ' The latter was and still is in some provinces entitled to collect certain taxes. By way of compensation for this service he had to keep an army for the Emperor, whose strength and armies as a matter of course were quite in proportion to the size and wealth of the provinces. In the same way the governor split up his province, so that his sub-governors, or chiefs, in the villages in the different districts had to set up armed forces in compensation for the right to collect taxes. Some districts are still being governed on these lines, but this entails, as history has shown, a certain amount of risk. The troops had not come under the direct influence of the Government, and the present Emneror has. therefore, done away with this system. Every new governor now appointed gets from the Emperor a certain army which is paid for by the State. He has this at his disposal to keep order within the province, and in case of war he has to place it at the service of the Emperor, but it is now a State army paid by the Emperor from the taxes which the Emperor, and not the governoi, imposes upon the people. ALL SOLDIERS PAID. But it is a mercenary army in so far as that the soldiers get a certain pay and are volunteers. Of late months then' has been established a rule that every man without fixed or employment, must go to the front. Therefore there is no longer any problem of uneniplovment in Abyssinia. The Emperor can dispose of 2,000,000 men, all of them excellent soldiers, but it is impossible to make use of all the reserves because the supply of arms and ammunition has been cut off. Nevertheless these people possess a warrior tradition which, of course, hag nothing in common with what we in Europe call modern warfare, and which may show some astonishing results. They have an instinct which in a surprising way turns them into good soldiers. This was seen at Ual Ual. Their co-operation there was on a pa: with the scientifically-calculated European war technique, wherever they may haw got it from. In fact, it is not so ea-»v for us to grasp and understand this. It depends upon deeply-rooted inherited traditions. It is. in spite of everything. misleadinsr to maintain that the Abyssinian soldiers lack military training This is only correct if we look at the matter from a European point of view The weak point is that this army will have to fight against aeroplanes, tanks, and artillery, and it is quite true that the Abyssinian Army in these respects is not only without arms, but also without any kind of training in a modern sense.

THE LESSON OF ADOWA. If it should come to a war the striking force of the army must be based upon its peculiar traditions; the famous battle of Adowa was won by this curious ability of manoeuvring, continues General Virgin. I am unable to understand how they did it. The Abyssinian troops were grouped in such a way that any European general would have had reason to be proud of the achievement. Uncivilised people have a special ability and flair to circumvent an enemy. They make use of signs and signals which are quite on a level with the aids offered by telephone and wireless, ant 1 in a marvellous wav the Abyssinian Army at Adowa prevented the three advancing Italian columns from co-operating. Did the Italians make use of modern military equipment at the engagement at Ual Ual? They made use of both aeroplanes and tanks, and the fact that apart from the tanks three airmen couM hover above the foremost fighting lines just as the action started must seem rather puzzling to those Italians who want to make out that it was a question of a sudden attack. It was found then that the Abyseinians did not run away in terror at the sight of the aeroplanes, although these men had never seen flying machines and were believed to be terrified from the first moment. Instead ci that they charged straight at the Italian tanks, climbed on to them at full sneed. and shot at the crews inside. Nothing but death can stop these people when the lust of battle gripe them. ITALIAN METHODS. During the six months that I was here before the affair at Ual Ual I got to know sufficiently about the Italian movements in Eritrea and Italian Somali-

land to understand that Signor Mussolini's occupation of Abyssinia would be a fearfnul tragedy for every free man in this country. Italian policy in the East African possessions was one day to fraternise with the natives and the next to try to regain the lost respect and power by means of kicks and blows. The experience of this has fully convinced me that in the name of humanity the world is bound to oppose Italian policy which is only the result of an impudent desire for power and, in case of victory, would brine in its train only misery and misfortune. It is not the Italian people I stigmatise in this way, but the policy pursued by its leaders. I have been called the enem v of the white race. I, too, have my ideas of how the white race will best be able to preserve its leading position. Not by opportunism and undue expansion, but by example.