WAR MEMOIRS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22025, 7 August 1933, Page 8

WAR MEMOIRS

THE ARMAMENT RACE An opportunity for reaching an agreement with Germany on naval construction seemed to present itself when, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, in July, 1908, I came into contact with the German Ambassador, Count Metternich. Of our meeting I made some years later a note from memory, which I reproduce here:—

“ Soon after I became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908, Count Metternich, the German Ambassador, invited me to lunch at the Embassy. I had never met the Ambassador, and I had A suspicion that the invitation had some political purpose.

“After lunch he soon made it clear why I had been asked. He knew that I belonged to the more pacifist group in the Cabinet. He introduced the subject of thfe growing suspicions between our two countries.

“I thought it a good opportunity lor explaining to him that the real ground for the growing antagonism in this country towards Germany was not jealousy of her rapidly developing commerce, but fear of her growing navy.

“I pointed out how completely dependent we were on our overseas supplies for our daily bread, and that any country that wrested from us the supremacy of the seas would be in a position to starve our population into abject surrender in a few months. I also urged that if our sea defences were overwhelmed by a superior naval force, our’ army could put up no effective resistance against the huge military machines of the Continent.

“ I thought it well to tell him that on the subject of maintaining the invulnerability of our shores by means of an adequately superior navy there was no difference of opinion in the Cabinet, and that, although I was one of those who were opposed to these huge armaments, I should, if our community were in the least imperilled, be the first to propose ev§n a loan of £100,000,000, if that were necessary, to inaugurate a programme -for building a navy adequate to our safety. “ I said to him, * If this rival shipbuilding goes on to such an extent as to render our people seriously apprehensive of invasion, we shall be driven inevitably to adopt conscription, and thus raise an army capable of defending our shores against any invader.’ “He replied quite curtly, ‘Do you think we should wait? ’

“M. Delcasse had Just been driven out of the Quai d’Orsay largely owing to German hostility. He had, however, been well received in London on his visit to this country immediately after his dismissal. I forget how his name cropped up in our conversation. I can only remember one passage. When I said, 'You dismissed M. Delcasse from his position of Foreign Secretary In France?’ he cut in tartly, ‘But evidently not in England! ’ I proceeded, ‘lf Germany had demanded the dismissal of the most unpopular Minister in this country, he would by that very demand be translated to the highest altitude of popular favour.’ ” This luncheon party was, I fear, not a success. THE KAISER’S. VIEW

Since the above note was written, I have, through the courtesy of the German Foreign Office, been able to study the German diplomatic correspondence for the period in question. From this 'I am reminded that there were, in fact, two interviews with Metternich, separated by an interval of about a fortnight.

The first was July 14, 1908, when I was invited' by Sir Edward Grey to lunch, to meet Count Metternich, and the second was the lunch already referred to, at the German Embassy on the 28th. Both of these interviews were reported very fully to Berlin by Metternich, and came before the Kaiser, whose annotations to the report are highly cignificant of the German attitude at that time.

They are also worth study for the light they throw on the character of the Kaiser —the quick leaps from sense to superciliousness, which later precipitated the world catastrophe. In addition to his marginal notes on Metternich’s report of the conversation, the Kaiser made the following comment:

“Bravo! Metternich! Has done his business very well, except in one point which is most important. The Ambassador has overlooked entirely that he was not permitted, even if entirely non-commitally and only as a private opinion, to agree to the insolent demands of the English Ministers, to make their peacefulness dependent on the diminution of our sea force. Through that he has put himself on a very dangerous slope. I am sorry for him because of that.

“ It must be pointed out to him that I do not wish a good understanding with England at the expense of the extinction of the German fleet. If England only intends graciously to hold out her hand to us with the indication that we should curtail our fleet, then this is an excessive impudence, which contains a great insult for the German people and its Kaiser, and which should be refused a limine by the Ambassador ! By the same rights. Prance and Russia could then demand a curtailment of our land force.

“ As soon as one allows any foreign Power, under any pretext whatsoever, to have something to say about our own armaments, then one may retire, like Portugal and Spain! The German fleet is not built against anybody, and not against England either! But according to our needs'. “This has been said quite clearly In the Navy Law, and has remained unchanged for 11 years! This law is being carried out to the very last tittle; whether the British like it or not does not worry ns. If they want a war, they may start it, we are not afraid of it! (Signed) Wilhelm. RJ.” ANOTHER KAISER NOTE To the second report of Metternich the / Kaiser appended the following footnote; “This sort of conversation, as it baa been carried on between Lloyd

BY MR LLOYD GEORGE BEFORE THE WAR ENGLAND AND GERMANY XXIII. In the light of later developments this article has a special interest as an echo of the pre-war past. The instalment which will appear to-morrow traverses some “ might have beens,” giving glimpses of international and party relationships.

