AN INDIVIDUALISTIC HISTORY OF THE WAR

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22422, 17 November 1934, Page 4

AN INDIVIDUALISTIC HISTORY OF THE WAR

LLOYD GEORGE’S TRENCHANT MEMOIRS “War Memoirs of David Lloyd George.” Volume 111. Illustrated. London; Ivor Nicholson and Watson. £1 lls. In his preface to the third volume of his “ War Memoirs ” Mr Lloyd . George prepares the: reader, though perhaps inadequately, for the temper in which a great part of the narrative is cast. “ Unfortunately,” he says, censure attracts more attention than laudation. 1 have , criticised a few—very few—statesmen and geherals. That attracts controversy, and controversy involves a pnblicity which caste the larger and more important part of the narrative into the shade.” Mr Lloyd George’s apprehensions that the historical significance of his book might be partly concealed by .its controversial and very personal criticism of men —and nations —cannot but be tui-

filled. The question which will occur to the average inquiring reader, not exhaustively informed as to the inner history of the war, is to what extent Mr Lloyd George’s narrative may be accepted as historically pure. The vigorous, outspoken (even contentious) personality ot the wartime Prime Minister was never more convincingly presented than in this book from his pen. One finds again that prodigious ability for marshalling and indexing facts, that gift of passionate rhetoric, which placed him in a position of supreme importance in a time of crisis; but one is surprised, not a little disappointed, to realise that, looking back, so many years later, on the events in which he played so distinguished a part, Mr Lloyd George has not reorientated his views, and brought to his contemplation of the war years calm consideration. Or if it is unfair to suggest that this volume is not the.,result of detached reconsideration, one might express regret that the tone in which its judgments are delivered is often so vehement. Oratorical eloquence and violent metaphor are inclined to appear unconvincing when crystallised between the pages of an expensive volume whose only value “for the future historian of war will depend upon the memories .Leiirg genuine and. upon the extent to winch they are fortified by documentary and other contemporary evidence.” The Admiralty Criticised Testing the pages of volume three of “War Memoirs” by the criterion postulated above by their author himself, the reader is not always impressed. Very often the documentary evidence is inadequate to support the forceful statement accompanying it, which generally amounts to reiteration of the thesis that Mr Lloyd George was right, and those who would not follow him unquestioning were wrong. For instance, in dealing with the submarine menace, one of the first questions to which the Lloyd George Administration turned its attention, the author claims that the utilisation of convoys (which ultimately was responsible for reducing the peril to a minimum) was suggested by him. The statement of the methods proposed, which he reproduces, appears, however, to be not a personal memorandum, and may even he no more than a convenient resume of the proposals accepted by the Shipping Controller. Immediately after this outline Mr Lloyd George proceeds to remark, in blistering language, upon “ the amazing and incomprehensible difficulties encountered in inducing the Admiralty even to_ try the convov system.” In an interview with the Morning Post, which was appended to a notice of this volume of the War Memoirs” from our London correspondent (Daily Times, November 10).. Lord Jellicoe, in reply to this scathing indictment; averred that the benefits of the convoy system were appreciated byJhe Admiralty at that time, and the difficulty in introducing it was the provision of the necessary escort vessels. Presuming that documentary evidence could be adduced in support of this contention also, it will be seen that, from being the sole authoritative reference of the future historian to the question, Mr Lloyd George’s statements must he read only as one commentary on a highly «ial issue. That the depredations of submarines were extraordinarily serious is hevond question. In February and March, 1917. British merchant vessels lost through .enemy action (principally submarine atS were 232, with a gross tonnage of 663,000, and in April the loss was 5?6,000 tons with 200,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping additional per mont . Bid is there justification m this book, or in official records, for the statements thaf the Admiralty was stunned, despondent* fill? of despair, and regarded the case as hopeless, to mention only a fewofMr TJovd George’s comments? At least it is a salutary rebuke to any vainglorious sen timent as to the might and majesty of the British Navy to read:— If Britannia ruled the waves, she did it with a shaky trident in the days before the submarine was overcome. After the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe came to the conclusion that t was not safe for his imposing Armada “ to undertake prolonged operations to the South of the Dogger Bank. Meanwhile, the flagship must be interned in safe creeks, the «ag W ‘o be carried on the small craft, the nimble destroyers and the weatheibeaten trawlers. Here is the Nel son touch w up-to-date. . That was the atmosphere of crouching nervousness, even before the Germans had launched more than a few of their latest specimens of submarine cruisers. One cannot but believe that there is another -side to this story, which Mr Lloyd George’s intense self-confidence makes A impossible for him to consider. In his review of the Rome Conference early in 1917. when he put forward with characteristic vigour his scheme for a great offensive from the Italian front upon the Austrians, and it was rejected, Mr L!o> a George again makes no concession to the possible merits of the case against bis proposal. In this instance the success, or otherwise, that might have attended its acceptance can be merely a matter tot conjecture: hut it is permissible to suppose that the reason the Italian I rout offensive plan was rejected was more ponderable than “the bondage of professional etiquette. ’ which, Mr Lloyd George asserts, inhibits the professional soldier to stand by his brethren all outsiders, including the facts. An Uncompromising Leader It may be understood, from this reference to only two sections in a large and compact volume, that Mr Lloyd George s “ War Memoirs ” are the work of a man who will never admit the death of a controversial issue, and brings to the consideration of every question a determinedly individualistic mind. But if the book inevitably must raise resistance in readers, save the most unquestioning ot the author’s admirers, to some of ms declarations on contentious matters whicn are not yet to be contemp ated in historical perspective, it certainly must rouse general admiration of the force, the keen-

ness of intellect and quickness in decision, of the statesman who was so largely responsible for the direction of war policy. Great Britain discovered in David, Lloyd George a leader with an independent spirit, unconfined confidence in hjs own judgment, and an almost superhuman ability to attend to numberless tasks simultaneously. That his impulsiveness and strategical unconventionality were modified by his colleagues and by the admirals and generals is a regret which may be expressed more vehemently by Mr Lloyd George than by the readers of bis book, but one realises in studying it how much more valuable was such an uncompromising leader in a time of national emergency than a Prime Minister would have been who possessed only the attributes of a rubber-stamp. This volutoe of the “War Memoirs” deals with seven months or so from December. 1916, and thus includes the account of the forming of Mr Lloyd George’s Government, the Nivelle offensive,, the entry of the United States into the war, and the first Russian revolution. The last two subjects mentioned are both dealt with trenchantly, with striking vividness, and the book is fully illustrated. ■ J. M.,