NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19981, 24 December 1926, Page 12

NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

The introduction of legislative proposals providing for the strengthening of the American navy by the construction of ten cruisers of powerful type is in the nature of a blow to those who have been interesting themselves in the cause of disarmament. The appearance of the measure in Congress has been accompanied .by a good deal of comment of which the general purpose would appear to be to fasten on other Powers the onus of making it necessary for the United States to increase her fleet. The chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives has more than insinuated that other Powers have forced the United States into the position of having to be a participant in competitive armament building. He has made it known that it is his personal opinion that some Powers have brazenly violated the spirit of the Washington Treaty. He has neglected to identify the alleged offenders. It is easy to declare, as he has done, that the five-five-three ratio was understood by everybody concerned to apply to all classes of warships, but the statement is just as easily challenged. On the other hand, it was always apparent that the Washington Agreement was at best a very imperfect instrument for effecting the restriction of naval armaments. It abolished competition in capital-ship building by fixing a ratio for the ownership of such ships by Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. It restricted the dimensions and armament of cruisers, but not the number. Destroyers and submarines were not affected by its provisions, though, the tonnage and armament of aircraft carriers were limited. The Washington Treaty was hailed as a great accomplishment, and not without some reason. But the variation of the respective strengths of the Powers in fighting craft other than battleships has always been considerable. One Power possesses more cruisers perhaps than another, but has fewer destroyers. Another Power may be relatively weak in cruisers and destroyers, but very strong in submarines. Different Governments, of course, favour different naval policies. The Power that builds submarines gives an incentive to other Powers to build surface craft for protective purposes, while the naval programme of each Government is based on those considerations of security which appeal particularly to itself. If the authorities at Washington consider that the American navy is not up to her One Power standard they are justified, no doubt, in favouring a programme;of new construction. But, it is unbecoming in them to cast reflections upon the manner in which other Powers —Great Britain, presumably, among them—have honoured the spirit of the Washington Treaty.

No Power has approached the sacrifice made by Great Britain in naval strength in accordance with the terms of the treaty. At the present time the navy of the United States is weaker than that of Great Britain in light cruisers, but it boasts a very marked numerical superiority in destroyers and it possesses double the number of submarines. It is clearly impossible to assess in any exact and definite ratio the fighting value of naval forces the composition of which shows great variation. The effective value of craft of different type depends on circumstances. It has always been recognised- by the Admiralty at Whitehall that Great Britain’s paramount need is of cruisers for the protection of the Empire’s enormously extended lines of communication and trade routes. No other Power is in a like position to the British Empire in its need, in the interests of security, of an adequate cruiser patrol, and, had it net been necessary that considerations of economy should be closely studied, there would be more British cruisers afloat or under construction than there are at the present time. In view of the Empire’s obvious requirements Great Britain can ceftainly claim to have embarked on a very modest amount of new cruiser construction. A few months ago the Navy League published a useful comparison of the strengths of the British, American, and Japanese navies, which showed that, far from improving her position as regards cruisers, destroyers and submarines, Great Britain was not even holding her own. It was pointed out that she possessed fifteen more cruisers than the United States, many of them, however, being old and small, while the United States owned more destroyers than Great Britain and Japan put together, and also eleven more submarines than the total possessed by these two Powers. The conclusion was reached that “the figures show that, not only has our naval strength deteriorated numerically in the past year, as compared with the other principal naval Powers, but also that the situation will be worse at the end of the present year as regards the particular classes of vessels referred to above.” The reference contained in a message from New York to America “dropping to third or fourth among naval Powers,” is, of course, absurd. Viewed by her neighbours, America has very much the appearance of the strongest sea Power at the present time —at least on paper.