George and Metternich, is utterly unworthy and provoking for Germany! I must beg him in future to have nothing to do with that sort of expectoration. Here he has accepted very patiently as a listener the opinions and orders of English statesmen, and has only ventured protests which had no effect at all.

“He should give these gentlemen who do not wish to see ‘ our wanton ideas of an attack,’ realised, an answer like ‘Go to H—,’ etc. That would bring these fellows to their senses again.

“ That Lloyd George even dared to come out with an order for defining the speed of OUR building is beyond the limit, but as a result the first discussions on the dangerous path of ‘ a possibility not being out of the question.’ ‘“The clever British are trying to hook him, and sooner or later they will pull the string and drag him out; despite this ‘private talk,’ ‘noncommittal character of expression of opinion,’ etc! He should ah ovo refuse everything with such remarks as ‘ No country allows itself to be dictated to or admonished by another country about the size and kind of its armaments.’ ‘I refuse to discuss such a matter.’ For the rest, let them read the Navy Law—known for 11 years — and Nauticus 1 ■

“ Matternich should give that sort of fanatic a kick in the . . he is too soft! ”

[Mr Lloyd George, in one of his introductory chapters, says that long before the war ho had been greatly concerned with the precariousness of our position in. the event of our naval defence being broken through.] LEADERS’ OPINIONS I felt that wetehould be safer if we held a system of training for the young manhood of this country which would fit it for the defence of the realm in the possible event of an invasion of our shores materialising. I was opposed to conscript armies of the Continental type, and thought them designed rather for aggression than for defence. For the latter purpose it seemed to me that something resembling the Swiss militia system would suffice, and might be adopted here.

In the year 1910 we were beset by an accumulation of grave political issues, rapidly becoming graver. In June that year I submitted a memorandum to Mr Asquith urging that a truce should be declared between the parties for the purpose of securing the co-operation of the leading statesmen of the various parties in a settlement of our national problems —Second Chamber, Home Rule, the development of our agricultural resources, national training for defence, and temperance.

Mr Asquith regarded the proposal with considerable favour, and it was decided to submit it to four or five members of the Cabinet for their observations. So far as I can recollect, the only Cabinet Ministers who were called into consultation were Lord Crewe, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and Mr Winston Churchill. I cannot recall any criticisms in detail. They all approved of the idea in principle, and it was agreed that the proposal should be submitted to Mr Balfour, who was still the Leader of the Conservative Party. The only outsiders to whom I showed the document were Mr F. E. Smith (subsequently Lord Birkenhead) and Mr Garvin. They were very pleased with the whole conception. MR BALFOUR’S PART Mr Bal/four was by no means hostile; in fact, he went a long way towards indicating that personally he regarded the proposal with a considerable measure of approval. He was not, however, certain of the reception which would be accorded to it by his party.

Unfortunately, at that time he was not very firmly seated in the saddle. The’Die-Hard cry against his leadership was getting audibly shriller each day. However, he consulted some of his leading colleagues, and he received from them replies which were by no means discouraging. I understood that Lord Lnnsdowne, Lord Cawdor, Lord Curzon, Mr Walter Long, and Mr Austen Chamberlain favoured the idea.

When he came to summon a more formal and general meeting of his colleagues, he again found that the ablest members of the Conservative Party were by no means antipathetic to the idea. So far as I can recollect, the only opposition came from the late Lord Londonderry. But when Mr Balfour proceeded later on to sound the opinion of the less capable and therefore more narrowly partisan members of his party, he encountered difficulties which proved insurmountable.

He called upon me one evening at 11 Downing street to discuss the matter, and I found him then much more hesitant and reluctant.

I g. acred from him that the chief objection entertained by his colleagues was to my presence in such a combination. I was so associated in their minds with extreme radical proposals, and I was so much in the front of the offence at that time, and I had said so many wounding things in the scrimmage that they were more than doubtful whether they could secure the adhesion of their supporters to any coalition of which I was a member.

I instantly assured him that, as far as I was concerned, I would not make my inclusion in the Ministry a condition of my support. On the contrary, I was quite prepared to keep out of it and give it my wholehearted and zealous support as an independent member of the House of Commons, so long as it tackled the job with courage and conviction.

He then told me that there was one other man he felt he would have to consult. Ho said, “You will bo surprised when I give you his name.” When I heard it I think I was rather surprised that this individual should still hold such an important and influental position in the counsels of the party, for he had retired from active political life for -a good many years. It was Mr Akers-Douglas, who had formally been Chief Whip of the Conservative Party, and was then Lord Chilston.