WAR MEMOIRS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22022, 3 August 1933, Page 10

WAR MEMOIRS

' BY MR LLOYD GEORGE

where to send troops The military experts were pressed for Information as to the date when they ■ would be in a position to spare troops V from France. There was a good deal of desultory and confusing talk as to what ought to be the destination of these troops, assuming they could be spared. Some suggested that they should be iespatched to the Dardanelles to reinforce the army in Gallipoli, in order to enable it to make another attack on the Turkish positions in that peninsula. The French were opposed to this plan unless at the same time an army was landed to occupy the Asiatic shore. They were strongly of opinion that the mere capture of Gallipoli, and the forcing of the Narrows would only entice the Allied fleets into a trap, which would be closed ; as soon as they entered the Marmora. The Allied fleets would there have no means of replenishing their fuel supply, and would soon be reduced to impotence. They-ought to have thought of that before agreeing to the Gallipoli Expedition. DIVIDED OPINIONS * Others, notably Mr Sonar Saw and Sir Edward Carson, were for landing the troops to Salonika and pushing along immediately to the help of Serbia. The Chief of the Staff objected that fhe

Salonica railway waa not equipped with

the necessary means of transport to en--1 able the Allies to carry any considerable body of troops, even as far as Uskub.

That revealed the fact that although the War Committee had decided in January last (1915) to take immediate steps to double the line where feasible, to construct sidings, and to Increase the rolling stock, nothing had been done to carry out that order.

I supported the view urged so strongly by Mr Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson. I supplemented this with a suggestion that we should immediately communicate with the Greeks and the ■Rumanians, pledging the Allies to send 250,000 troops without delay to Salonika, if they on their part were prepared to join in a combined effort to rescue Serbia.' . ■ '.- -tv--'HT-

Lord Gnrzon and others thought it was too late to send any support, and that we had better utilise our troops as reinforcements for the Gallipoli expeditionary force, with a view to making a fresh attack on the Turks. Others suggested

a landing at Alcxandretta, and others that we should despatch our forces to Egypt without prejudice to their ultimate destination or action, and fdr this purpose neither Alexandretta nor Salonika nor the Adriatic side of the Straits would be rujed out. ' *

A COUNCIL OF DESPAIR P g The conclusions of this distracted council were an embodiment of its

despair

“1. Immediate instructions to b e given for the despatch, so soon as the present operations are over, of an adequate substantial force from France to Egypt, without prejudice to its ultimate destination, transport for which is to be prepared by the Admiralty. “2. A specially selected general to. proceed without delay to the Near East, and to consider and report as to which particular sphere and with what particular objective we should direct our attention.

THE CRY FOR HELP SERBIA AND SALONIKA XV. The confusion arising from many counsellors is apparent in this article and Sir Edward Carson resigned from the Government. To-morrows instalment contains correspondence between the Prime Minister (Mr Asquith) and Mr Lloyd George concerning the future conduct of the war.

“8. The General Staff, War Office, to state in what way their views given in the Appreciation of October 9 would be - modified if both Greece and Rumania were to act with the Allies.” This conclusion meant the practical abandonment of Serbia to her doom. The combined armies of Gernjany, Austria, and Bulgaria had no difficulty in sweeping the depleted and ill-equipped army of Serbia out of the way, capturing the' Balkans and clearing the road to Constantinople. THE HOLD ON GALLIPOLI In the meantime it was decided to send General Monro to the Mediterranean, and on October 31 he recommended the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. At the first meeting of the new War'Committee on November 3, the decision was taken to eend Lord Kitchener to view the situation for himself. This decision was not dictated solely by military considerations. _ Lord Kitchener’s influence in the Cabinet was not what it had been in the first year of the war. The members of the

Cabinet were frankly intimidated by his presence, his repute, and his enormous influence amongst all classes of the people outside. A word from him was decisive, and no one dared to challenge it at a Cabinet meeting.

I think I may say I was the first to do so on munitions and on subsidiary questions like the Welsh Division and the appointment of Nonconformist chaplains. But my colleagues regarded my intervention on these questions with a certain amount of uneasiness approaching dismay. /

LORD KITCHENER’S AUTHORITY

, Gradually one mistake after another, committed by the military, for which he was held responsible as the supreme War Lord, lowered his prestige and weakened his influence; and a very general feeling that his usefulness had been exhausted subsequently found practical expression in the appointment of Sir William Robertson as Chief of the, Imperial General Staff, with exceptional powers all carved out of Lord Kitchener’s authority.

On this occasion there was a mute hope that once Lord Kitchener went to the Mediterranean, and especially if he returned to Egypt, the ‘sphere of his greatest triumphs, he might find it worth while to remain there to direct the great forces accumulated in the Western Mediterranean, in Egypt, Gallipoli, and either Salonica or Alexandretta.

When the appointment was made, a member of the Cabinet pushed a note to me on which was written: “Malbrbuck s’en va. t’en guerre?' But will he return?” 1

Greece was pressed to send troops to assist in saving Serbia, but the appeal to her came too late, because by that time the armies of the Central Powers and of Bulgaria had overwhelmed Serbian resistance, and the Greeks put in the plea that they were afraid of standing up against the victors when there were no Allied troops sight to assist them. SERBIA ABANDONED They had the fate of Serbia before their eyes. Serbia had been abandoned by the Allies in defiance of solemn pledges of timely support. The Greeks were naturally of a repetition of the same desertion in their own case. The Germans, already in the defiles of the Balkans, would soon be on their southern slopes. At that time there was nothing between them and the Greek frontier. Greece, with her small army, would be easily devoured by this terrible monster.

Sir Edward Carson, disgusted with what he conceived to be the deception practised upon Serbia, resigned. Mr Bonar Law and I shared his opinion about the whole transaction, but on the whole decided that we could not withdraw from the Ministry at this critical juncture.