THE ARAB REVOLT

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22718, 2 November 1935, Page 18

THE ARAB REVOLT

LAWRENCE REPORT FOUND HIS SINGLE "I" Readers of Colonel Lawrence's report on the Arab revolt —the discovery of which has just been announced —will be struck by the suppression of the "ego," writes A. C. R. Carter in the Daily Telegraph. Only once, on the last page, does Lawrence use the capital " I," and in a previous paragraph he mentions "we." Throughout he gives all the credit . for the success of the Arab campaign to King Feisal, and writes as if he, were no more than an anonymous eyewitness. The first sentence epitomises the simplicity and directness of the narrative: "The Arab revolt broke out in June, 1916, at Mecca and Medina simultaneously." He describes the taking of Fort Jiad and Jidda and of Taif ("taken with help of a five-inch howitzer"), and goes on to the " less fortunate" siege of Medina, hampered by shortage of rifles, so that the " situation was critical in November and December, 1916." Naturally, General Allenby soon comes into the picture, and Lawrence states: "General Allenby recognised the value of the Arab army as his extreme right wing as soon as he reached Egypt in July, 1917, and helped Feisal liberally with equipment. In consequence, the Arab Regular Army took efficient shape, and increased to nearly 6000 men." Then follows an outstanding example of Lawrence's modesty:— " Feisal failed to take Maan itself. He did, however, succeed in cutting the Hejaz railway from Maan southwards finally, so that the ultimate surrender of Medina became only a matter of time." As is now well known, it was largely through Lawrence's personal heroism that the railways were cut. TURKS HOAXED. The report goes on to describe the role of the Arab army in Palestine:— " General Allenby assigned to the Arab army the duty of cutting the Turkish railway and telegraphic communications between Damascus and Palestine two days before the attack—and keeping them cut. The Arab army was also to demonstrate against Amman so as to strengthen the Turkish delusion that the main British attack was to be delivered in the Jordan Valley. The second intention was very successfully carried out, and the Turks had more than one-third of their total forces as the entirely useless flank when Allenby struck." There is an interesting comment on the credit claimed for the French troops in the capture of Eayrout: — "Combined forces of British cavalry moved swiftly towards Damascus, which was entered on September 30. On October 8 the Allied troops entered Beyrout. The Arab rising had been suppressed in the newspapers so that the French troops might have the honour of its liberation from the Turks."

That there should be no exaggeration of the effect of the revolt, Lawrence is at pains to add: — " The Arab army had no separate share in the conquest of Syria and do not wish any attempt to be made to estimate their individual importance." It is in a passage describing the Arab forces that there occurs the single use of the personal pronoun and the only

reference to the fact that Lawrence was with Feisal:— "Arab regular army never more than 9000 strong. The numbers of the irregulars were difficult to estimate. They came up to fight when called, and went home after the action. The whole male population of the district in which he happened to be operating were at the disposal of Feisal, and he used to summon few or many according to the object we had in view. Irregulars were all volunteers. I have never seen more than 11,000 of them together and, more often, we had only a few hundred."