WAR MEMOIRS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22023, 4 August 1933, Page 10

WAR MEMOIRS

BY MR LLOYD GEORGE GROWING UNEASINESS CONDUCT OF THE WAR XVI. The repeated checks which followed the operations of the Allies was creating a feeling of uncertainty, and this article reveals the growing dissatisfaction in many quarters. To-morrow General Joffre occupies the stage and Mr Lloyd George was obviously dissatisfied with the course of events.

A LACK OF GRIP There was a general feeling that there was a disastrous lack of grip In the direction of the war, and that the Cabinet ought to take upon itself a more direct responsibility in controlling its conduct. Suggestions were put forward for the setting-up of a War Committee which would exercise a more constant supervision oyer the direction of the war. I was amongst those who made representations to the Prime Minister upon this point. On October 29, 1915, I received from him the following memorandum on the conduct of the war:— “ The proposal, as I understand it, is that there should be a small committee of the Cabinet, not less than three or more than five in number, to deal executively with the conduct of the war. „“It is understood that the committee will from time to time call to their aid, for the purposes both of discussion and decision, other members of the Cabinet, either because their departments are concerned in the particular matter which is being dealt with or for other special reasons. “The Cabinet to remain as it is, in numbers and composition. “ The plenum of the Cabinet to be kept constantly informed of the decisions and actions of the committee, and in all questions which involve a change or new departure in policy to be consulted before decisive action is taken.” A DAMAGING CRITICISM Three days later I replied to the Prime Minister: — " The appointment of a small committee with fairly full powers will undoubtedly be a great improvement- on the sort of Duma^which has been sitting on war problems up to the present. But unless there is, a complete change in the War Office, the new council will be just as impotent as the Cabinet and old council have proved themselves to be. Our war administration have committed every blunder that the enemy could wish them to be guilty of.” “In July the Intelligence Department of the War Office warned Kitchener that the Germans were likely to break through to Constantinople. We were constantly warned that Bulgaria was becoming more, and more hpstile. One or two Cabinet Ministers, including myself, urged that step* should be taken to prepare for this probable German move.

“ Nothing was done. Even when information came in that the Germans and Austrians were accumulating -forces in the valleys of Hungary and in the Bukovina, no plan of action was thought out.

“ Kitchener never knew that they had crossed the Danube 20 hours after the news reached the War Office that they had effected a crossing at five points. A fortnight after the crossing bis only plan was to send a general to the Mediterranean to report on the situation. Days after the road to Constantinople had been cleared through Bulgaria, and weeks after the actual commencement of the struggle upon which the fate of our rule in Egypt may depend, we are forced by the French to take some action.

“ The public may have delusions now about Kitchener, but the moment the facts are told in the House of Commons I have very little doubt what will be thought and said by all sections.

“If I thought the appointment of a small committee would put an-end to all this amazing series of blunders I should be satisfied. But I have gone on for months always thinking that every mistake must surely be the last, and finding myself constantly surprised by the capacity of our great Ward Lords for blundering.

“ The nation would endure this and a good deal more if they knew everything was being done that human effort and foresight could compass to ensure final victory; but their confidence has been rudely shaken by what they can eee of our unpreparedness in the Balkans.

“ The friendly press are showing marked symptoms of mutiny. The steadfast loyalty of our own party to your leadership has so far saved the Government, but you will forgive me for saying that I doubt whether that would save us if a catastrophe befell Serbia or our forces in the Dardanelles, and all the facts on the conduct of the war were dragged out, as they would be. Every mistake and omission would then be brought out with cumulative force.

“The row in the Commons will come last. Press and public will be moved before the party politician, but in the end he will follow public opinion, and we must have a good answer when the time comes.

