JUTLAND BATTLE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22628, 20 July 1935, Page 9

JUTLAND BATTLE

TO WHOM THE VICT6RY? BRITISH AND GERMAN VIEWS THE RIVAL CLAIMS. British and German views of the Battle of Jutland were recently put forward in correspondence in the London Daily Telegraph. First there was a letter from Mr Hector Bywater, the newspaper’s naval correspondent. . A dispatch from your Berlin correspondent describes the Jutland celebrations in Berlin and quotes an extract from a Russian admiral’s criticism of British strategy on that occasion, Mr Bywater wrote. No official celebration, however flamboyant, of the Battle of 'Jutland as a “great German victory” is likely to affect the considered verdict of naval historians, a verdict in which even the official German chronicler (“Nordsee,” Vol. V) concurs with some natural qualification. It is that Jutland, although a partial tactical success for the German fleet, was strategically a decisive German reverse.

Admiral Scheer admitted as ,much by implication, in his dispatch to the Kaiser, written a few days after the battle.

1 In that document he makes no sug--1 geation that the “ victorious ” fleet should seek another encounter with the British. On the contrary, he strongly urges the adoption of ruthless submarine warfare 1 as an alternative. His conviction that the High Seas Fleet was incapable of deciding the .issue at sea is implicit in every line of the dispatch. The Jutland action had two distinct phases—namely, the battle-cruiser engagement, in which our losses were much heavier than those of the enemy; and the main fleet encounter, in which the German forces were hopelessly worsted. So overwhelming and destructive was the British gunfire in the second phase that the German fleet was driven headlong out of the battle, its return fire being absolutely ineffective. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. Humanly speaking, there can be no reasonable doubt that with higher visibility and two more hours of daylight Admiral Jellicoe would have utterly defeated the High Seas Fleet. Subsequent events clearly indicate the moral effect of Jutland on the German naval command. Three months after the battle the German fleet made a timorous sortie into the North Sea, preceded by screens of Zeppelins and submarines. It needed only a false report from an airship that British ships were coming up from the southward to send Admiral Scheer racing home at full speed. Not until April, 1918, did the German fleet venture out again, and its purpose then was not to seek the Grand Fleet, but merely to cut up the Scandinavian convoys. Actually it achieved nothing. What the men of the German Navy thought of Jutland is evidenced by their conduct in October, 1918, when they heard that the fleet was going out | to force a battle. Rather than face another such “ victory ” they rose in n.utiny and disarmed the ships. Against such concrete facts the waves, alike of criticism and propaganda, beat in vain. THE ANSWER. The German case was stated by Count Leo Graf von Zeppelin. Will you allow me space to comment upon a letter from Mr Hector Bywater on the subject of the German celebrations of the “ victory of Jutland ”? Count von Zeppelin asked. If, in battle, the victory of one side over the other be decided by the relative amount of damage inflicted and by the losses in lives and tonnage, etc., involved, .then, according to statistical evidence which is accepted by both sides, the victory at Jutland must be accorded to Germany. That is why the Germans permit themselves to celebrate Jutland as their /victory. ' Whether, as Mr By water suggests, “ with higher visibility and two more hours of light,” Admiral Jellicoe would have “ utterly defeated the High Seas Fleet ” is a question that I think better left for the decision of Mars, the director of battles. It is always so easy to say “\f only ” this and that. But such references to what might have been do not make very convincing arguments with which to dispute facts. If there had been no Flood, Father Noah would never have become a celebrity, etc., etc.! Let us, therefore, leave the question of what might have been and let the Germahis celebrate their victory.

After all, it docs no harm to the British; the British Navy still enjoys the afterglow of its pre-war glamour. I am much more concerned with the concluding paragraphs of your correspondent’s letter.

Either Air Bywater has been misinformed, or else he is attempting, in the role of a “ Hun ” defamer. to take away from the Germans the- one attribute which up to now has been left them by all their worst enemies, without exception, both past and present. I speak of the attribute of courage. We Germans may well have as many failings as our opponents, both declared and undeclared, have attributed to us at various times. But never since the days of the Caesars, and before, has lack of courage been counted amongst them. This discovery has been preserved for the pen of Air Hector Bywater. GERMAN COURAGE. Tf he is right, then why. I wonder, was it necessary to resort to propaganda l falsehood about war guilt and atrocities in order to stir up half the world against an opponent lacking in courage? Or, again, how was it possible for a people lacking in courage to make a stand during four solid years against such brave anil numerous opponents?

I!-- that as ir may. in I!HS. when a number of the eivws of a numb-r of the haul siiips of the German Meet mutinied on receiving the command to put to sea, they did not do so—as Air Bywater would have it—because they were intiiui-

dated by the thought of recollection of the guns of the British Navy. Not because of the terrifying memories of the Battle of Jutland. They mutinied because they had been “ got at ” by Communist and otfier agitators, mostly Jewish, with the result that the poor fools were under the impression that by mutinying they would cause bloodshed to cease, since, if they made a beginning, the soldiers and sailors of the enemy countries would follow their example and the war would end. Nor was it—as Mr Bywater suggests —fear of 'British naval superiority which caused Admiral Seheer io turn back on the reception of a report that tlie English were hearing down upon him. It was against both his own inclinations and those of his officers and men that he obeyed the Highest Command, which at that time, in common with the English High Command, was chiefly concerned in losing as little tonnage as possible.

I could enlarge still further on the attitude reflected in such a letter as Mr By waters.. 1 only abstain from doing so because I am at the moment a guest of tills country, and have always found by many conversations with

offieers of both the navy and the army an attitude of fair criticism and warm appreciation of their opponents during the war. Jn fact, 1 have found the attitude which is supposed to be traditionally Britisii, but which does not seem to he shared by Mr Bywatcr.