EUROPE AGOG

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22628, 20 July 1935, Page 3

EUROPE AGOG

RIVAL WAR PLANS FRANCO-RUSSIAN PACT. , Again nothing seems to have happened to arrest what has been characterised as the "galloping deterioration” that has recently afflicted European relations. Yet the fact is that rarely have the European chancelleries been busier. The results are another matter (writes Frederick T. Birchall from Berlin to the New York Times). Any attempt to define and evaluate' what has been going on must start from the premise that it is war preparation rather than peace promotion that has occupied the diplomats. This may be ultimately in the interests of peace because with everybody prepared any nation that deliberately sets a match to the tinder so plentifully overspreading Europe at present must surety be adjudged insane. Unfortunately it is not deliberateness as much as some sudden, incident that is likely to provide the spark that will set Europe aflame. From this starting point an outstanding event has been that after endless backing and filling the Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance has been drawn up and signed. NOT AN EASY TASK.

It has not been easy. The problem has been to effectuate what was nothing less than a military alliance within the framework of the covenant of the League of Nations, which forbids such alliances. It hae therefore been what in the phraseology of Geneva is called “ a problem of drafting,” Apart from this there was the difficulty of equality in commitments between countries rendered by geographical conditions wholly unequal in their opportunities for giving assistance. Between Franco and Germany—and Germany was the only "enemy” envisaged in these negotiations —is a wide-open gate. On the other hand, nowhere are the German and Russian borders contiguous. A violation of French territory by German troops or of German territory by French troops could be accomplished in a matter of hours. It would be a week at least under the most favourable conditions, and in the present state of Russian transportation it might easily be a month, before Russian forces could aid the French. In any case, how could the Russian forces reach Germany? Through Poland —thus providing Germany with an immediate ally of no mean strength? _ Moreover, the problem is one of immediate ” assistance because the worst menace of aggression is now aerial. Russia has no large cities in immediate danger from German aeroplanes in case of aggression. France has at least a score, with Paris, the greatest and most vulnerable target on the Continent. An almost insignificant air attack upon a Russian settlement of comparatively small importance might leave France pledged to immediate mobilisation and an attack upon Germany. "AUTOMATIC" ASSISTANCE.

Russia wanted much —“ automatic ” assistance in case of need without waiting for the League Council to pronounce upon the aggression committed; a huge loan to make the Russian railways capable of transporting the needed assistance when needed —these demands are certain. It is certain also that she did not and could not get them in full. Apparently she has been content to take what the 1 reach Cabinet was willing to give. Outside of this one achievement, progress towards European stabilisation is still in the realm of polemics. Adoh Hitler's brief May Day speech to the snow-flaked ranks of German labour told nothing. The British House of Commons debate upon the startling revelations of actually superior German air strength and approaching German naval equality revealed concrete plans to meet neither pmil. And German rearmament steadily proceeds at a pace only indicated when the curtain'of secrecy _ surrounding it is momentarily lifted, as in the case of the air force revelation and the submarine plans. All that the German public are permitted to know about these matters is that the British have become comically disturbed about a rumour that Germany may shortly turn out 12 small submarines —less than two for each of the seven seas, German commenators point out whereas they received with comparative equanimity the announcement of the forthcoming German army of 3C divisions, leaving that for the French to worry about. NEW BARRACKS.

The German public see new barracks building all over the land and hear ot reserve officers being tallied in readiness to train the new army, but all that is for the future. It is some months until October, when these plans will conic to a head. ! In the meantime expectation hangs upon Herr Hitler’s forthcoming pronouncement on foreign policy, vaguely set us due within the next fortnight. The outside world expects it to define once and for all the German position upon ■ collective security and the pacts whereby it is hoped to attain the same end, and its attitude towards Geneva. It is more likely, however, to concern itself more with denunciation of the past rather than pledges for the future, if the tone of inspired commentaries such as the Foreign Officers’ “ DiplomaUsche Kon-e* spondeuz ” are any guide. This organ oi official opinion is concerned chiefly to lay the blame for the present diplomatic unrest upon anything but the German activities that have produced it.

“ Rearming activities everywhere, it laments, “ have produced a highly unsatisfactory atmosphere. The foreign press unhappily gives more consideration to discussions of military measures and rearming policies than to the problem of international settlement and co-operation. “ This tendency has even become increasingly noticeable in the proceedings of the British House of Commons, which was once recognised as an exalted parliamentary forum.

The “ Diplomatische Korrespondenz ” still hopes that enough will remain in the way of “ positive ” material from the Stresa talks to pick up the broken threads of further negotiation. In other words, the German hope appears to be to keep the talkfest going until Germany’s full strength is achieved and she is in a position to make her weight felt and attain her full desires, which are now eo discreetly veiled.