BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20075, 16 April 1927, Page 24

BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

MR CHURCHILL’S WAR STORY. STRONG INDICTMENTS. REVIEW BY REAR-ADMIRAL HARPER. CFbom Odb Own Correspondent.) LONDON, March 9. Rear-Admiral J. E. T. Harper, who compiled the special report on the Battle of Jutland, contributes an article to the Morning Post reviewing and criticising Mr Churchill’s book on the Great War. “A life of varied experiences,” says Admiral Harper, “combined with brilliant intelligence which produces a sound critic of naval strategy and tactics, unless accompanied by at least some pratical experience in handling fleets. Mr Churchill lacks this experience. In ‘The World Crisis’ he assumes the role of an authority on naval strategy and tactics, and, in a plausible manner, offers to the public his opinions on these technical matters, and criticises the conduct of experienced flag officers as if ho himself were also an expert. The conduct of war at sea is a high and very technical business to which men devote their whole lives. OPEN TO RIDICULE. *’ ‘There was no victory for anyone.’ This statement is open tq argument, and a long article could be written on the subject. If we consider what is. in reality, the mast important factor; which belligerent feels that he is defeated and fears to risk another encounter, wo need have no hesitation in claiming a victory. The sequel to Jellicoe’s victory at Jutland was the surrender of the German Fleet in November, 1918. “Mr Churchill would have shown more dexterity if ho had limited himself to reviewing the general effects of our naval policy and of our naval engagements on the progress of the war; those are matters on which he should be competent to speak authoritatively. By constituting himself open to the ridicule of those who have studied them.” Admiral Harper maintains that Mr Churchill's account of the Battle of Jutland is written with a distinct bias against Admiral Jellicoe. “Nothing that Jellicoo did is right m the eyes of our gifted author, except, possibly, in one respect. He refers to the disastrous consequences to Britain and her Allies which would have followed from a decisive Britjsn defeat’ He admits that. for this reason, Jellicoo was not justified in taking unnecessary risks when bv a material defeat wo had all to lose, ’anil by a material victory, comparatively little to gain. In this connection he 6 ays- ‘Jollicoo was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’ It u xu d(^ls with the tactics of the battle that he gives his readers the imnression that, except for preventable mistakes on his own part, Jellicoo might have gone far towards ‘winning the war in an afternoon. He reminds us that: ‘A British Admirahssnno cannot he blamed for making those grave and solid reasons the basis of his thought and the foundation from which all his decisions should spring.’” A GROSS MISSTATEMENT. . “When referring to the delay in bringmg the h ifth Battle Squadron into action the author states: ‘At 2.32 the Lion, having already warned her consorts by signal °f her. intentions, turned about again. . . .’ “This,” writers Admiral Harper “i g a gross misstatement of fact which’ is unpardonable, unless it is duo to carelessness S which case it is highly reprehensible! Iho Lion did not warn her consorts—the I‘ifth Battle Squadron. Blame is attnbuted, by the author, to Admiral Evanihqmas for not bringing his squadron into action sooner. This is gross injustice. ’The fundamental cause of this delay was the disposition, previously ordered bv Beattv whereby the Fifth Battle Squadron was stationed m a position in which it would be almost certain to be loft out of the action if the enemy were met with then. The delay thus caused was augmented by the failure of the signal staff of the Lion to transmit the signal. BEATTY’S RESPONSIBILITY. “The responsibility for the reception of a Flag signal rests with the ship of origin The. responsibility for co-ordinating the movements of the Fifth Battle Squadron with thoso of tlie Battle Cruisers was Beatty’s alone, and it was he who was the cause of Admiral Evan-Thomas and his powerful squadron being kept out of action for ‘the most critical and most fatal hour.’ “Mr Churchill >ums up this episode with the mild criticism that it would ‘have been bettor if the original cruising formation of the battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron had been more compact.’ The conclusive evidence from our own ana German sources of the low standard of gunnery in our rattle cruisers, which inefficiency went some way towards accounting for the loss of the Queen Mary and Indefatigable, is ignored by the author. “Tlie gorn in this column is’ . . . the two hours’ fight between Beatty and Harper constitutes the prodigy of modern war at sea,’ A British force of four battleships and six battle cruisers, to say nothing of a preponderance of cruisers and destroyers, suffered material defeat at the hands of five enemy battle cruisers in the short space of 50 minutes. Comment is superfluous I “FOOLS RUSH IN—” “No criticism is levelled at Beatty for the woeful lack of information from him in the important hour before the battle fleets met, or for having lost touch with the enemy at *he critica' moment, or for having failed to send on his light force*, as Jellicoe attempted to do with his to obtain visual touch. “The deployment is treated as a geometric problem; the poor visibility heii ignored. The deployment as ordered by Jellicoe enabled all guns to bear, crossed the enemy’s ‘T ' and placed our fleet between the enemy and his base, but this enormous tactical and strategical advantage is ignored by the author, who, with his greater knowledge of tactics, advocates an involved method of forced deployment which no officer of experience would have attempted under the condition? then prevailing. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. The author does not mention that the German Official History gives good reason for its opinion that, of tl e many forms of deployment possible, ibe one selected by Jellicoe was the least acceptable to the enemy.”