“ There is only one answer that can satisfy the public, and that is that you have already made an end of the futile regime that tumbled along from one fatuity to another. “ I am quite willing to face the inevitable tumult when it comes if this

answer can be given, but I have very reluctantly come to the conclusion that I can no longer be responsible for the present war direction, and at the Cabinet to-morrow I propose, with your permission, to raise the real issue.” PASSING NOTES The allusion in my letter to tbe fact, that Lord Kitchener never knew the Germans had crossed the Danube for 20 hours after the news had reached the War Office is explained in the following note made a lew days after the committee meeting by one of my secretaries; “At a Cabinet last week, before the German advance into Serbia had begun, but when news of it was being expected at every moment, LI.G. asked K. in the Cabinet whether there was any news of the Germans having crossed the Danube. K. said that up to the time when he came to the Cabinet he had received no news. “ LI.G. suggested that the news might have come in since, and said he would get the P.M.’s secretary to telephone to the War Office and ask if any news had been received, as he considered it most important to know when the Germans had begun to cross the Danube. “The following is the reply which LI.G. received, and which he read out to the Cabinet. A telegram had been received in the War Office the day before.’ “K. did not express the least surprise that he had not seen the telegram, which briefly stated that the crossing of the Danube had begun.” Immediately it was read to the Cabinet Sir Edward Carson passed me the following note: — “K. does not'read the telegrams—and we don’t see them —it is intolerable.—E.C.” MR ASQUITH WRITES On November 4 I received the following letter from Mr Asquith:— “ Secret.” “ 10 Downing street, Whitehall, S.W., November 3, 1915. “ My dear Lloyd George, “ I want you to know before to-mor-row’e Cabinet that, in view of the conflicting opinions now to hand of Monro and the other generals in regard to the Dardanelles, I arranged to-day that K. should proceed without delay (tomorrow, Thursday night) to Alexandria, and after visiting Gallipoli and Salonika, and conferring with all our military and diplomatic experts in that quarter of the world, advise us as to our strategy in the Eastern theatre. “ In the meantime, I propose to take over the War Office, and I am confident that in the course of the next month I can put things on a better footing, and in particular, come to a complete understanding with you on all the important problems which are connected with the design, fabrication and supply of munitions. “We avoid by this method of procedure, the immediate supersession of K. as War Minister, while attaining the same result. And I suppose even B.L. (Bonar Law) would hardly object to such a plan. “Yours very sincerely, “ (sgd.) H. H. A. “ P.S.—This is for yourself alone; I have not said anything to any of our colleagues. But I regard it as of the first moment that in this matter you and I should act together.” DISASTER ON DISASTER The whole strategic possibilities of the war for the Allies were changed by the Serbian collapse. The General Staffs of France and Britain bad not won tbe war, but they had won their war. The Dardenelles had been evacuated; the Balkans had been transferred from Allied to enemy hands; the road to the Danube, to Constantinople, and the Black Sea had been finally blocked; Serbia had been wiped out; Russia was tottering to its fall; Rumania was isolated.

What consummate strategy! The Germans had not been beaten, but the politicians had been thwarted. The Capital Letters were triumphant. They sang their chortling Te Deums from Chantilly to Whitehall. The East, with its opportunities, which were also temptations, was no more. Hail to the blood-red sun of the West! It is true that forces which numerically appeared to be very powerful were sent to Salonika, and there was every appearance of a formidable army of British, French, Serbians, and Greeks, numbering in the aggregate hundreds of thousands, being assembled in that theatre. It was for all offensive purposes reduced to stagnation and impotence by an equipment so inadequate as to render this conglomerate army incapable of making any offensive attack upon the enemy. The General Staffs were determined that all temptation to action must be removed from generals performing in that theatre.

The Salonika army was left practically without any guns or ammunition which would have enabled it to bombard its way through the crudest defences in such a difficult terrain. They were camped on the malarial plains of the Struma and the Vardar for, two years, without being given the means of fighting their way to healthier ground. The British staff were in favour of the first course, and would have reduced this force to dimensions sufficient for the discharge of this role. The French staff hesitated between the two. The argument between them went on for months.