“THE FIFTH ARMY”

Otago Daily Times, Issue 21627, 23 April 1932, Page 4

“THE FIFTH ARMY”

GENERAL GOUGH’S VINDICATION “The Fifth Army.” By General Sir Hubert Gough, G.C.M.G., K.C.8., K.C.V.O. With Frontispiece and Maps London: Hodder and Stoughton (£1 5s net) “ The Fifth Army ” is a book which is both inspiring and depressing. It is, above all, a book that had to be written. If it has not yet been generally admitted that a slur as cruel as it was unmerited was cast upon the command and men of “Gough’s Army,” that confession is overdue. Gough’s talents were recognised by Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig, and his 'wartime promotion was rapid In 1916 he became commander of the Reserve, later known as the Fifth Army, which, instead of being left stationary with responsibility for a fixed .sector of the front, was moved by the Commander-in-Chief from one part of the line to another to stiffen up the resistance or lend force to the attack in important movements. Continually increasing in size, it fought throughout the Somme until Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel were captured; it was sent north _ for Passchendaele and south to the Barisis front when the sector was handed over by the French in 1918.

Most interest attaches to the situation in which the Fifth Array was placed at the time of the German drive in March. 1918. Neville launched an offensive with disastrous results, and Maud-huy had admitted of his men, “If this attack fails they will never fight again.” Mutinies occurred in the French forces involving 200,000 men. An appeal to Haig resulted in the Fifth Array being sent to take over. The 30-mile front was poorly organised for, defence, and Haig was refused reinforcements, or even drafts to keep his units up to strength. General Gough proves that the Fifth Army was not surprised when the attack occurred on March 21. The intelligence staff had foretold the day and the hour, hut G.H.Q. ignored —or at any rate refused to act on—lns warnings. When the onslaught came, after a terrific short bombardment. Gough s twelve weak divisions were faced by forty-two German divisions. According to a plan prearranged with Haig he retired, gradually with the purpose of delaying and exhausting the attackers. The Fifth Army fell back fighting stubbornly. It was practically cut to pieces because help was too slow in coming. There was, General Gough states emphatically, no rout. Indeed, the Fifth Army fell back more slowly than the French on the right and the Third Army on the left. Haig, in the critical days, was the only member of G.H.Q. who cnme_ to see the position for himself, and bis comment was, “ Well. Hubert, one can’t fight without men.”

Enter Foch When Foch appeared, the crisis was actually past fie was, General Gough says, “ peremptory, rude, and excited. He began by firing a sides of questions: Why are you at your headquarters instead of in the firing line? Why could you not fight as we fought at Ypres in 1914? Why did the Array retire? And so on. He did not acknowledge the answers. Gough was at headquarters because he had been summoned to meet Foch, and the reply to the other questions is in the record of his men, thousands of whom had fought to the end, taking the toll of the German forces at close range which finally brought the'advance to a stop. General, Gough comments; — Even if my personal feelings are put aside,' it is unfortunate from all points of view when those in positions of authority are exposed to such treatment at the hands of other Nationals, for it reacts over a wide field, and its repercussions extend in ever-widening circles. 1 cannot think that in the settlement of the peace of Europe or in the Councils of the Nations in the ensuing years the voice of the British Empire was accorded the weight and respect which was due to its power and its conduct in the War, and the seeds of this regrettable state of affairs can well have been sown at this interview, to grow later on into a formidable plant. The orders Foch gave at this interview, “ There must be no more retreat, the line must now be held at all costs,” were, General Gough says, given without full knowledge of the facts and could not be carried out; What was left of the Fifth Army retired only a further five or six miles, and that principally in order to bring it to the same alignment as the Third Army. Meanwhile the French fell back ten or twelve miles and lost Montdidier and Moreuil before the battle closed. Foch, “ excitable and _ evidently apt to jump to conclusions,” did not inspire confidence: — Undoubtedly some authority was, called for at this moment to co-ordinate the operations of the French and British Armies and to prevent Retain from falling back on Paris in total disregard of his Allies. It is also true that oven in this moment of crisis, even, in the crise de nerfs from which the French were suffering, it is unlikely that they would ever have consented to a British generalissimo: the legend of the superiority of French leadership was naturally firmly established in France, and it found supporters even in England. Nevertheless, considering the ■ question from a purely military standpoint as it appeared even at that time, could Foch’s record as a commander be compared with Haig’s? If we go into these questions we find that Foch had suffered a continuous scries of reverses. . . . He had been removed from command after the Somme by his own Government; for more than a year he had not been actively employed, and had been merely criticising and advising. Pershing’s Tribute

When the retreat was practically over General Gough was suddenly'recalled and put on half pay. His urgent requests for an inquiry were ignored. The most satisfactory judgment be obtained was in a letter from Pershing some months later: “ These days are brighter and more promising, thank God, than those in March, when you were taking the brunt of the German attack. But how you made them pay for their success. They failed to get the decision they hoped for, and to the price the .Fifth Army exacted is largely due the opportunities we have seized.” Mr Lloyd George is severely criticised for the statement in which he implied that the Fifth Army had participated in, and been., mainly responsible for, a disaster. There was no disaster, not even a defeat, General Gough*says, arid the retreat was in fact a clearly-defined manceuvre foreseen months before it took place, sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief. carefully planned in detail. Mr Lloyd George should have known’the facts in April, but to this, day “he has done nothing to dispel the ignorant rumours which he initiated.”

“ The Fifth Army ” is an important contribution to ajstory which has still to be told in full. It is a straightforward, sometimes a dramatic narrative, which, though in the main concerned with military history, contains a strong personal element, and is brightened by descriptions of persons. J. M.