WESTERN SAMOA.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20991, 2 April 1930, Page 5

WESTERN SAMOA.

THE MAU ORGANISATION. LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE FIRMNESS. Written for the Otago Daily Times By Our Specixt, Correspondent. IV. Between March and November, 1929, the Man inarched in procession through Apia on ten different occasions, while almost daily small parties were about the streets. The purpose of most of the large parades appeared to be to “ show the flog and to prove that the Mau was not afraid of the powers of the Administration. Several of these marches occurred in the very early morning, residents of Apia awakening to the sound of songs and gibing cries about the police. Here also mhy be mentioned the number of occasions upon which the police were assaulted by the Mau men iu the performance of their duty. Between December, 1027, and December, 1929, prior to the riot of December 28 of that year, the police were assaulted or resisted on 21 ccasions. Among those who suffered injury were Inspector Braisby, Sergeant Fell, Lance-corporals Ricketts and Cahill, and Constables Eollis, Reid, Gray, Bell, and Peterson. Several members of the native constabularly wore injured, including native constable Lino, who was clubbed and tabbed, native constables Siiiaki, Naea, Fuamau, and Aputi, who lost an eye, yet it is affirmed that the Mau was an example of passive resistance. A number of the attaekf on native constables were entirely unprovoked. An episode which occurred at Tifitifi on November 23 of last year is typical of the experiences of the police force. A police party of four, commanded by Lance-cor-poral Ricketts, arrested a man on warrant. He was a heavy man, and when the handcuffs were placed upon his wrists he- struggled and cried for help. Large numbers of men responded. They carried knives and fish spears, but as . sual relied upon stones. Under a fusillade of missiles the police dragged their resisting captive along, -but there was no end to attack from the villages. Finally the lance-cor-poral fired his revolver and it is believed that two men were wounded in the leg. After covering a mile and a-half the police were utterly exhausted, and in the end were compelled to release their prisoner. As already indicated, the authorities were hopeful that the Mau would lose driving force and . die a natural death. The return of Faumuina and Tuimaleahxfono from New Zealand in November last supplied the needed stimulus. There was a great reception to these two chiefs, native festivities which extended over two days attracting Mau followers and interested outsiders to Vaimoao, among them being a number of the fellow-pas-sengers of the chiefs on the Tofua, who were made honoured guests and given a, wonderful exhibition of the .picturesque pageantry of the Samoans, The speech of Faumuina was fuel to the flame. He affirmed ■ that they had won the victory and tljat the mandate was to be taken fpom 'New Zealand and Quoted al* leged ‘ promises from Mr Holland, the leader of the Labour Party. It may seem incredible to New Zealanders that such a speech should have made a deep impression, but it was only typical of the class of propaganda which has arrived by every mail from .New-Zea-land. Much of this matter has been translated into the Samoan language and cir ; culated broadcast. It can hardly be imagined that the leader of the Labour Party would have committed himself to the degree indicated by Famnuina’s words, but the Samoan people are not yet competent to form judgments as to the value of such statements for themselves. Literalism is their limitation in religion and literalism “ goes ” in the case of propaganda. They .receive reports of waterfront meetings held in Auckland and they believe tliat the speeches there delivered represent the mind of a large section of the New Zealand people. They believe that a Samoan publication issued in New Zealand is read by everyone, and that, therefore, a great part of New Zealand is inclined to support them. It should be repeated that the chiefs are absolute rulers in the Mau, but one had opportunity of learning in some slight 1 degree the attitude of the common Samoan 1 •—the taulcalea. I asked a taxi, driver, whose English was better than the aver- ! age, what the Mau really wanted. He said, " The Government must be sent lawny.” “Why?” I asked. “Because,” I he replied, “the .Governor ordered 1 Tamasese to be shot.” He proceeded to say” that the Governor in some other j island. New Hebrides or Solomon, or i somewhere, bad killed thousands of me>. I This was his impression of Colonel Allen, the soldier. Thanks to the propagandists. I he believed him to be a killer, a wholesalo murderer. I asked who the Man wanted instead, of Mr Allen as Governor. He replied, “ Bring the High Chief from Britannia.” ' , no „ Now we-come to December 28, 11)29, when the police attempted to arrest a “wanted” man' in a Mau procession in \pia. There was resistance and bloodshed’ High Chief Tamasese being numbered with the killed. The story of that unfortunate episode has been told at the inquests and has been threshed out a thousand times privately, and no purpose can b 3 served by recounting it. Probably, the general opinion < 8 that on such an occasion the police should not have interfered —that the procession should have been allowed to_ march with the “ wanted ” men, thus doing no more than add one more defiant demonstration to the already long list. _ . But no matter what one’s opinion may bo as to the police action that led to resistance and precipitated bloodshed, there still remains one outstanding question which, does not seem to have occurred to ’ any person with whom _ 1 have discussed this matter; that is, when should force have been applied and 'what would have happened when it was applied? For over two years the Man had openly defied the law. The chief responsibility for that rests upon the New Zealand inspirers of the Mau and upon the New Zealand Government, which in February, 1928, made a demonstration of force by the two cruisers, but so tied the hands of the Administrator and the commodore commanding the ships that they possessed no discretionary jjpwer ns to the employment of force rhould it have been needed. It was needed when Ta.nia.sosc s men pievented his arrfst, but, as already stated, the natives called the bluff and laughed in derision. Thus, from lebruary, 1928, the Mau, interpreting tolerance for weakness, as they always do, believed that New Zealand was afraid to take forceful action against them. i firmly believe that when that procession marched into Apia on December 28 the Mau chiefs were convinced that once a°nin the Administration would weakly submit to tlicir defiance. And those mainly responsible for their attitude were those who forbade the employment of force when the cruisers were sent to Apia iu ID2B, those who permitted the subsequent two years of revolt and those wiio encouraged the Mau to persist. , , ! Evidently the time had come when the Administration had to uphold the law, and, if necessary, use lorcc, but whatever the occasion, there is little doubt tliat 11-iTC would lihvc been as much r( -Utancc. a ml perhaps it is just a- well that the clash took

