THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1933. THE BRITISH NAVY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22114, 18 November 1933, Page 12

THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1933. THE BRITISH NAVY

The announcement of the British Government's decision to review its 1933 naval programme does not come altogether as a surprise. Three months ago it was reported that the Admiralty had prepared a new construction programme, and that the House of Commons might be asked to follow a course that would be without precedent because the situation which had arisen was itself without precedent. The position is, made sufficiently clear in the statement a few days ago by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The programme which is to be reviewed was framed in accordance with the British policy of building comparatively small cruisers in the hope that other nations would follow that lead. Despite British representations at Geneva, the other nations have not done so, Japan, and the United States have built, laid down, or intend building cruisers of greater tonnage and heavier armaments than those provided for in the British programme. This has been disappointing to the British Government, but it has had to face the question of its adherence to a programme which would be productive of ships inferior to those possessed by other Powers. It has decided that it cannot let the British Navy become inferior to the extent .that would be involved if its previous intentions had been carried into effect and therefore, instead of four cruisers as originally contemplated—one of 7250 tons and three of 5400 tons—three are to be constructed —two of 9000 tons and one of 5200 tons. The cost and the total new tonnage,' which has to be calculated in terms of the London Naval Treaty, will coincide with that provided for in the original , programme. By reason of her Imperial j obligations Britain haL need of many j cruisers, and a policy of building i vessels of large rather than moderate j tonnage is at variance with her require--1 ments. But the restriction of the size I of warships, as consistently advocated by Britain at Geneva, bears upon the question of disarmament. Smaller vessels have a utility in peace time in the performance of necessary patrol services which are not associated with that most expensive luxury, the battleship. But that Great Britain, so dependent as she is on sea-power, should let her navy be out-built by the navies of the United States and Japan is certainly not a contingency that the people of the Empire could contemplate with any satisfaction. The cause for regret lies, of course, in the fact that the present decision has been practically forced on the British Government by circumstances over which it has no control. Japan and the United States are not building larger ships than they are entitled to build under the London Treaty. That convention expires at the end of 1936, and even then, at the rate at which she is proceeding, Britain will not have built up to her quota. “ Nor do the cruisers built or building,” wrote recently the well-informed naval correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, “ compare favourably in tonnage, armament, and radius with the best of their foreign contemporaries. The latter include 10,000 ton vessels with 8-inch guns and strong armour protection — a type without counterpart in the British Navy. Not the least disquieting feature of recent naval policy has been the construction of ships which could not meet foreign vessels on terms of fighting equality. This, indeed, is a remarkable departure from British traditions.” Thus the British Government’s decision would appear to be hacked by a weight of argument a good deal stronger, when all things are considered, than was deemed sufficient in the concise statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell apparently said nothing about the speeding up in the replacement of inefficient and worn-out vessels which the Admiralty is understood to regard as essential. It is no doubt an accurate contention that for the first time in modern history Britain is maintaining no definite standard of strength at sea. So far as it has turned in other directions, her policy has been attended with disappointing results, and the position has been succinctly summed up in the statement that she is “ suffering the penalty of unrequited confidence.” The impetus for a stock-taking as regards the defensive forces of Great. Britain has been furnished in the demonstration of the inability of the League of Nations to fulfil the role of keeper of the peace. Britain has striven sedulously to advance the cause of disarmament, in practice as well as in proposal. A member of the French Chamber of Deputies has advanced the argument that she has gone too far on the road to disarmament as a reason why she should seek security in an alliance with France. It may be inevitable that the building

programmes of the Powers will be viewed with : Jsgivings as suggestive of fresh naval competition. The more it is to be desired, therefore, that the continued endeavour on which the British Government is bent to secure, by common agreement, restrictions of naval tonnage may eventually be crowned with success. It is devoutly to be hoped that the nations which profess fo desire peace are not going to endanger peace by refusing to recognise the possibility of reaching an agreement on the question of disarmament. It would be a momentous achievement on the British Government’s part if it could only discover, as The Times appeals to it to make further effort to do, some formula which would retrieve the disarmament position and “prevent the wreckage of a practical and noble plan.”