place when cnly the Mau men were assembled. Tamasese, it is said, this shouting to his followers not to resist when •he was shot. But the long list of episodes of resistance over two years shows the Mau attitude of mind. The power of anv leader to pacify excited msn is always doubtful. There is usually only a split second. separating passive resistance from attack, and A believe that after the long reign of defiance a clash was inevitable before the Mau would begin to submit; and such a clash could hardly fail to have tragic results. It is remarkable that the casualties of December 28 were not greater under the circumstances. If there had not been a .man with the cool head of Sergeant Waterson behind the Lewis gun that sent a few bursts of fare over the heads of the people to intimidate them, there might have been carnage. I say so as one who has had experience of machine gun fire from Wh ends of the gun. It is argued that better staff \\ork on the part of the police might have secured the prisoners before the crowd was sufficiently aware of the fact to intervene. It also suggested that the police showed signs of “ nerves and that there was “ panic ” fire the staff work, possibly no outsider is competent to judge. As to "nerves and E panic” by the police, this kind of criticism as usual comes mainly from people without any experience .of-the reactions of the human mind to the stress of struggle in which firearms are used and who are unaware of the effect upon the individual when open fire ” sounds. If there were “ nerves it is only fair to remember that many members of the police had been knocked about by Man men on several occasions during the preceding two years, and that they had plenty of excuse for what in a front line is called “ jumpiness. I do not imagine that any body of British police was -ever placed under such a prolonged strain as were the Samoan police. For two years they had suffered insult and injury—and in a climate that is bad for European “ nerves.” There is no desire to defend the police from intelligent criticism, but all these influences should be taken into consideration by those who would sit in judgment upon them. It is regrettable in the extreme that bloodshed occurred. It is regrettable that the position was allowed to drift so long. It is regrettable that- the New Zealand public was not made fully aware of the growth of the revolt. The tragic sequel has engendered hate that will last for many years. It has enabled the Mau and its supporters to lay charges, and extravagant charges against the Administration and to relegate to oblivion the original grounds of the troubles and those were the ordinary political discontents. of European and lialf-caste trading interests which were inevitable under the unusual circumstances of a mandate rule.